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Introduction 
Expressing a vote in any kind of democratic elections is an obvious indicator of political 
participation (Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and Russell, 2007). Voting is considered as “the most-all 
embracing form of political activity” and voter turnout as a “democratic health check” (Topf, 
1995, p. 27). Low electoral participation is often seen as a worrying sign for a democracy, 
mainly because it could imply a lack of civic-mindedness and adhesion to democratic norms 
and duties (Franklin, 2004). An opposite thesis, which goes back to the seminal work of 
Lipset (1960), states that high rates of abstention stand as indicators of a country’s political 
stability because they could be interpreted as a symptom of low conflict. Anyhow, abstention 
is perceived as a political problem when it suddenly and significantly increases (or decreases) 
after a period of relative stability (Caciagli and Scaramozzino, 1983). This is very much the 
situation that we are experiencing in Europe, both in old and new democracies.  
Electoral participation has been declining all over Europe in the last 30 years (Franklin, 
2004; Lutz and Marsh, 2007; Tuorto and Blais, 2014) but this trend has speeded up 
dramatically in the last 10 to 15 years, especially in second-order elections (e.g. European 
elections). In Italy, scholars generally agree that a turning point for electoral participation was 
reached in the 1979 election (Mannheimer and Sani, 2001; Tuorto, 2006), when an increase in 
the abstention rate was registered after three decades of high and stable levels of participation, 
and was confirmed in the following elections, especially in the last two decades, given the 
political earthquake of the 1990s. During that period, voter turnout in national general 
elections declined from 87% in 1992 to 75% in 2013, while the drop was even more dramatic 
in the European elections, from 73% in 1994 to 65% in 2009 up to a record low of 57% in 
2014. This trend can also be generalized to all kinds of political elections.
1
 
                                                          
1
 A noticeable exception is represented by the constitutional referendum held in December 2016, which 
registered the highest turnout in Italian constitutional referenda, equal to 65.5%. Nonetheless, only three 
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Nonetheless, seminal studies on political participation in Italy considered electoral 
participation as a useless measure to study political behaviour because of the compulsory 
voting system (Martinotti, 1966a; Capecchi, 1968).
2
 Regardless of the obligation to vote, 
which however does not lead to total compliance though it takes to a higher turnout rate 
(Jackman, 1987), until the 1970s, electoral participation in Italy did not represent a form of 
political activity that was interesting to analyse, since the percentage of non-voters was too 
low. On the contrary, in the same period, the study of political participation in the US was 
mainly focused on electoral participation, since back in the 1960s the percentage of non-
voters in US presidential elections was already about 40%. 
Nowadays, even within the Italian context, both the academic community and the public 
opinion acknowledge the crucial role of electoral participation within the framework of 
political participation. During electoral campaigns, politicians make efforts to take intended 
non-voters to the polls, and often attribute a negative electoral outcome to a failure in 
convincing a number of citizens to participate. Furthermore, when the news media provide 
information on the electoral results, the turnout rate is generally reported together with the 
vote shares for the main parties and candidates. With the substantial increase of the abstainers 
since the 1990s, scholars have also started to analyse their characteristics, by focusing in 
particular on the two categories of intermittent and chronical abstainers (Legnante and Segatti, 
2001; Tuorto, 2006). Notwithstanding, the individual-level analyses of turnout in recent 
Italian elections suffer from two considerable methodological issues. 
First, after the introduction of the privacy law in 2003, the access to individual voting 
records has become extremely complicated; therefore information on actual individual turnout 
is hardly available. Before the introduction of the law, several studies employed those official 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
constitutional referenda took place in the history of the Italian republic, and each referendum aimed at addressing 
different constitutional issues, thus comparison among turnout rates in those electoral races needs to be taken 
with caution.  
2
 In Italy, the law on compulsory voting was abolished in 1993. 
7 
 
data sources in order to analyse socio-demographic factors coming from administrative data 
as predictors of individual turnout (Legnante and Segatti, 2001; Mannheimer and Sani, 2001; 
Corbetta and Tuorto, 2004; Tuorto, 2006). The paradox deals with the fact that this precious 
tool for research has been made almost unavailable just when the study of abstention was 
becoming more substantially relevant. 
Second, self-reported measures of turnout in surveys are generally affected by a sizable 
overestimation of 10-15 percentage points. This represents a further issue in countries where 
the level of electoral participation is rather high (Karp and Brockington, 2005), like Italy. In 
such a situation, the scarce variability of the measure of self-reported turnout makes inference 
on the factors predicting turnout hard to draw.  
These issues have discouraged scholars from shedding more light on the individual-
level determinants of electoral participation in recent elections, with the exception of few 
studies concerning the effects of economic factors (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2014; Tuorto, 2014; 
Tuorto and Blais, 2014) and interpersonal networks (Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016). 
Nonetheless, although the individual data available on electoral participation suffer from the 
abovementioned shortcomings, more research is needed to better understand why people vote 
or do not vote in the various electoral races.  
With the awareness of the methodological limitations concerning the study of electoral 
participation, this thesis aims at giving some contributions on the role played by some extra-
individual factors of individual participation, with a focus on the Italian context. Since voters 
are not surrounded by a social vacuum where their choices only depend on their individual 
characteristics and the rational evaluation of costs and benefits, the study of their electoral 
participation has to move “beyond the worlds of individuals” (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, 
p. 23). Indeed, voters are exposed on the one hand to political messages delivered by political 
parties and candidates or other individuals, and on the other hand to social interactions within 
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their networks. In other words, they are exposed to mobilization and interpersonal influence, 
which can thus affect in a number of ways their decision to turn out.  
Citizens participate in elections, and more in general in politics, because they want, 
because they can, or because they are asked to (Brady, Scholzman, and Verba, 1995). 
Mobilization deals exactly with the third explanation, namely with the activities aimed at 
convincing an individual to vote for a specific candidate or party. Indeed, during electoral 
campaigns, political candidates and parties make an effort to persuade citizens to vote for 
them. In recent years, electoral campaigns have largely evolved towards a high level of 
professionalization, a differentiated use of media sources and an attention to specific target 
groups of voters (Farrell, 2002; Negrine et al., 2007). Political communication literature has 
devoted large attention to the transformation of electoral campaigns and the illustration of the 
features of recent electoral campaigns is widespread (Norris, 2000; Gibson and Rommele, 
2009). Nonetheless, in the light of the decreasing trend of turnout, the assessment of the 
impact of the recent campaigns on electoral participation deserves further investigation, 
especially in the European context. 
Moreover, electoral participation can be influenced by the informal networks citizens 
are embedded in. Therefore, by conversing with family members, friends, coworkers, and 
acquaintances, individuals expose one another to several pieces of information, which can 
condition the decision to participate or not. Various features of interpersonal influence can 
impact on participation, thus the scholars’ interest consists in discovering under which 
conditions individual are less prone to participate. Nonetheless, with the exception of a single 
contribution (Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016), the relation between interpersonal 
influence and turnout has been poorly studied in the Italian context. 
Are electoral campaigns mobilizing? And if so, to what extent? Does mobilization 
increase turnout? Which form of mobilization is the most effective? Does the network 
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political composition affect the electoral participation and how? By highlighting the salience 
of the concepts of mobilization and interpersonal influence within the framework of electoral 
politics, the aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to these general questions alongside 
more specific ones, analysing empirical evidence mainly but not exclusively concerning the 
Italian case. 
The goal is to give new empirical insight to some relevant research questions within the 
conceptual framework of mobilization, interpersonal influence, and turnout, which is 
presented in Chapter 1. The three empirical chapters (Chap. 2-4) are thought both as integral 
pieces of this thesis and as single contributions to the literature of mobilization, interpersonal 
communication and political participation. Although Chapter 1 addresses the theoretical 
foundations of the whole thesis, every empirical chapter addresses specific theoretical issues 
strictly related to the research questions that are there tested.  
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Chapter 1. Mobilization, interpersonal influence and electoral 
participation: A theoretical framework 
1.1. Main approaches to the study of electoral participation 
Although research on electoral participation has been addressed by multiple and diverse 
points of view, it has traditionally focused on two main approaches, the first one inspired by 
the rational choice theory, the second one framed in the socio-structural analysis of political 
behaviour. Both the theoretical frameworks have been largely employed, though they do not 
succeed in providing a complete explanation of voter turnout dynamics since they suffer from 
some shortcomings. This does not mean that they fail in providing any kind of explanation of 
electoral participation, but that they need to be taken with caution when referred to as 
unifying theories. Next subsections (1.1.1 - 1.1.2) aim at giving an overview of the two 
approaches. 
1.1.1 Rational choice approach 
The first approach is based on the Downsian spatial model (1957), according to which 
voting is a function of costs and benefits, thus citizens decide to vote only if the benefits are 
higher than the costs. This kind of approach studies voter turnout in terms of expected utilities 
that every individual maximizes. Benefits are the product of two components: the expected 
utilities coming from the choice of a specific party, coalition or candidate against other 
possible choices, intended as benefits in stricto sensu (B), multiplied by the utility derived 
from the ability to influence the final outcome, in other words, the probability of casting a 
decisive ballot (p). Costs (C) are intended as opportunity costs (Blais, 2000), which include 
the time required to go to the polls and mark a ballot, collect information on candidates and 
parties, and register to vote for the countries which need it as for example the US. Thus, the 
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original formalization of the rational-choice model is simply synthesized by the following 
formula: 
pB – C. 
According to this model, citizens go to the polls only when the difference is positive. 
Therefore, when individuals do not express any preference because the difference of expected 
utilities is null or their vote does not have any influence on the final outcome, it means that 
they are indifferent to the elections, so they do not vote. 
Rational choice model succeeds in identifying some of the factors that predict electoral 
participation. If we focus on the p term, for instance, we can understand why the population 
size and the closeness of an election are significant predictors of electoral participation (see 
Geys, 2006, for a meta-analysis on the determinants of voter turnout at the aggregate level); 
indeed, the larger (smaller) the population size (closeness of the electoral race), the lower 
(higher) the probability to cast a decisive ballot and the lower (higher) the likelihood for every 
individual to vote.  
The aim of this model is to provide a unifying theory of voter turnout, which considers 
the characteristics of the electoral context as opportunity costs to obtain information about the 
electoral race. These are usually lower in first-order than in second-order elections (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980), or, when close to an election, higher when the level of competition is higher. 
Although there are no reasons to discard the entire model, as it “provide(s) some helpful 
insights into why some people are more likely to vote than others and why turnout is higher 
and lower in certain places or times” (Blais, 2000, p. 15), it fails in giving a reasonable 
estimate of the turnout rate.  
Indeed, by taking into account the original formulation of the rational choice theory on 
voter turnout, it is easy to see how only a few people (if any) would take part in an election 
because the probability to cast a decisive vote is infinitesimal. This is clearly a paradox, that 
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was also defined as “the Achilles’ heel of rational choice theory in political science” (Aldrich, 
1997, p. 373), and goes against trivial empirical evidence. Downs himself realized the 
weakness of the model, but he did not manage to solve it. At a later stage, some 
reformulations of the original theory were suggested to overcome the problem. Riker and 
Ordershook (1968) introduced an additional component to the original function of voting, the 
D term, which stands for the sense of civic duty. Therefore, the revised formulation of the 
function of voting is expressed as follows: 
pB – C + D. 
Although this reformulation makes the theory more plausible and well addresses the 
paradox, it weakens some properties of the rational choice model. Indeed, since the D term is 
successful in overcoming the paradox, it means that it plays an important role in the model of 
electoral participation and, as a consequence, that rational choice theory fails in explaining 
why citizens vote (Aldrich, 1993). An alternative solution is proposed by Ferejohn and 
Fiorina (1974), who reject the Riker and Ordershook (1968) formulation, considered only 
functional to overcome the paradox, and proposed an alternative concept of rationality. 
According to them, the voting choice is made under uncertainty, because citizens are not able 
to estimate the probability of being decisive. Furthermore, rationality does not refer to as the 
maximization of the expected utility, but as the minimization of the maximum regret, thus 
citizens make the decision that minimizes their regret. However, even Ferejohn and Fiorina’s 
(1974) alternative conceptualization of rationality was highly criticized. Among the various 
criticisms, it can be simply underlined that it is rather doubtful that for every individual the 
stakes of an election are so high to provoke too much regret (Udehn, 1996).  
As highlighted, various reformulations have tried to make the Downsian theory more 
efficient, nonetheless the rational choice approach presents some clear shortcomings, as it 
completely neglects the social context (Franklin, 2004) and the non-rational reasons to vote 
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(Grofman, 1993). Therefore, as Rolfe (2012, p. 9) underlines, “it remains difficult to 
adequately model voter turnout starting with a Downsian logic of costs and benefits”, 
although some factors introduced in the model need to be framed in an ideal core model of 
voter turnout. 
1.1.2 Socio-structural approach 
An alternative to the Downsian paradigm is represented by the socio-structural approach 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Milbrath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1972), which argues that turnout 
is strongly dependent on the socio-economic status (the model is also defined as SES model). 
According to that model, high-status people (with high level of education, high occupational 
prestige and high wage) have a higher propensity to vote than low-status individuals; 
therefore core voters tend to participate in elections more frequently than peripheral ones. The 
SES model assigns a central role to education, which is “the key ingredient of any relationship 
between socioeconomic status and voting turnout’’(Lewis-Beck et al., 2008, p. 102). Indeed, 
literature largely agrees on the fact that education is one of the most powerful predictor of 
electoral participation (Milbrath, 1965; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Nie, Junn, and 
Sthelik-Barry, 1996). Nonetheless, also the socio-structural model of electoral participation 
fails in predicting the relationship between educational attainment and voter turnout at the 
aggregate level. Since education is placed at the beginning of the funnel of causality of voting 
(Campbell et al., 1960), the expectation is that a large increase of the general educational 
attainment, such as the one experienced in the Western countries during the last decades, 
would cause an increase of turnout. Instead, turnout has been decreasing over time. This is the 
paradox of the SES model, also referred to as a puzzle (Brody, 1978; Blais, Gidengil, and 
Nevitte, 2004; Burden, 2009). In order to solve the puzzle, Nie, Junn, and Sthelik-Barry 
(1996) suggest that the effect of educational attainments should not be intended as absolute 
but as relative to the average level of education of one’s social environment. Therefore, since 
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educational level is a proxy for the social status, when the average educational level increases 
in a social environment, individuals need to have higher skills in order to reach the top of the 
status hierarchy. The underlying idea is that education affects the individual’s social centrality 
in a network, which predicts electoral participation. Such a reformulation of the original SES 
model of electoral participation turnout helps to overcome the paradox, by highlighting the 
role of the social context in explaining turnout and its dynamics.  
Further scholars have tried to go beyond the standard SES model, in order to understand 
not only who is voting but also why do people vote.  The main contribution within this 
framework is given by Brady, Scholzman, and Verba (1995), who focus on the mechanism 
that links the socio-economic status to electoral participation. They outline the role that 
resources, namely time, money, and civic skills, the individual psychological involvement, 
and the recruitment networks can play in determining participation in politics. According to 
their theoretical framework, education has an indirect effect on turnout through those factors. 
The last explanation deals with the concept of mobilization, which will be discussed in depth 
as it represents a key-concept of the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
The revised version of the SES model outlines the social nature of the act of voting, by 
providing a more comprehensive explanation of electoral participation. However, it does not 
examine in depth the focal part the context plays, here examined through its various 
meanings. In particular, this approach often neglects the electoral context “as a source of 
instrumental motivation” (Franklin, 2002, p. 153) that characterizes every democratic 
election. Furthermore, SES models seem to underestimate the role of political factors 
(McClurg, 2004), namely the influence of political parties and candidates, in explaining 
electoral participation. 
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1.2 Electoral participation in context 
Despite a large number of scholars have studied electoral participation by endorsing 
more or less explicitly one of the approaches illustrated before, “almost everything of voter 
turnout is puzzling” (Franklin, 2004, p. XI). The models employed are so many that the 
current state of that strand of research is depicted as “the embarrassment of riches” (Smets 
and Van Ham, 2013, p. 356). This comes from the fact that the study of electoral participation 
should take into account a larger number of elements that account for the multi-faceted nature 
of the process. Moreover, electoral participation needs to be framed within context, which can 
be conceptualized at three different levels, characterized by growing degrees of specificity: 
the institutional context, the temporal or campaign context, and the social context (Franklin, 
2004).  
The institutional context includes every institutional feature that helps explaining the 
variations of the level of electoral participation within countries, and in some circumstances 
through time within the same country. Among the institutional factors that can affect electoral 
participation in every single country, a crucial role is played by the presence of compulsory 
voting (Powell, 1986; Jackman, 1987), still existing in some countries as Belgium and 
Australia, which by definition has a positive effect on voting. Other influencing institutional 
factors are represented by the registration laws, which are considered one of the causes of the 
low electoral participation in US (Powell, 1986), the electoral system, as turnout tends to be 
higher in proportional electoral systems (Blais and Dobrynska, 1998), and the voting age, 
since a lower voting age tends to correspond to a lower electoral participation (Blais and 
Dobrynska, 1998; Franklin, 2004).  
The temporal or campaign context refers to the context of every specific election. It 
involves the electoral competitiveness, the stake of the elections and the electoral campaign. 
This contextual level can be split into two different levels, which I refer to as the electoral 
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context and the campaign context, which are however strictly interrelated. The electoral 
context involves both the level of competition and the stakes of the election. Electoral 
competitiveness deals with the closeness of the race and is also a standing point in the rational 
choice theory. The electoral stakes depend on the perceived importance of the policy level. 
Therefore, in first-order national elections, people tend to vote more than in second-order 
elections, such as European and local elections, because in the former there is more at stake 
compared to the latter (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The campaign context instead specifically 
refers to the electoral campaign, which can influence electoral participation. Voters who are 
more exposed to the electoral campaign obtain more information on the election and are 
therefore more likely to participate (Franklin and Van Der Eijk, 1996; Lefevere and Van 
Aelst, 2014). Moreover, political parties, candidates, and groups can contact voters in a large 
variety of ways in order to encourage their participation and consequently producing 
mobilization efforts (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). The intensity of an electoral campaign is 
related both to the electoral competitiveness and to the electoral stakes, nonetheless the 
campaign context can exert an influence on turnout independently from the electoral context. 
Elections with similar levels of competitiveness and stakes could indeed be characterized by 
different levels of campaign intensity.  
Social context refers to the social groups in which every individual is embedded. 
Citizens are integrated within different types of social structures in which they interact. Thus, 
they can learn about politics by obtaining political information through their social contacts 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987) and, as a consequence, be more likely to vote (Schmitt-Beck 
and Mackenrodt, 2010). Moreover, we have to take into account the fact that social networks, 
along with the information exchange function, have also the role of affecting normatively the 
individual, by means of social rewards and punishments (Franklin, 2004). In other words, 
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people can be pushed to vote or to not vote by the individuals in their social surrounding, such 
as relatives, co-workers, and friends.  
The traditional approaches to the study of electoral participation allows us to consider 
several factors which should never be neglected, as they can give a more comprehensive 
framework of turnout once integrated with the notion of context and all of its dimensions. A 
recent meta-analysis on the determinants of micro-level turnout, which reviewed 90 top-
journal articles in the period 2000-2010, pointed out that the empirical studies on turnout 
often underspecify the models, both theoretically and empirically (Smets and Van Ham, 2013, 
p. 356). According to the authors, while the theoretical framework relative to the independent 
variable(s) of interest of the study is usually well-specified, low attention is generally devoted 
to the other factors that can have a substantial effect on electoral participation or confound the 
effect of the main independent variables. As they suggest, scholars should always add the core 
predictors as controls in their models, unless there are theoretical reasons to exclude them. 
By taking into account all of the competing factors which influence turnout, the present 
work focuses on the role of the campaign and the social context in explaining electoral 
participation. If the institutional context generally deals with the electoral rules of a country, 
and the electoral context with characteristics of a specific election, both campaign and social 
context refer to the environmental factors related to the individual’s exposure to information. 
Since individuals are exposed to a number of stimuli from the external environment, the study 
of participation has to move beyond an atomistic approach. The two notions of mobilization 
and interpersonal influence are well suited to address that issue. 
1.3 Mobilization and turnout  
Starting from the seminal Columbia studies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968), it has been generally acknowledged that the two 
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main functions of electoral campaigns consist in activating and reinforcing individual latent 
predispositions, while they are less effective in their ultimate goal, namely converting voters 
from a party to another. For that reason, scholars started to refer to campaign effects as 
minimal effects, whose nature was confirmed in several other studies (Finkel, 1993; Gelman 
and King, 1993). Therefore, as the main campaign effects are activation and reinforcement, 
campaigns mainly produce mobilization effects, namely an increase in the likelihood to turn 
out. Within the contextual theory of electoral participation, mobilization represents a 
characteristic of the campaign context. Nonetheless, the term ‘mobilization’ is often misused, 
thus the following lines will try to clarify its proper meaning.   
1.3.1 The concept of mobilization 
In common language, mobilization could be intended as the vote itself; citizens who 
mobilize themselves coincide with citizens who vote. Mobilization can be even seen as an 
inner characteristic of the individual, referred to as cognitive mobilization and defined as 
“one’s inner predisposition to attend to politics” (Inglehart and Rabier, 1979, p. 484). As 
outlined, mobilization can have at least two different meanings, which do not necessarily 
relate to the actual concept of mobilization. Indeed, mobilization represents a classical 
example of conceptual stretching, as it includes both the voluntary participation and the 
external forces that move the individuals to participate (Sartori 1970, 2011). The latter deals 
with what is defined by Sartori (2011, p. 223) as mobilization in strictu sensu. In other words, 
“[w]e can say that individuals participate, but we cannot say about the same individuals that 
they mobilize – they are mobilized3” (Sartori, 1970, pp. 1050-1051). Mobilization indeed 
requires the presence of external forces, as well as external actors, that push the individual to 
participate. 
                                                          
3
 Italic characters come from the original quotation. 
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Within the electoral framework, mobilization indeed consists in a process preceding the 
election that can influence citizens to participate. More precisely, it is defined as ”the process 
by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate” 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, p. 25). The seminal studies debating the relevance of 
mobilization in the explanation of turnout have tried to integrate it with the main traditional 
approaches to the study of electoral participation. On the one hand, moving away from the 
rational choice approach, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argued that benefits and costs are 
able to explain electoral participation only partially, thus mobilization helps in subsidizing the 
costs of turnout by providing information regarding the election. On the other hand, Brady, 
Scholzman, and Verba (1995) employ the notion of mobilization (citizens vote because they 
are asked to) in order to overcome the traditional socio-structural model, as highlighted in 
subsection 1.1.2. 
In their work on the decline of voter turnout in the US from the 1960s to the 1980s, 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) concluded that “Had candidates, parties, campaigns, interest 
groups, and social movements been as active in mobilizing voters in the 1980s as they were in 
the 1960s, even leaving the social structure and the condition of individual voters unchanged, 
reported voter participation would have fallen only 2.6 percent, rather than the 11.3 percent 
that it did” (p. 218). Although their analysis seems to overestimate the role of mobilization in 
the dynamics of electoral participation (Green and Schwam-Baird, 2016), it makes stressing 
its salience in the explanation of participation possible. The abovementioned meta-analysis on 
the determinants of micro-level turnout indeed argues that mobilization needs to be included 
in the core model of voter turnout (Smets and Van Ham, 2013).  
Nonetheless, mobilization is a broad concept, which needs to be specified in its several 
facets in order to assess under which circumstances it boosts turnout and to which extent. The 
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concept can be declined at least in two main dimensions: direct and indirect mobilization 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  
Direct mobilization, also defined as political mobilization (Inglehart and Rabier, 1979), 
deals with the “external factors, such as political parties or electoral campaigns, that can 
inform and motivate the individual to act politically” (Inglehart and Rabier, 1979, p. 484). 
Political candidates and parties are indeed incentivized to convince people to vote for them in 
order to fulfil a good electoral performance. Direct mobilization is achieved through the 
electoral campaign, which either encourages or discourages citizens to participate by exposing 
them to political information.  
Indirect mobilization, also defined as interpersonal mobilization, is strictly connected to 
direct mobilization. Indeed, political parties and candidates can get in touch directly with a 
limited number of people, and these people can then spread the messages they receive through 
interpersonal communication. Interpersonal mobilization is thus activated indirectly by direct 
mobilization through social networks (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).
4
 According to Rolfe’s 
(2012) social theory of political participation, in a hypothetical non-salient election, where no 
campaign activities are undertaken, the only citizens who vote would be the so called 
unconditional voters, the ones who vote independently from the process of mobilization. 
Moreover, this scenario would imply that the lack of direct mobilization resulted in the 
absence of interpersonal mobilization, given that interpersonal mobilization takes place 
within the social context, as Franklin’s (2004) framework suggests.5 Indeed, the identification 
of the two dimensions of mobilization allows us to detect how different contextual levels 
                                                          
4
 The logic of indirect mobilization is similar to the one of the ‘two-step flow of communication’ (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955). 
5
 Anyhow, some argue that interpersonal mobilization is not completely derivative from direct mobilization. 
According to this perspective, within a social network individuals who are not candidates or party members can 
persuade other individuals to turn out although none of them have been contacted by a candidate or a party 
(McClurg, 2004). In other words, contrasting with Rolfe’s (2012) theoretical model, even if no campaign 
activities are undertaken individuals can attempt to convince other individuals to vote through interpersonal 
conversation. 
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interrelate, in other words, how the campaign context activates the social context in order to 
amplify the effect of mobilization on turnout. 
When testing mobilization effects on turnout, a good part of the literature analyses the 
effect of the whole campaign on participation in elections as an exogenous factor. This 
approach allows for testing whether a campaign has been able to increase turnout and to 
which extent, however, it cannot disentangle the effect of the various mobilization strategies 
on turnout. Both direct and indirect mobilization represent two broad dimensions of the 
concept of mobilization and can be expressed into several forms. Mobilizing messages can 
indeed vary in terms of mode of delivery, content, timing and a number of other features.  
A recent strand of research, defined as Get Out The Vote (GOTV), has largely 
contributed to shed light on the nature of mobilization effects. By means of field experimental 
techniques, these studies analyse the effects of specific campaign messages that encourage 
people to vote on individual electoral participation, which are then measured through official 
voting records in an unbiased manner. Differently from the studies that consider electoral 
campaigns as black boxes that have an impact on various electoral outcomes, GOTV studies 
deal with specific mechanisms of the process of campaign mobilization. Moving from the 
seminal works of Gosnell (1927) and Eldersveld (1956), the first GOTV study was carried out 
in the context of New Haven mayor election (Gerber and Green, 2000), in an attempt to 
analyse the effects on voter turnout of non-partisan messages that encouraged people to vote. 
Gerber and Green’s work gave birth to an impressive strand of GOTV research carried out 
mainly in the US context (for a review Green and Gerber, 2008; Green, Aronow, and 
McGrath, 2013), which is also growing in Europe, especially in the UK (John and Brannan, 
2006, 2008; Fieldhouse et al., 2013) and in Denmark (Bhatti et al., 2015, 2017, 2018).   
GOTV studies, and further studies on mobilization effects, have mainly focused on the 
assessment of the impact on turnout of direct mobilization, since the measurement of indirect 
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mobilization is rather complicated (see subsection 1.3.5, which offers a review of the few 
studies on the interpersonal mobilization effect on turnout). Therefore, when overviewing the 
mobilization effects on turnout by examining various features of mobilization messages 
(subsections 1.3.2 – 1.3.3) and the interplay between mobilization and other factors in 
influencing turnout (subsection 1.3.4), I refer to direct mobilization.   
1.3.2 Forms of mobilization and turnout 
Political parties contact voters through several modes that can be classified according to 
different criteria. The most employed criterion depends on the presence of a physical person 
that delivers the mobilizing message; hence mobilization techniques can be both personal and 
impersonal. A classic example of personal mobilization is represented by face-to-face 
interaction with a candidate, a party member or a volunteer, generally measured in GOTV 
research by means of door-to-door canvassing.
6
 Impersonal mobilization is expressed through 
phone calls, direct mail, emails, text-messages, social networks, TV, radio and press 
advertisements and other mediated forms. Therefore, we refer to impersonal mobilization 
when the campaign message is delivered through every mean of communication.  
Two different mechanisms attempt to explain the differentiated effects of personal and 
impersonal mobilization on turnout. These mechanisms are respectively explained by the 
Social Occasion Theory or the Noticeable Reminder Theory (Dale and Strauss, 2009).
7
  
The Social Occasion Theory, largely employed within the GOTV research (Gerber and 
Green, 2000; Green and Gerber, 2008), argues that the necessary condition of mobilization is 
the social connection between the voter and the electoral process. The underlying idea is that 
“face-to-face interaction makes politics come to life and helps voters to establish a personal 
                                                          
6
 Sometimes literature defines personal mobilization in terms of direct contacts. Nonetheless, direct contact does 
not necessarily imply direct mobilization, as an individual could be personally contacted by another individual 
who has been contacted by a political party or candidate. For this reason, in the thesis I will always employ the 
expression personal mobilization instead of direct contacting, in order not to create confusion between direct 
mobilization and direct modes of contacting. 
7
 These two labels were first introduced in Dale and Strauss (2009). 
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connection with the electoral process” (Green and Gerber, 2008, p. 45), and it is therefore 
more successful in increasing the individual motivation to participate. Therefore, personal 
contacts are more likely to increase participation than impersonal ones, since they are more 
effective in getting voters involved in the electoral race. 
The Noticeable Reminder Theory states instead that the necessary condition for 
mobilization does not involve the social connection but a noticeable reminder that helps the 
individual remember to go to the polls. This theory first proposed by Dale and Strauss (2009), 
moves from the consideration that impersonal messages, which do not include any element of 
social connection, can increase the likelihood of turnout.
8
 Moreover, it is argued that the 
medium of delivery affects the noticeability of a reminder; therefore personal techniques are 
expected to be more effective than impersonal ones. 
Since Gerber and Green’s (2000) study, empirical evidence has corroborated both of the 
theories, by showing that personal mobilization is generally more effective than impersonal 
one. Nonetheless, even among the impersonal mobilization techniques, the presence of 
elements of personal mobilization can vary and therefore produce differentiated effects on 
turnout. In other words, although personal and impersonal mobilization are two separate 
dimensions, it could be argued that some impersonal mobilization techniques are more 
personal than others. For instance, if we look at phone calls, live calls where there is at least a 
minimal social interaction can be considered as more personal than pre-recorded ones. The 
forms of mobilization could thus be classified on a continuum where the two poles 
respectively represent the most personal and the most impersonal techniques. While the most 
personal technique is the face-to-face contact, which is defined the “gold-standard mode” 
(Aldrich et al., 2016, p. 167), the most impersonal ones deal with those mediated forms which 
do not include any element of personal connection. Accordingly, the main expectation of the 
                                                          
8
 Their argumentation, indeed, moves from the effectiveness of text messages. 
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Social Occasion Theory can be reformulated as follows: the more personal is the contact, the 
higher is the likelihood of increasing electoral participation. Indeed, even if the same 
impersonal medium of delivery is employed, more personal messages can increase the level 
of connection between the individual and the electoral process. 
Anyhow, every medium of delivery has a different impact on turnout.  
A meta-analysis of 71 door-to-door canvassing experiments, whose large majority was 
carried out in the US, reported a 2.5 percentage point average effect
9
 of personal contact on 
turnout (Green, Aronow, and McGrath, 2013). Focusing on the European context, where a 
smaller number of GOTV studies were carried out, the effect of personal mobilization on 
turnout proved to be lower than in the US; a meta-analysis examining 9 GOTV studies in 6 
European countries proved the average effect
10
 of door-to-door canvassing positive, but equal 
to 0.8 percentage points and significant only at the 90% level (Bhatti et al., 2017). Although 
further research is needed to compare the effects of personal mobilization on turnout between 
the American and the European context, the existent studies suggest that contextual 
characteristics could interact with personal mobilization. In particular, in European countries 
door-to-door canvassing is far less spread than in the US, thus people could perceive it as 
more invasive and be less prone to receive the mobilization message (Schmitt-Beck, 2016; 
Bhatti et al., 2016). Personal mobilization does not, however, deal with only door-to-door 
canvassing, but also with other forms, such as being approached by a party member at an 
electoral booth or being visited by a politician at the workplace or at the headquarters of an 
association. Those further forms of contact have not however been analysed by means of 
GOTV research. 
                                                          
9
 The effect was estimated in terms of Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE). It represents the average 
treatment effect estimated among the compliers, namely the individuals receiving the treatment when assigned to 
the treatment group and not receiving the treatment when assigned to the control group (Gerber and Green, 2012, 
p. 137). 
10
 CACE effect. 
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Looking at the impersonal mobilization, several studies have assessed the impact of the 
various mediated forms on turnout. However, they generally proved to be less effective than 
door-to-door canvassing. Regardless of the partisan or nonpartisan nature of the message, 
conventional direct mails result in a very small but positive effect on turnout, equal to 0.2 
percentage points measured on the results of 110 experiments
11
 (Green, Aronow, and 
McGrath, 2013). Similar findings also come from the European context, where the effect was 
proved to be a little higher (in the UK, Fieldhouse et al., 2013; in Denmark: Bhatti et al., 
2018). 
In contrast with Gerber and Green’s (2000) findings, even phone calls have produced a 
significant increase in turnout in a large number of studies (Green, Aronow, and McGrath, 
2013). If we consider phone-calls, while the most impersonal ones are the pre-recorded calls 
and their effect on turnout in 11 treatments is equal to 0.2 percentage points and not 
significant, live calls from commercial (25 treatments) and volunteers phone banks (37 
treatments) make the turnout increase of 1.0 and 1.9 percentage points respectively
12
 (Green, 
Aronow, and McGrath, 2013). According to the only two experiments carried out in Europe - 
at the best of my knowledge - coming from the UK, phone calls seem to be more effective 
than in the US, both when employing professional (John and Brannan, 2008) and volunteer 
phone banks (Fieldhouse et al., 2013). These preliminary findings suggest that in the 
European context individuals could be more open to these messages, since campaigns are not 
characterized by a massive use of phone calls as it happens in the US (John and Brannan, 
2008).  
Another form of impersonal mobilization is represented by text messages, which are 
well suited for large-scale campaigns, as they can reach a large number of people in only a 
few seconds. Few studies have assessed their impact on turnout, all of them reporting positive 
                                                          
11
 Since researchers do not know whether the individuals have actually been treated, namely whether they have 
received the mail, this effect is calculated in terms of intent to treat (ITT) and not in terms of CACE. 
12
 All the effects of phone calls are expressed in terms of CACE. 
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effects but different in size. In particular, the first experiment, carried out in the US, registered 
a sizeable effect of 3 percentage points (Dale and Strauss, 2009), comparable to personal 
mobilization effects. Another study reported a positive effect of 0.8-0.9 percentage points in 
the US context (Malhotra et al., 2011), while a recent study carried out in Denmark, the only 
one published concerning the European context, found a similar pooled effect of four different 
experiments, equal to 0.7 percentage points (Bhatti et al., 2017). However, as pointed out by 
Bhatti and colleagues (2017), those two studies seem to provide more plausible and externally 
valid findings, as in Dale and Strauss’s study (2009), had already established a connection 
with one of the partner organization of the experiment.
13
  
Furthermore, email messages share various features with text messages and especially 
the potential to contact a broad audience within a short period of time. Nonetheless, limited 
existing research shows mixed evidence on their impact of turnout, which has proved to be 
insignificant (Nickerson, 2007a) or small but positive (Malhotra, Michelson, and Valenzuela, 
2012).
14
 
Although previous research tends to confirm the higher efficacy of personal 
mobilization in boosting turnout, we need to take into account the costs of personal 
mobilization. While some impersonal mobilization techniques, such as text-messages and 
emails, require a minimum effort in terms of money and time, door-to-door canvassing is 
largely demanding. Moreover, “the more personal the interaction, the harder it is to reproduce 
on a large scale” (Green and Gerber, 2008, p. 10). Therefore, when evaluating the efficacy of 
personal and impersonal mobilization, both scholars and electoral campaigners should take 
into account the trade-off between the mobilization effect and the effort to undertake such 
activities. In this regards, a relevant contribution of GOTV research stands in providing the 
cost of every additional vote obtained through a mobilization campaign. 
                                                          
13
 They registered to vote with that organization and subscribed to an agreement concerning the reception of 
communications. 
14
 A broader overview on the effects of email messages on turnout is provided in Chapter 3. 
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As previously mentioned, the forms of mobilization can be categorized according to 
other criteria in relation to the medium of delivery. We thus refer to online mobilization when 
the message is delivered through the web, and to offline mobilization when it is delivered 
otherwise. Going back to personal and impersonal mobilization, while personal mobilization 
necessarily deals with offline mobilization, the modes of impersonal mobilization could be 
classified into online and offline mobilization depending on the medium of delivery. Moving 
from Aldrich and colleagues’ typology (2016), online mobilization is expressed by means of 
emails, social media, and websites.
15
 Despite the increasing potential and the resulting 
employment of online mobilization, previous research has showed mixed findings towards the 
effects of emails on turnout, as previously outlined. By employing observational data, Aldrich 
and colleagues (2016) did not find a significant measure effect on turnout of online 
mobilization in neither in the UK nor the US. In relation to social media, an impressive large-
scale experiment on 61 million Facebook users registered an increase of 0.4 percentage points 
in actual turnout in the 2010 US congressional election. The experiment was carried out on 
individuals who had received a Facebook message showing them information on the polling 
place and a list of 6 random Facebook friends who had already voted
16
 (Bond et al., 2012). 
However, messages containing only information on polling stations did not have any effect on 
turnout. 
An additional distinction is based on the campaigning style of a political party and, 
specifically, on the adoption of old or new mobilization techniques. For this purpose, a 
distinction between traditional campaigning, e-campaigning, and modern campaigning has 
been recently suggested (Fisher et al., 2016). While traditional campaigning is characterized 
                                                          
15
 According to that typology, text messages are included within online mobilization because of the purposes of 
their paper. They argue that text messages represent a hybrid form because, on the one hand they represent a 
form of phone contact, which deals with offline mobilization, but on the other hand they constitute a new form of 
communication similar to other forms of web contacting. Nonetheless, the latter argumentation does not seem to 
fit with the dimensions of online and offline mobilization, but with further dimensions of the concept of 
mobilization. Therefore, it seems more reasonable to treat text messages as a form of offline mobilization. 
16
 That strategy includes an element of interpersonal influence within an on-line mobilizing message. Section 1.4 
provides an overview of the relationship between interpersonal networks and electoral participation.  
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by face-to-face interactions and the use of leaflets and posters, modern campaigning involves 
phone calls and direct mail, (using computers only to organize contacts), and e-campaigning 
employs text-messages, emails, and social media. By employing constituency-level data 
coming from the UK 2010 election to test the impact of the different campaigning styles on 
turnout, Fisher and colleagues (2016) provided similar evidence to GOTV findings: 
traditional campaigning is the most effective, modern campaigning is also effective, while e-
campaigning proves not to increase turnout. 
In sum, an adequate conceptualization of mobilization that considers the various 
characteristics of the medium of delivery helps in shedding light on the different dimensions 
of mobilization and their impact on turnout. However, scholars need to be careful and 
measure these dimensions in a rightful manner, in order to avoid the overlapping of the 
dimensions themselves. 
1.3.3 Content, timing of mobilization, and turnout     
Political parties and candidates contact voters by means of various media, but the 
messages delivered differ in content and timing. Which phrasing is most effective in boosting 
turnout? And when should parties and candidates contact voters in order to maximize the 
mobilization effect on turnout? The Social Occasion Theory and the Noticeable Reminder 
Theory offer two different explanations. 
According to the Social Occasion Theory content does matter: the hypothesis is that 
messages with more personal contents produce higher effects on turnout, as they increase the 
level of social connection. On the contrary, the Noticeable Reminder Theory suggests that 
content should not matter, since mobilization messages simply have to remind voters to turn 
out, despite the phrasing of the message. 
Nonetheless, even among the impersonal mobilization techniques, the presence of 
elements of personal mobilization can vary and therefore determine differentiated effects on 
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turnout. In other words, although personal and impersonal mobilization represent two 
separate dimensions, it could be argued that some impersonal mobilization techniques are 
more personal than others.  
Several GOTV studies have been carried out to test these hypotheses, but the empirical 
evidence does not lead to a unique conclusion. Gerber and Green (2000) varied the content of 
the appeal of personal canvassing in terms of civic duty, neighbourhood solidarity
17
 and 
closeness of the election. Similarly, Dale and Strauss (2009) sent text messages appealing 
respectively to civic duty and closeness of the election. In the Danish context, Bhatti et al. 
(2017) compared the effects of text messages underlining respectively civic duty and political 
conflict
18
. Although the studies did not find significant and different effects of the diverse 
contents (Gerber and Green, 2000; Dale and Strauss, 2009; Bhatti et al., 2017), they provide 
some empirical evidence for the Noticeable Reminder hypothesis; however, they do not 
directly refer to the Social Occasion hypothesis, as the content of the message does change, 
but not in terms of personalization of the message. 
Nevertheless, content matters when it touches elements of social pressure, which proved 
to have a higher effect on turnout than other types of messages (Green, Aronow, and 
McGrath, 2013). For example, mobilizing direct mail that contains the turnout history of the 
household or the neighbourhood, and informs on the publicity of the individual turnout, was 
found to be more effective than direct mail simply appealing to civic duty (Gerber, Green, and 
Larimer, 2008). Nonetheless, sometimes such explicit social pressure might seem like a 
violation of the voter’s privacy and may produce backlash effects (Matland and Murray, 
2013). Other studies have tested the effects of direct mails containing implicit social pressure 
– e.g. showing a picture of human eyes – on turnout, but report mixed findings 
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 When appealing to neighborhood solidarity, the messages stressed the importance of reaching a high turnout in 
the neighborhood in order to make the neighborhood’s voice heard among the politicians. 
18
 Political conflict messages stated that politicians disagree on political matters, and thus invited to vote for the 
candidate with whom the voter agreed the most (Bhatti et al., 2017, p. 300) 
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(Panagopoulos, 2014; Matland and Murray, 2016). Given that social pressure messages are in 
general more effective than others in increasing the turnout, the Noticeable Reminder 
hypothesis, which states that the content does not matter, fails in predicting the effect of 
various contents on the turnout. On the other hand, the Social Occasion hypothesis does not 
mention social pressure, even though it argues that different contents can produce 
differentiated effects on turnout. The two above-mentioned theories are thus able to provide 
only a partial explanation of the relationship between mobilizing content and turnout. Instead, 
a more plausible explanation can be provided by the socio-psychological literature, according 
to which individuals are more likely to conform to normative instructions when exposed to 
social pressure (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008), such as the 
case in which their behaviour is publicized. 
If we consider the timing of the mobilization, the Social Occasion Theory hypothesizes 
that timing does not matter. Following this hypothesis, the social connection created by the 
mobilization efforts can take place in every circumstance of the electoral campaign, and 
produces similar positive effects on turnout. On the contrary, the timing of the message plays 
a key role within the framework of the Noticeable Reminder theory, as “the reminders must 
be close to the election to be relevant”(Dale and Strauss, 2009, p. 792). 
Looking at existent empirical evidence, previous GOTV experiments give some support 
to the Noticeable Reminder theory. Nickerson (2007b) empirically proved that phone calls are 
successful in increasing turnout only when made during the week before the election, while 
Murray and Matland (2014) found that in Wisconsin direct mails sent four days before the 
election had a 2.6 percentage points higher effect on turnout than direct mails sent eight days 
before the election. Nonetheless, a similar mailing experiment carried out in Texas did not 
register an effect of timing (Murray and Matland, 2014). Moreover, in Denmark Bhatti and 
colleagues (2017) provided only partial evidence of the stronger effect of text messages 
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delivered on the last days of the campaign compared to those delivered on the Election Day 
itself. In sum, there is partial evidence towards the Noticeable Reminder hypothesis on a 
timing effect on turnout; nonetheless, future research in other contexts is needed to provide a 
more robust assessment of that effect. 
1.3.4 Who is mobilized? For which type of election? 
Despite the modality of party contacting, mobilization effects on turnout can vary 
among types of voters, according to their latent propensity to turn out, which is thought as an 
enduring individual trait (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). The ultimate goal of an electoral 
campaign is to increase by means of mobilization efforts the individual propensity to turn out 
in that election. Individual turnout, in turn, is seen as a probabilistic function of that 
propensity. Although the baseline propensity is thought to be strictly dependent on a number 
of variables, above all we find the past voting behaviour (Niven, 2004). Indeed, while high-
propensity voters tend to turn out in every election, moderate-propensity voters are 
intermittent and tend to vote only in some elections, whereas low-propensity voters seldom go 
to the polls. High-propensity voters are also more likely to be contacted than low-propensity 
ones as they are more socially central and more involved in politics. As explained in the 
socio-structural theories of turnout (subsection 1.1.2), voters with a high propensity to turn 
out differ in the socio-demographics, on average, from voters with a low propensity to turn 
out, therefore mobilization can reduce or enlarge social disparities in participation. While a 
reduction of the participation gap fosters equality in participation (Enos, Fowler, and 
Vavreck, 2014), an increase of the gap has the negative consequence of exacerbating the 
political underrepresentation of more peripheral, disadvantaged citizens. Despite the 
likelihood of being contacted, previous literature argues that mobilization produces 
differentiated effects on turnout depending on the interplay between the individual propensity 
to turnout and the electoral context.   
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The theoretical foundations come from Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample model (1992). 
According to this framework, an individual attitude change on a political issue is considered 
as a function of campaign intensity
19
 and individual political awareness. When a message 
concerning a political issue is spread with low intensity, the highest proportion of attitude 
change is registered among the highly politically-aware voters, since they are supposed to be 
the only ones able to receive the message. On the contrary, when a message is spread with 
high intensity, the proportion of attitude change will be higher among less-aware individuals, 
who are more likely to change their mind when receiving a piece of information. This 
theoretical framework seems suitable also for the explanation of changes in turnout intentions, 
when considering an attitude change the shift from the intention not to vote to the intention to 
vote (and the consequent behaviour). The theory of contingent mobilization (Arceneaux and 
Nickerson, 2009) indeed argues, and empirically proves, that mobilization interacts with the 
individual propensity to turn out and the salience of the election in affecting turnout. More in 
detail, the theory assumes that a latent variable dealing with the individual decision to turn out 
in a particular election is equal to the sum of the individual latent propensity to turn out and 
the level of mobilization of the campaign. When the value of the latent variable exceeds a 
certain threshold, which is inversely proportional to the salience of an election (namely, the 
higher is the threshold, the lower is the salience of the election), the individual is expected to 
turn out; otherwise, she is expected not to vote. Model implications come to light by looking 
at the peaks of the three distributions in Figure 1.1. While in high-salience elections 
campaigns are able to increase the turnout mostly among voters with a low propensity to 
participate, in low-salience elections campaigns are most effective in increasing turnout 
among high-propensity voters, whereas in medium-salience elections the highest effect is 
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 According to Zaller’s (1992) framework, intensity itself could be intended as a function of media attention to a 
political news/issue (for instance, in terms of broadcast time in radio and TV or front-page space in newspapers). 
Campaign intensity is strictly related to the electoral context. 
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expected among moderate-propensity voters.
20
 In other words, in high-salience elections 
mobilization effects are supposed to be affected by a ceiling effect for high-propensity voters; 
the large majority of them intend to vote independently from the mobilization efforts, 
therefore whenever the effect of mobilization on turnout is detected, it is mainly registered 
among low-propensity voters. Instead, in low-salience elections mobilization efforts are less 
effective in convincing low-propensity voters to turn out, as their perceived stakes on 
electoral outcomes are considerably lower, and mobilization is less able to subsidize the 
higher cost of participation. Therefore, in this kind of election, there is more room to mobilize 
high-propensity voters, as they are, on average, less likely to turn out than in high-salience 
elections. 
Figure 1.1. Theory of contingent mobilization. Hypothesized effects of mobilization on turnout 
by individual propensity to turn out and salience of the election. 
 
Source: Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009, p. 4 
 
The theory of contingent mobilization was also applied to 24 GOTV face-to-face 
experiments (Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck, 2014), which provided further empirical evidence 
to explain the exacerbated participation gap in low-salience elections. Nonetheless, it was 
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 The theory of contingent mobilization has been mainly applied to the US context, where scholars distinguish 
among high, medium, and low salience elections because of the high number of elections and the large 
variability in turnout among the types of elections. According to this categorization, medium salience elections 
deal with the US mayoral and congressional elections (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). In the European 
context, where the variability is less pronounced, scholars tend to simply distinguish between first and second-
order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), which can be considered as equivalent of respectively high and low 
salience election (Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass, 2016). 
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found the mobilization effect to be higher among high-propensity than low-propensity voters 
even in high-salience elections, in contrast with Arceneaux and Nickerson’s (2009) theory. 
According to Enos and colleagues’ (2014) argument, high-propensity voters are always more 
responsive to mobilization than low-propensity ones, thus political parties need to concentrate 
their efforts on the latter category in order to avoid the increase of political inequalities. 
Further research could shed more light on the mobilization effect on the participation gap 
since by now GOTV research has mainly analysed the overall effect of the various 
mobilization techniques on turnout. 
1.3.5 The effects of interpersonal mobilization on turnout 
When the concept of mobilization was introduced, the idea that parties and candidates 
could get in touch with voters indirectly, thanks to the interpersonal communication, became 
an issue of interest. Parties have become more and more aware of the potential of the 
interpersonal mobilization, in particular since the diffusion of the social media (Grandi and 
Vaccari, 2013). They acknowledge that only a limited number of individuals can be directly 
contacted, but an efficient direct mobilization can have cascade effects on a larger number of 
voters. However, very few empirical studies have assessed both the magnitude of 
interpersonal mobilization and its effect on turnout. The measurement of interpersonal 
mobilization suffers indeed from several issues, in particular when observational data are 
employed. An accurate measurement requires indeed gathering information on both the 
individuals who have been contacted by parties and on the members of their social networks. 
Anyhow, these data sources are extremely rare. 
One of the most relevant empirical contributions comes from McClurg (2004) who used 
the South Bend data collected during the 1984 US presidential election (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1987). Those data represent a unique data source for the study of political networks 
thanks to the adoption of a snowball sampling, which allowed researchers to interview both 
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the sampled individual and their discussants. The analysis provides evidence toward the 
actual presence of interpersonal mobilization, which spreads mainly through what the author 
defines as ‘behavioral contagion’. On average, respondents contacted by a party proved to be 
15 percentage points more likely to persuade a discussant to vote than respondents who were 
not contacted.
21
 Furthermore, though the effect of interpersonal mobilization on turnout was 
not estimated, the discussants’ likelihood of working for the campaign and attending meetings 
seemed to increase when the party contacted the respondent directly. In particular, among 
politically interested discussants, the increase was of respectively 6 and 10 percentage points.  
When the effect of interpersonal mobilization is analysed through survey data, it could 
be confused with the effect of other external factors: indeed, other forms of campaign 
exposure are not necessarily measured in surveys but may affect the turnout of indirectly 
contacted individuals in a non-random manner. Furthermore, more than one member of the 
same network could be directly contacted, hence accurately disentangling the effect of direct 
and indirect mobilization becomes rather hard (Nickerson, 2008). However, these issues could 
be overcome by the adoption of an experimental design and thanks to randomization. 
However, such a design needs a high level of experimental control, since it has to guarantee 
that the treatment is only delivered to the subjects assigned to the treatment group and not to 
their social network peers excluded from the treatment group.  
A remarkable experimental design comes from Nickerson (2008). The experiment 
consisted in delivering door-to-door messages to households with two registered voters in 
which the cohabitant who opened the door received either a GOTV message or a recycling 
pitch. The effect of GOTV on the turnout of the message recipient proved to be equal to 9.8 
percentage points. More interestingly, the likelihood of turnout of the other member of the 
household registered a 6 percentage points increase when their cohabitant received the 
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 The frequency of political communication of the main discussants does not significantly vary with party 
contacting; therefore, little evidence was given towards what McClurg (2004) defines as ‘informational 
contagion’.  
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mobilizing message.
22
 It was estimated that the message recipient, when their turnout is 
affected by the mobilizing message, influenced the electoral participation of the other 
household member in about 60% of the cases. That outstanding experiment succeeds in 
empirically studying the whole process of mobilization, and leads to the substantive 
conclusion that voting can be contagious to a sizeable extent. Nonetheless, the complexity of 
carrying out such experiments with an adequate level of internal validity has reflected in the 
paucity of empirical research (among the few exceptions, see Sinclair, McConnell, and Green, 
2012). 
Moreover, the same categorization associated with the concept of direct mobilization 
can be applied to the concept of indirect mobilization. Regardless the way in which indirect 
mobilization is referred to (namely, whether it is totally derivative from direct mobilization or 
it also includes individual attempts to persuasion independently from the campaign-stimulated 
process), forms of indirect mobilization could be classified in online and offline (Aldrich et 
al., 2016). For instance, when an individual attempts to persuade other individuals to vote 
through emails and/or social media, or when she shares with them campaign messages 
coming from candidates and parties, we can refer to it as indirect online mobilization. 
Conversely, when they try to convince people to vote through face-to-face conversations, 
calls, and text messages, we are dealing with indirect offline mobilization. Similarly to direct 
mobilization effects, in a study on the UK and the US Aldrich et al. (2016) found the indirect 
offline contacts are associated to a higher turnout, while the same does not apply from indirect 
online contacts. As well, we can apply to indirect mobilization even the distinction between 
personal and impersonal forms, and furthermore in terms of the continuum from the most 
personal to the most impersonal forms where the most personal one is represented by face-to-
face contacts. On the contrary, when considering emails as an example of impersonal 
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 This effect is referred to as spillover effect (Sinclair, McConnell, and Green, 2012). 
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mobilization, the most impersonal form could consist of an email where an individual only 
shares with another individual a campaign message. Instead, an email where an individual 
writes a text for convincing another to vote should be considered as less impersonal. 
Analogously, such an example could be applied to the other impersonal forms. 
1.4 The social logic of participation 
As previously argued, the decision to turnout is conditional to a wide array of factors, 
most of which do not pertain to individual characteristics. According to Franklin’s (2004) 
contextual theory of turnout, a key role in the explanation of electoral participation is played 
by the social context the individual is embedded in. If we consider the impact the social 
context has on participation, we cannot ignore the role of the interpersonal networks where 
individuals interact.  
Within the study of voting behaviour, the salience of social circles in shaping individual 
political preferences has been addressed since the seminal Columbia school studies (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968). After a long 
predominance of atomistic approaches to the study of political behaviour and therefore of 
electoral participation, the largely neglected network-cantered approach has emerged as a 
renewed scholars’ interest in the last three decades within the framework of the social logic of 
politics (Zuckerman, 2005; see also Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987, 1995; Mutz, 2002; 
McClurg 2006).  
If we go back to the process of indirect mobilization, it is argued whether interpersonal 
networks can amplify mobilization messages to a larger audience (subsection 1.3.4). 
However, social networks can influence the decision to turn out independently from indirect 
mobilization (McClurg, 2004). When dealing with the effect of interpersonal influence on 
political participation, by paraphrasing Zuckerman’s (2005) formula, we can refer to it as 
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social logic of participation. There are various ways in which interpersonal networks exert an 
influence on turnout, depending on the network members’ turnout, on the frequency and 
quality of political conversations, and on the political views of the network members.  
According to the social theory of political participation (Rolfe, 2012), voter turnout 
should be thought as a conditional choice. This means that “turnout decision is best 
represented as a conditional cooperative response to cooperative decisions made by friends, 
family, neighbors, and coworkers[…]. Sometimes a handful of people are willing to cooperate 
if enough other people will do the same, whereas some people will not cooperate under any 
circumstances” (Rolfe, 2012, p. 4). Therefore, despite interpersonal mobilization, turnout can 
be contagious. Being part of a network in which most of the associates go to the polls, makes 
the individual’s likelihood to turn out increase, especially when it occurs in the family 
network (Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010). Although individuals are hardly aware of the 
definitive turnout behaviour of their associates, interpersonal networks can indeed transmit 
normative views towards participation by means of social interactions (Leighley 1990), which 
can condition the final decision to turn out. Indeed, it seems that when individuals perceive 
normative views toward electoral participation among their family members, they are more 
likely to turn out (Schmitt-Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010). 
Moreover, social networks can influence electoral participation through the exchange of 
information (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). Citizens are embedded in networks in which they 
hold conversations concerning several topics, including political issues. Therefore, the 
mechanism would be that individuals share political information by conversing with other 
individuals (McClurg, 2003). According to this mechanism, when individuals talk about 
politics they gain information on the candidates, the party positions, and more in general on 
the electoral process. Therefore, they get more politically involved, and it works as a driver to 
their turnout. The function of the social networks is thus to “accrue resources that lower the 
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barriers to political participation” (McClurg 2003, p. 450). The frequency of political 
discussion within the network has indeed proved to be positively related to voter turnout 
(McClurg 2003; Klofstad 2007, 2015). Furthermore, the quality of those conversations can 
have a crucial impact on voters’ participation as well. The key element that increases the 
quality of a political conversation within the social network is the level of political expertise 
of its members. As argued in McClurg (2006), discussing politics with politically expert 
associates helps in getting clearer information, and consequently in being more confident on 
personal political views. This “establishes a more secure attitudinal foundation for 
involvement” (McClurg, 2006, p. 740), also reflecting in a higher propensity to turn out. 
Another feature of social networks that can influence individuals’ electoral participation 
is their political composition. Individuals are embedded in networks where components hold 
similar or mixed political views, and these political views can correspond or differ from the 
ones of the individuals themselves. In other words, voters can experience disagreement, 
namely the “interaction among citizens who hold divergent viewpoints and perspectives 
regarding politics” (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004, pp. 3-4). Nonetheless, the 
empirical assessment of the effect of networks’ disagreement on turnout has provided mixed 
evidence. Several works (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968; Mutz, 2002) have 
stressed a negative relation between disagreement and electoral participation. According to 
these studies, people exposed to high levels of disagreement are more likely to remain 
undecided until the election day, or are less motivated to participate so as to preserve the 
harmony of their network and avoid arguments. However, a recent line of research has 
introduced a different perspective by showing that disagreement does not always depress 
turnout. Some forms of disagreement - a situation in which some discussants agree and some 
others do not - can indeed increase it. According to this view, a diverse network enhances a 
more passionate partisanship attitude and commitment (Eveland and Hively, 2009; Nir, 2011; 
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Bello, 2012; Lupton and Thornton, 2017), which leads eventually to a much more vivid 
political debate and a higher propensity for individuals to turn out.
23
 
Finally, intimacy has proved to be crucial in shaping the way people are affected by 
their social network (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Erisen and Erisen, 2012; Bello and Rolfe, 
2014). Since more intimate relationships are thought to exert a higher normative pressure 
(Faas and Schmitt-Beck, 2010; Partheymuller and Schmitt-Beck, 2012), they are generally 
expected to have a stronger influence on electoral participation. Indeed, if we take into 
consideration all the above-mentioned network characteristics aimed at influencing the 
turnout, it seems that while normative positions toward participation among friends do not 
affect the individual turnout, they do among family, as reported before (Schmitt-Beck and 
Mackenrodt, 2010). Similarly, the positive effect of the frequency of political conversation on 
participation in electoral activities proves to be larger when the main discussant is the spouse 
or another family member other than a friend (McClurg, 2003). Nonetheless, scant evidence 
on the role of intimacy regarding the relationship between disagreement and turnout has been 
provided up to now, although it could be crucial for a better understanding of the social logic 
of participation. Indeed, the higher coercion that characterizes more intimate relationships 
makes disagreement more difficult to be sustained, On the contrary, a social circle 
characterized by less intimate relationships can render disagreement more bearable, and thus 
leading to a more intense exchange of ideas. As a consequence, the differentiated experience 
of disagreement in a social network can be reflected in a different relationship between 
disagreement and turnout. Depending on the level of intimacy with discussants, the 
mechanisms explaining the effects of disagreement on turnout could be different. Mechanisms 
are explained in detail in Chapter 4 
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1.5 The contribution of the dissertation 
Moving from the theoretical framework here presented, the empirical chapters aims at 
investigating the role played by mobilization and interpersonal influence in affecting electoral 
participation. Nonetheless, these chapters will not cover all the features of mobilization and 
interpersonal influence, and their effects on turnout. Instead, they are thought to provide 
empirical evidence to some theoretically relevant research questions within this framework, 
which have been little investigated so far. 
Most of the existent research on mobilization, interpersonal influence, and turnout has 
been carried out in the US, which however represents “an outlier with respect to important 
aspects of political behaviour and the political system” (Hopmann, 2012, p. 266) compared to 
European countries. Some of those aspects can have an impact on the nature of mobilization 
and interpersonal influence, and accordingly, on their relationship with electoral participation. 
First, the difference in the voting system between the US (majoritarian) and most of the 
European countries (proportional representation)
24
 can affect the forms of mobilization; 
majoritarian systems are more candidate-centered, therefore the forms of mobilization are 
more focused on the candidate, while in proportional representation systems they are more 
focused on the party (Bhatti et al., 2016). Furthermore, party contacts have proved to be less 
frequent in proportional representation systems (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2008), and the 
level of professionalization of campaigns is far lower in the European than in the US (Aldrich 
et al., 2016, see Section 2.1). Second, the impact of interpersonal influence can vary from a 
two-party system (like the US) to a multi-party system (like European countries). Differently 
from contexts with a two-party system, in contexts characterized by a multi-party system the 
experience of the same amount of political disagreement in a social network can have indeed 
several meanings. Namely, when one individual is embedded in a network where the 
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 This consideration applies for most of the European countries, but not for their totality (e.g. France and the 
UK, which the voting system is majoritarian). 
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members support a different party from the one supported by the individual, they could all 
support a single party or alternatively two or more parties. Therefore, in multi-party systems, 
the various experience of the same amount of disagreement could produce differentiated 
effects on turnout, while the same cannot be extended to two-party systems. Moreover, levels 
of disagreement prove to be higher in multi-party systems (Smith, 2015).   
Empirical evidence shown in this thesis is mainly referred to the Italian context, which 
shares with the other European countries most of the abovementioned characteristics (the 
same applies for the Austrian context, which represents the case study of Chapter 2 together 
to the Italian one). Therefore, findings are meant to give some insights into the role of 
mobilization and interpersonal networks in influencing electoral participation in Western 
European countries characterized by multi-party systems and a proportional representation 
voting systems. Nevertheless, since the thesis does not adopt a fully comparative design, 
future research is needed to test whether the results here provided could be actually 
generalized to the other European countries. 
Next paragraphs briefly illustrate every empirical chapter, by highlighting their potential 
contribution to the existent literature.  
By focusing on the Austrian and the Italian case, where the 2013 National Elections 
registered the lowest turnout record, Chapter 2 will try to disentangle the effects of 
mobilization on participation by integrating two empirical strategies. First, it explores the 
dynamics of campaign effects on measures of latent participation in the two countries. This 
first set of analysis allows testing whether electoral campaigns are successful in increasing the 
political predispositions in contexts characterized by a long decline in electoral participation. 
It thus contributes in understanding at a first glance whether mobilization has to be thought as 
a crucial factor in the negative trend of turnout. Second, it analyses the effect on self-reported 
turnout of various forms of party contacting, both personal and impersonal, as measures of 
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direct mobilization. Since the study of the different forms of party-contacting and their effects 
has remained somehow underdeveloped in the Western European countries, this chapter will 
thus help in understanding which mobilization strategies are more successful. Because of data 
availability, this section only focuses on the Austrian case, which shares several features with 
the Italian one, especially concerning electoral participation. Data come from the Austrian 
National Election Study (Autnes) and Italian National Election Study (Itanes) Rolling Cross-
Section Panel 2013. These data sources make it possible to analyse the campaign effects 
dynamically through LOWESS estimations of the daily means of measures of latent 
participation. At the same time, they allow us to take under control the propensity to turn out 
before the elections whilst studying the effects of party contacting on self-reported turnout (by 
means of logistic regression models). 
Chapter 3 still analyses the relation between direct mobilization and turnout, especially 
focusing on the effect of online mobilization, in terms of email messages. Since in the 
European context no empirical assessment of the impact of e-mail campaigning on turnout 
has been provided yet, this chapter aims at filling this gap by adopting an original research 
design. It employs field experimental data coming from a Get Out The Vote (GOTV) 
campaign carried out in the context of the elections for the students’ representatives of the 
University of Trento. The experiment tests whether a non-partisan email message sent before 
the election inviting to vote increases the individual probability to turn out. The population 
was randomized in four groups: three of them received an official email from the 
communication office of the university encouraging them to participate in the election 
(treatment groups), while the fourth group received no messages (control group). Each treated 
group received a message with different content randomly sent either one or five days before 
the election. This chapter aims at integrating the findings of the second chapter by employing 
a methodology that guarantees a higher internal validity, and by testing the effect of online 
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mobilization, which could not be tested in the previous chapter. The chapter also explores the 
determinants of participation in university elections, which have been scarcely investigated 
before. 
While the second and the third chapter could be considered as complementary and aim 
at giving a broader assessment of mobilization - especially direct mobilization - on turnout, 
the Chapter 4 deals instead with the role played by interpersonal networks in influencing 
turnout. This chapter analyses the relationship between the level of disagreement an 
individual perceives in her social circles and turnout. In particular, the chapter aims at 
providing some new theoretical insights into the explanation of this relationship. Since 
individuals are embedded in various social circles, which are characterized by different levels 
of cohesiveness, the main aim of the chapter is to provide an empirical answer to the 
following research question: Does cohesiveness matter in explaining the relationship between 
disagreement and turnout? By separately studying the effects of disagreement in family and 
friends’ networks and employing 2013 Itanes Rolling-Cross Section data, the shape of the 
relation is analysed. The chapter thus argues that the insights of previous studies are the result 
of two differentiated effects that depend on the level of cohesiveness of the social circle to 
which one is exposed (high among relatives, low among friends). 
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Chapter 2. Campaign dynamic effects on participation in Austrian and 
Italian 2013 General Elections: A focus on direct mobilization  
2.1 Introduction 
Starting from Rosenstone and Hansen’s work (1993) on mobilization and participation 
in the US, scholars largely acknowledge the key role of extra-individual mobilization factors 
in explaining electoral participation. In order to break down the broad concept of 
mobilization, two main dimensions have been identified: direct mobilization and indirect 
mobilization. Moving from this conceptualization, this chapter mainly focuses on the first 
dimension and its effects on electoral participation. The study of the effects of the several 
forms of direct mobilization deserves a further investigation especially in the European 
context, since most of the previous research was carried out in the US. Moreover, in recent 
years electoral campaigns have been gradually changing their nature, as well as the contexts 
in which they take place.   
On the one hand, the level of professionalization of campaigns has become increasingly 
higher, aiming at targeting specific groups of voters through a broader employment of digital 
techniques and professional figures (Farrell 1996, 2002; Negrine et al., 2007). On the other 
hand, Western countries have gradually transformed into a high media choice environment 
(Prior, 2007), where citizens are potentially exposed to a far larger number of media sources 
than in the past. With the expansion of the media supply and by personalizing their media 
consumption, citizens can now decide where, when and how to obtain political information, 
but at the same time they can also avoid political information or undesired messages 
(Stromback, 2017). In such a framework, it could be hypothetically expected that only 
politically involved citizens would be exposed to the electoral campaign while low involved 
ones would not. Therefore, campaign effects on participation should not be taken for granted 
as a conventional wisdom (Stromback, 2017), but need to be further assessed.  
46 
 
Furthermore, in recent years various European countries have experienced a significant 
decrease in voter turnout, reaching the lowest record in the last National elections. This is the 
case experienced by Austria and Italy, two countries that show very similar levels and trends 
of voter turnout. Scholars have identified various concurring factors as responsible for that 
decline, such as the dissatisfaction with politics, the economic crisis and the generational 
replacement (Kritzinger, Muller, and Schönbach, 2014; Tuorto, 2014), but little attention has 
been devoted to the role played by campaign mobilization.  
This chapter thus aims at investigating whether electoral campaigns and, eventually, 
which forms of direct mobilization enhance electoral participation, and to which extent in 
such contexts. The choice of providing analyses on a different country from Italy mostly 
depends on the lack of adequate Italian data to analyse the effect of the various forms of 
mobilization. Austria is selected as a case study since it shares several characteristics with the 
Italian context, as later argued. In order to give a broad overview of the effects of campaign 
mobilization on electoral participation, two different strategies for the operationalization and 
the assessment of the relation between mobilization and participation will be employed.  
First, we will examine the dynamic effect on some measures of latent participation of 
campaign mobilization, which is measured in terms of days of campaign. This first empirical 
section is mainly exploratory and analyses at the aggregate level the trend of some measures 
of latent participation during the time-span of the electoral campaign by employing Austrian 
National Election Study (Autnes) and Italian National Election Study (Itanes) 2013 Rolling 
Cross-Section data.  
Second, in order to enter the black box of campaign effects, the effects on individual 
self-reported turnout of the different forms of party contacting, intended as measures of direct 
mobilization, will be examined by comparing the effects of personal and impersonal forms. 
Finally, whether mobilization effects vary according to the propensity to turn out before the 
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elections will be tested. These analyses will be performed on the panel component of Rolling 
Cross-Section Autnes 2013 data that integrates the pre-electoral survey with a post-electoral 
one. The panel structure of the data consents to detect the effects of the forms of party contact 
net of the propensity to turn out before the elections. Because of data availability, the same 
analyses cannot be carried out on Itanes data.  
2.2 Campaigns dynamic effects on latent participation 
Since electoral campaigns are basically “the period right before citizens make a real 
choice” (Brady, Johnson, and Sides, 2006, p. 2), it seems straightforward to assume that 
during that period the primary goal of parties and candidates is to convince citizens to vote for 
them. As argued in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), campaign efforts are more successful in 
increasing individual predispositions to participate in elections rather then moving voting 
intentions from a party to another. Some scholars even found out that campaigns can depress 
turnout when they are characterized by a negative tonality (Ansolabehere et al., 1994), but this 
demobilizing effect was not proved in most of the studies (Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner, 2007). 
Although for a long time the debate on campaign mobilization effects focused on the very 
common and general question “Do campaigns matter?” (Holbrook, 1996), empirical research 
has recently started to go beyond this question by investigating how campaign dynamics 
shape mobilization effects. 
Campaigns are indeed dynamic processes, but the assessment of their impact usually 
deals with the analysis of two points in time, namely before and after the elections. In the 
framework of mobilization effects, pre-post electoral panel analysis could thus be integrated 
with dynamic analyses concerning the evolution of the campaigns. Following this hint, as 
suggested by Bartels (2006, p. 134) “time must enter the analysis either directly or indirectly 
(as a proxy for campaign activities or events)”. In particular, the days of the campaign should 
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coincide with the units of time in the analyses, as the aim is to catch the daily variations in the 
outcomes of interest. In order to detect the dynamic effects of the campaign in the 
mobilization perspective, we need to take into account some measures that do not directly 
involve electoral participation itself, which is measured after the campaign. The notion of 
latent participation seems well suited to study the campaign dynamic effects of mobilization. 
According to the conceptualization by Ekman and Amnå (2012), latent participation, also 
referred to as pre-political engagement, includes the non-manifest forms of political 
participation preceding the act of voting, such as the interest in the electoral campaign and in 
the electoral outcome, the propensity to turn out and the interest in politics.
25
 Turnout could 
be seen as a probabilistic function of latent participation, as a high level of the latter is 
associated with a higher likelihood of electoral participation. The focus on the dynamics of 
latent participation during an electoral campaign seems thus appropriate to investigate not 
only whether campaigns behave as mobilizers, but also to what extent and in which way (e.g. 
by showing whether there are days or periods of the campaign that are more mobilizing than 
others).  
Every campaign is characterized by a different level of intensity (Brady, Johnson, and 
Sides, 2006, p. 2), consisting in parties and candidates’ efforts and in mass media attention 
toward the elections, which can depend on the electoral context and interact with the 
“approaching “deadline” of the Election Day” (p. 2). Campaign intensity is also associated 
with the salience of the elections, which is expected to be higher in first order than in second 
order elections and to produce higher mobilizing effects as a consequence (Stromback, 2017). 
Coming back to the dynamics of latent participation, in two elections of similar salience but 
characterized by a different level of campaign intensity, and where the initial level of latent 
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 The notion of ‘latent participation’ has also been employed in previous studies, in opposition to the notion of 
‘manifest participation’ (Pasquino, 1997; Raniolo, 2004). Moreover, here the term ‘latent participation’ does not 
deal with a latent construct of political participation within the framework of measurement models (see, for 
instance, Finkel, 1985). However, it refers to forms of political and social involvement, dealing with “citizens’ 
readiness or willingness to take action” (Ekman and Amnå, 2012, p. 286). 
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participation is assumed to be the same, we should expect a higher increase of the level of 
latent participation where the intensity is higher. 
Since both in Austria and in Italy the campaign dynamic effects on latent participation 
have never been investigated, to the best of my knowledge, this chapter contributes to give 
some empirical evidence on these two situations that experienced the lowest level of turnout 
in general elections. The first general research question could be thus expressed in the 
following way: Does electoral campaign increase latent participation in such contexts?  
Since electoral campaigns are aimed at increasing the salience of an election, and 
consequently the level of latent participation, we should expect them to have some mobilizing 
effects even in contexts experiencing a decrease in turnout. If no increase in latent 
participation is observed, campaigns prove to be non-mobilizing at all. After providing an 
answer to the first general question, it is then possible to compare the trends of latent 
participation between the two countries, in order to test when and how the campaigns have 
had an effect on latent participation. Although it cannot be directly tested, we can infer that a 
higher increase in latent participation could be associated with higher campaign intensity. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the dynamics of the campaign cannot give insights on the 
mechanisms that lead to an increase of participation, since it cannot disentangle the effects of 
direct mobilization, indirect mobilization, and other campaign events. 
The next section will argue the impact of some of the specific features of the 
campaigns, namely party contacting, on individual electoral participation. 
2.3 Party contacting effects on electoral participation 
Apart from the studies that treat campaigns as a sort of external shock (Hillygus, 2005), 
research on campaign effects on electoral participation follows two main approaches. Some 
studies, which mainly look at the US context, employ some contextual variables as proxies of 
50 
 
campaign mobilization, such as campaign expenditures (Patterson and Caldeira, 1983; Cox 
and Munger, 1989; Jackson, 1997) or candidate appearances (Shaw, 1999; Holbrook and 
McClurg, 2005) measured at a specific area-level. Other studies based on individual-level 
data analyse instead the effect of campaign contacting on individual electoral participation. 
This latter approach, well suited to study direct mobilization effects, will be the one employed 
in the chapter in order to enter the black box of campaign effects. 
During the last fifteen years, the relationship between campaign contacting and turnout 
has been largely investigated by means of the Get Out The Vote (GOTV) field experimental 
research, as argued in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3). Although the advantages of experimental 
research are acknowledged (above all, the randomization of contacts and the unbiased 
measures of actual turnout, measured through the access to voting records), various studies 
have employed survey data to analyse the relationship between party contacting and turnout. 
In various countries (such as Italy and Germany), it is indeed very hard to access the official 
voting records because of privacy restrictions.
26
 However, the main limitation of survey 
measures of party contacting, namely their endogeneity with self-reported turnout,
27
 could be 
overcome through the employment of pre-post elections panel data, that makes it possible to 
test the effect of contact on turnout net of the propensity to turn out before the elections.   
Even though the number of contacts proved to be higher in some contexts rather than in 
others, for instance in countries with majoritarian electoral systems (Karp, Banducci, and 
Bowler, 2008) and in old democracies (Karp and Banducci, 2007), various comparative 
studies on survey data have basically discovered that party contacting boosts turnout (Karp 
and Banducci, 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2008; Magalhaes, Segatti, and Shi, 2016). 
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 In Italy, the introduction of the privacy law in 2003 made rather complicated the access to individual voting 
records (see further details in Chapter 3), while in Germany there is no possibility to get access (Schmitt-Beck 
and Mackenrodt, 2010). 
27
 The employment of cross-sectional post-electoral survey data does not allow disentangling whether party 
contacting makes increase turnout, or whether mobilization messages are mainly addressed to citizens with a 
high likelihood to turn out (Gerber and Green, 2000).  
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However, those studies do not analyse the differentiated effects of the various modes of party 
contacting.  
Greater attention has been recently given to the forms of contacts in a special issue of 
Party Politics (2, 2016), aimed at studying the effects of mobilization in the digital age. The 
most surprising findings come from the only study on the issue carried out outside both the 
US and the UK, which is focused on German 2013 Federal Election and employs the German 
Longitudinal Panel Study (GLES) Rolling Cross-Section Panel Data (Schmitt-Beck, 2016). In 
contrast to the large amount of GOTV research (see subsection 1.3.2), it shows indeed that 
personal mobilization is less effective than impersonal one, taking personal mobilization as a 
count index of exposure to three different ways of personal contacts (namely attending rallies, 
visiting street stands and reading leaflets), and impersonal mobilization as a count index of 
exposure to two mediated contacts (watching TV advertisements and visiting party websites). 
Moreover, personal mobilization proves not to increase turnout. In the discussion, Schmitt-
Beck (2016) argues that the results are not so surprising as, on the one hand, personal forms 
of contacting like door-to-door canvassing are considered more intrusive in Germany, and 
more in general in European countries (Bhatti et al., 2016), than in the US, and, on the other 
hand, personal contacts with parties could be more exposed to self-selection, as high-
propensity voters are largely more likely to be contacted.
28
 Nonetheless, no measure of 
exposure to door-to-door canvassing is included in the analyses, and the synthetic additive 
indexes of personal and mediated party contacting cannot disentangle which specific forms of 
contacting were taken as the mobilizing force and to which extent, and which were not, as it 
will be later argued in Section 2.5. Moreover, recent GOTV studies conducted in the 
European context have shown that door-to-door canvassing has positive effects on turnout, 
even though smaller than in the US (Bhatti et al., 2016).  
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 Furthermore, it has been argued that in proportional representation voting systems, which characterize most of 
the European democracies, the effect of personal mobilization is expected to be lower than in majoritarian ones,  
like the ones employed in the UK and US, that are more candidate-centered (Bhatti et al., 2016). 
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This chapter thus aims to test the effects of personal and impersonal mobilization in the 
Austrian context. As pointed out in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.3.2), existent theories argue that 
personal contacts are expected to be more effective than impersonal ones (Dale and Strauss, 
2009). On the one hand, the Social Occasion Theory states that face-to-face interactions are 
more successful in creating a social connection between voters and the elections; on the other 
hand, according to the Noticeable Reminder Theory, the personal contact makes increase the 
noticeability of a reminder. Although German data seem not to provide empirical evidence to 
those theoretical expectations, there are no substantial reasons not to extend those theories to 
Austrian context. Moreover, moving from this framework and further empirical evidence 
from previous GOTV studies, the first hypothesis states as follows: 
Hp1: Personal contacts have a higher effect on turnout than impersonal ones. 
Besides testing which forms of party contacting are more effective, the next step 
consists in identifying the categories of voters who are more likely to increase their turnout 
after the contact. According to the theory of contingent mobilization (Arceneaux and 
Nickerson, 2009), mobilization effects on turnout depends on the interplay between the 
individual propensity to turn out and the salience of the election (see Chapter 1, subsection 
1.3.3). Namely, the theory predicts that in high-salience elections mobilization efforts are 
more successful among low-propensity voters, while the effect of mobilization on turnout is 
expected to be the highest among medium-propensity voters in medium-salience elections, 
and among high-propensity voters in low-salience ones. Since this study analyses a first-order 
election, which is considered as equivalent to a high-salience one (Bhatti, Hansen, and Wass, 
2016), moving from this theoretical framework the second hypothesis stands as follows:: 
Hp2: In high-salience elections party contacting is more effective in increasing the turnout 
among low-propensity voters than among medium and high-propensity voters. 
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2.4 The contexts 
The case studies of the chapter refer to Austrian and Italian 2013 general elections. In 
Austria, elections took place on September 29, while in Italy on February 24-25. The choice 
of analysing the Austrian context together to the Italian one is based on the several similarities 
which the two countries share. First, Austria and Italy show largely similar trends of 
participation in national elections, as reported in Figure 2.1. Indeed, both countries registered 
a very high turnout (above 90%) in the first elections after the II World War, which remained 
rather stable until the 70s. Although voter turnout had slightly began to decline in Italy 
already in the late 70s (1979 election), a considerable decrease was observable in both 
countries starting from the 90s, though in Austria the turnout had remained higher than 90% 
until the late 80s. This drop in participation led to the record-low in the last national elections 
in both countries, equal to 74.9 % in Austria and to 75.2% in Italy. Nonetheless, the level of 
electoral participation in the two countries is quite high when compared to the other European 
Union countries, where the average turnout in last national elections was equal to 66.9%.  
Figure 2.1: Turnout in national elections in Austria and Italy from 1945 to 2013. 
 
Second, the two contexts share a crucial institutional factor, namely the type of voting 
system. Indeed, in 2013 both in Austria and in Italy voting system is based on proportional 
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representation, which has been argued to lead to less candidate-centered mobilization than 
what happens in majoritarian systems (Bhatti et al., 2016).
29
  
Looking at the political arenas, Austria and Italy shared various elements in 
approaching 2013 elections. In both the countries the main parties faced the 2013 elections in 
a climate of general disaffection toward traditional politics, fuelled by the various scandals 
that had characterized the previous legislative period (Bellucci and Segatti, 2013; Dolezal and 
Zeglovits, 2014). Furthermore, in Italy especially, the economic crisis largely affected the 
trust towards parties and politicians, which had proven to be unable to manage the economic 
crisis. In Italy, indeed, from November 2011 up until the 2013 elections a technocratic 
government led by professor Mario Monti and supported by the large majority of political 
parties, settled down in order to save the country from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
(Garzia, 2013). In both countries, these several issues gave the opportunity for new parties to 
emerge, such as the Five Stars Movement in Italy, led by comedian Beppe Grillo, and the 
Team Stronach, founded by billionaire entrepreneur Frank Stronach, and the liberal NEOS in 
Austria.  
Even the electoral campaigns of the two countries shared various features. First, 
although scholars agree that the starting point of the hot phase of the 2013 campaigns can be 
located around six weeks before the elections (Garzia, 2013; Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014), 
Austria and Italy do not give legal limitation to the campaign length. Second, they impose 
restrictions on campaign expenditures (CESifo, 2015). Nevertheless, the rules are not so strict, 
thus some parties still exceed the limit (for instance, Team Stronach in Austria, see Dolezal 
and Zeglovits, 2014) and not all parties provide information on the expenditures. 
However, the two contexts also present some differences. First, the two campaigns vary 
by the role played by the TV debates among the candidates. The Austrian 2013 campaign was 
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 Nonetheless, differently from Italy, Austrian electoral system allows the preferential vote; therefore, personal 
contacts could be more incentivized. 
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characterized by 15 pairwise debates among the six main parties, other than a round table with 
representatives of all the six parties; these  represented the main media events of the campaign 
and were watched on average by more than 10 per cent of the electorate (Dolezal and 
Zeglovits, 2014). In Italy, though no restrictions were set, no debates among candidates took 
place during the 2013 campaign.
30
 Nonetheless, observers acknowledged Silvio Berlusconi’s 
participation on January 10 to the talk show Servizio Pubblico, well known for expressing 
positions against the candidate’s politics, as the major media event of the campaign (Garzia, 
2013). 
Moreover, Austria and Italy largely differ in the levels of party membership. Although 
since the 1980s both the countries have seen a substantial decline in party membership, like 
all the other European democracies, the ratio of party members to the electorate is far higher 
in Austria (17.3% in 2008) than in Italy (5.6% in 2007). Austria is indeed the European 
democracy with the highest proportion of party members (Van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke, 
2012
31
). These figures can have direct implications on the proportion of people contacted by 
parties during the electoral campaigns since party members are supposed to have a higher 
likelihood to be contacted than other individuals. 
Focusing on the forms of party contacting, while on Austrian TV advertisements are 
only allowed on private TV channels, in Italy since 1996 they have been forbidden in every 
TV national channel during the electoral campaigns (Morini, 2015), while they are still 
allowed in local TV channels. If we concentrate on expenditures by types of campaigning, in 
Austria almost 90% of the parties’ budget was spent for traditional advertising, like 
newspapers advertisements and posters, and only 3.3% for advertisements in online media 
(Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014), while similar information cannot be detected for the Italian 
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 In the history of Italian national elections campaigns, the last debate took place in 2006, between the candidate 
of the center-right coalition Silvio Berlusconi and the candidate of the center-left coalition Romano Prodi. TV 
debates between the leaders took place also in 1994 and 1996. 
31
 Figures on the levels of party membership come from data reported by political parties and then collected by 
the authors. 
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case. Nonetheless, even Italian 2013 campaign was little characterized by a high targetization 
of voters and a broad adoption of web technologies together with a renewed employment of 
personal mobilization techniques, that are typical traits of postmodern campaigns (Grandi and 
Vaccari, 2013)
32
. 
2.5 Data, methods and measures 
2.5.1 Data 
A well-suited tool to dynamically study the campaign effects is represented by the 
rolling cross-section design (Johnston and Brady, 2002), thanks to which random samples of 
individuals are interviewed daily throughout the campaign period. By including time in terms 
of days of the campaign within the study of campaign effects, it is also possible to detect the 
mobilizing effect of the main events characterizing every electoral campaign, such as the 
televised debates among candidates (see McKinney and Carlin, 2004; Ferreri et al., 2015). 
Although electoral research tends to mainly employ the rolling cross-section data to analyse 
campaign effects on party preferences, leaders evaluations and media exposure (on Austrian 
2013 Elections see various contributions in Kritzinger, Muller, and Schonbach, 2014; on 
Italian 2013 Elections see Barisione, Catellani, and Garzia, 2014; Vezzoni and Mancosu, 
2016), the design is in fact apt to analyse campaign effects on latent participation (Schmitt-
Beck and Faas, 2006; Krewel, Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing, 2011). Both Autnes and Itanes 
2013 include a rolling cross-section survey
33
 with a panel module, that allows for the testing 
of the exogenous impact of the campaign on the various outcomes available for both the pre 
and post-electoral period. Nonetheless, the two studies differ in data collection mode, 
sampling design and information collected. 
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 According to Norris’ (2000) typology, electoral campaigns are classified in premodern, modern, and 
postmodern. 
33
 In the case of Austria, this represents the first rolling cross-section survey carried out, while in Italy a previous 
rolling cross-section survey was undertaken during the 2006 electoral campaign. 
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Autnes Rolling Cross-Section survey covers the time span from August 5 to September 
27, two days before the elections, excluding Saturdays and Sundays. Apart from the first four 
days of fieldwork,
34
 about 100 CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) interviews 
on independent samples were carried out every day. Autnes RCS adopts a probabilistic 
sampling design for the initial inclusion in the sample. On the whole, RCS sample consists of 
4011 people and 2607 of them, randomly selected, were interviewed in the post-electoral 
survey as well (for further details see Kritzinger et al., 2016). 
Itanes Rolling Cross-Section survey almost covers the last two months of 2013 electoral 
campaign, from January 5 to February 23, the day before the elections, for a total of 43 days 
of interviews excluding Sundays. Unlike the Austrian survey, Itanes RCS employs 
independent quota samples of about 200 people,
35
 selected from an opt-in community group 
of a private research company (SWG) and interviewed through the CAWI (Computer 
Assisted Web Interviewing) mode. The entire sample is made of 8722 individuals, while a 
random sample of 3008 of them was later interviewed after the elections (for further details 
see Vezzoni, 2014). 
2.5.2 Main dependent and independent measures 
Since the empirical analyses of the chapter are based on two different surveys, some 
pieces of information are not available for both countries. Regarding the measurement of 
latent participation in the RCS surveys, we employ the propensity to turn out on an 11-point 
scale (0: not at all likely - 10: very likely), which is common to both the surveys. Since 
additional measures of latent participation are not shared by the two surveys, we consider two 
similar indicators, namely the attentiveness to the electoral campaign on a 4-point scale (0: 
not at all – 3: a lot) for Austria and the interest in the electoral outcome still on a 4-point scale 
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 The first four days are not considered in the following analyses. 
35
 Daily samples aim at reproducing the quota of the Italian population for gender, age, and territorial areas. 
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(0: not at all – 3: a lot) for Italy. These measures of latent participation constitute the key 
dependent variables in the first section of the study, concerning the dynamics of latent 
participation through the campaign. 
Self-reported turnout represents the dependent variable of the second section of the 
study focusing on party contacting effects. Similar self-reported rates are found in Austria 
(90,8% of the entire sample, 91,1% of the valid cases) and Italy (87,7% of the entire sample, 
91,4% of the valid cases), registering about 15 percentage points of overestimation compared 
to the actual rates, as it usually happens when measuring turnout in surveys (McDonald, 
2003). 
Concerning the measures of party contacting, Autnes RCS Panel Study includes six 
dichotomous measures of party contacting (yes/no), both in pre and post-electoral surveys. 
These six questions deal with individual exposure to party contacts in terms of receiving 
call/text messages, receiving letters/e-mails, watching TV advertisements, receiving 
information material/gifts (from any party or candidate at a campaign stand or at a campaign 
event), talking to a party member and being visited by a politician at home or at the 
workplace. In addition, for every form of contact the name of the party(ies) that had contacted 
the respondent was also asked. While the first three (call/text messages, letters/e-mails and 
TV ads) are mediated forms of contacting and the last two figure as personal contact (talk and 
visit), receiving information material/gifts could be related to both forms, as it does involve a 
personal contact on the one hand, but the content of the message is indirectly delivered.
36
 
However, all the various forms will be treated separately in this study as six main independent 
variables in six separated regression models. The choice of discarding additive indexes of 
personal and impersonal contacts, where the highest level of the index would correspond to 
being contacted through all the forms, is based on the following consideration: as it seems 
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 In his study on Germany, Schmitt-Beck (2016) argues that these are more connected to the personal modes of 
contacting, thus are included in the count index of personal party contacting. 
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plausible that two forms of contact can have a different impact on the turnout even when 
belonging to the same dimension, for instance respectively a positive and a null effect, the 
employment of an additive index as the main independent variable could hide the actual effect 
of party contacting. If only one out of three forms of contact is positively associated to 
turnout, the linear effect of the additive index of the three forms of contacting on turnout 
could prove not to be significantly positive. Nonetheless we cannot conclude by saying that 
party contacting does not boost participation. This shortcoming could have affected the 
findings of Schmitt-Beck (2016), where only impersonal contacts proved to behave as 
mobilizers.  
Unfortunately, the assessment of the effect of online contacting on turnout cannot be 
carried out, since no explicit measure of it is available. The two items included as online 
forms of contacting do not indeed allow for comparison between online and offline contacting 
(text messages are included in the same item as phone calls, and the same applies for letters 
and e-mails). 
On the contrary, Itanes RCS Panel Study includes in the pre-electoral survey a single 
item regarding online contacting, namely having been contacted by a candidate or a party by 
e-mail or social networks. Since no measures of party contacting are included in the post-
electoral survey, data do not allow an accurate measuring of the online contact during the 
campaign. Indeed, some respondents might not had yet been contacted by parties at the time 
the pre-electoral survey was carried out, but might have been contacted subsequently in the 
timespan between the interview and the election. Therefore, the effect of party contacting on 
turnout cannot be properly assessed.  
2.5.3 Methods 
In the first section of the chapter, which deals with the dynamic effects of latent 
participation during the campaign, LOWESS estimations (bandwidth 0.5) of the daily means 
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of the measures of latent participation will be employed separately on Austrian and Italian 
data. Furthermore, LOWESS estimations of the daily proportions of the different party 
contacting forms (six for Austria, one for Italy) will be shown, in order to analyse whether the 
intensity of every single form of party contacting increases with the approaching deadline of 
the elections, and, if so, to what extent. Although causal relationships between campaign 
mobilization and latent participation cannot be established by means of this kind of analysis, 
it could be useful to simultaneously consider both the trend of party contacting and that of 
latent participation in order to verify at first glance the plausibility of an association between 
the two. For instance, if the amount of party contacting increases throughout the campaign, 
while the daily means of the measures of latent participation remain stable, there is 
preliminary empirical evidence against the mobilizing effect of party contacting.
37
 
The second part of the study will focus on the Austrian case, as previously mentioned. 
In order to contextualise party contacting in 2013 Austrian elections, before testing 
Hypothesis 1 we provide a multivariate analysis aimed at profiling the characteristics of 
citizens contacted by parties during the campaign. For every form of contact, a logistic 
regression model was estimated (overall, six different models), where the dependent variable 
is party contacting, while independent variables deals with control variables employed in 
models with self-reported turnout as dependent variable (later listed in this paragraph), except 
for the propensity to turn out. Hypothesis 1 is tested by analysing the effect of every single 
form of party contacting on turnout, net of the main predictors of turnout. Thanks to the panel 
design of the study, it is possible to control for the propensity to turn out in the pre-electoral 
survey by following the strategy of Schmitt-Beck (2016). Six separated logistic models were 
then estimated, having individual turnout (yes/no) as dependent variable and the form of party 
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 Since we are referring to aggregate data, a null relationship between party contacting and latent participation 
could be produced by the combination of a mobilizing effect among a group of respondents balanced out by a 
demobilizing effect among another group of respondents. However, previous empirical research generally tends 
to avoid the demobilizing hypothesis, thus we can basically exclude the presence of a demobilizing effect. 
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contacting, measured in the post-electoral survey, as the main independent variable. Besides 
the propensity to turn out (measured on a 11-point scale: 0 - I will definitely not vote; 10 – I 
will definitely vote), the models control for a large number of covariates: gender, age and age 
squared (as recommended by Smets and Van Ham, 2013), educational level (4 categories: 
primary/lower secondary, vocational training, secondary, tertiary), degree of religiosity (4 
categories: not at all, little, somewhat, very religious), union membership, party identification, 
exposure to newspapers and television in terms of reading or watching about political events 
(0: never – 4: almost every day), attentiveness to the electoral campaign (0-3 scale) and 
attitudes towards politicians (0-4 index, where 4 means extremely positive attitudes
38
). 
Furthermore, controls include a measure of interpersonal influence, dealing with the ego’s 
perception of the amount of relatives and friends who were supposed to vote in the 2013 
Austrian General Election, measured on a 4-point scale (0: almost none of them/only a few of 
them - 3: almost all of them)
39. Following previous research on networks’ effects (Schmitt-
Beck and Mackenrodt, 2010), the expectation is that the higher the percentage of network 
members who are likely to vote, the higher the likelihood the ego goes to the polls. All the 
control variables listed are measured in the pre-electoral survey. Finally, an additional logistic 
regression model including all the six forms of contacting as independent variables was 
estimated. 
To run robustness checks, the same models were estimated by employing as the main 
independent variable the contact with parties when delivered in the timespan between the pre-
electoral survey and the elections. Such a procedure enables to further approach the issue of 
endogeneity between party contacting and the propensity to turn out before the elections. 
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 This is computed by considering the average of two items, dealing respectively with how many politicians are 
honest with voters and how many politicians are in politics to achieve as much goals as possible, which is 
reversed to preserve the same semantic polarity. Both the questions include 5 answer categories, from 0 (almost 
no one) to 4 (almost all). 
39
 The original variable is measured on a 5-point scale, however, since only 5 panel respondents answered the 
category ‘almost none of them’ (0,2% of the entire sample), in the analyses that category has been joined to the 
category ‘only a few of them’. 
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Indeed, any form of party contact before the pre-electoral survey could produce a positive 
effect on the propensity to turn out, which is likely to be positively related to the actual 
turnout. Therefore, the main independent variables are still dichotomous measures, but they 
are equal to 1 when an individual was contacted in the period between the pre-electoral survey 
and the elections and to 0 otherwise.   
After having tested whether every single form of party contacting increases the turnout, 
we can then test Hypothesis 2 by means of a similar logistic model, holding an interaction 
term between the mode of party contacting and the propensity to turn out.  In order to 
properly test that hypothesis, propensity to turn out is here recoded in three categories. The 
distribution of the original variable shows a strongly negative skewness (10-score is 
associated to the 64% of the respondents, 66% if we consider only valid cases), hence the 
categorization of it needs to be taken into account. We thus call low-propensity voters those 
who score between 0 and 5, that is when they have at most the same likelihood to vote or not; 
we deal with medium-propensity voters when the score is between 6 and 8, and high-
propensity voters when the score is 9 or 10, that is to say when they are rather sure to go to 
the polls. Differently from the models employed for testing Hypothesis 1, these models do not 
control for the original measure of the propensity to turn out, but for its three-categories 
version. 
2.6 Results 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show respectively the dynamics of latent participation in Austria 
and in Italy, which follow different patterns. In Austria (Figure 2.2), both the propensity to 
turn out and the attentiveness to the electoral campaign enable to register an overall increasing 
trend during the timespan of the campaign. Although the daily means of the propensity to turn 
out show to be rather high at the beginning of the campaign (higher than 8 on a 0-10 scale), 
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the average leads to a 1-point increase of the measure at the end of the campaign. If we focus 
on the dynamics of the trend we note that the propensity to turn out increases significantly 
during the last month of the campaign, while during the first three weeks it remains rather 
stable. This trend is not surprising, as the hottest phase of the campaign started at the end of 
August when the first two pairwise debates between the candidates took place (on August 29). 
Indeed, if one looks at Figure 2.2, it seems that the trend of the propensity to turn out starts 
increasing around August 29. The mean level of attentiveness to the campaign shows however 
a rather linear increasing trend. Overall, it seems that the Austrian 2013 campaign has 
produced a mobilizing effect.  
Figure 2.2: Trends of propensity to turn out (N=3,988) and attentiveness to the campaign 
(N=3,986) during 2013 Austrian electoral campaign. Daily means and LOWESS interpolation 
(bandwidth=0.5). 
 
On the contrary, Figure 2.3 shows the non-mobilizing effect of Italian 2013 campaign, 
except for an increase in the first 10 days, which could be attributed to the effect of the 
abovementioned media event of the campaign with the presence of Silvio Berlusconi at the 
talk show Servizio Pubblico on January 10. Though the average level of the propensity to vote 
and the interest in the electoral outcome prove to be rather high, the final trend is quite 
surprising, as it seems that the last month of the campaign has not had any effect on latent 
participation. Nonetheless, some signals of the limited impact on public opinion of the 
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campaign have come out also in previous research. For instance, the amount of political and 
electoral news in several TV programs during the last two months of the campaign did not 
result in an increasing trend towards the deadline of the elections (Bianchi, Chianale, and 
Pulvirenti, 2014). In particular, the trends observed a strong negative peak during the second 
to last week before the elections, after the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI (February 11). 
The event had a strong impact among the public opinion because of its exceptionality, hence 
overshadowed the electoral campaign in the media. Another element that could explain the 
low mobilization effect in the 2013 Italian campaign is represented by the ranking of the 
appearances of the main political leaders in the media. The most visible leader in newspapers 
(Legnante et al., 2013) and television (Bianchi, Chianale, and Pulvirenti, 2014) was Mario 
Monti, the former president and then leader of the new party Scelta Civica, who decided to 
run for the elections about two months before the deadline (December 23, 2012). This 
element symbolically demonstrates the low intensity of the 2013 electoral campaign, given 
both the scarce electoral performance of Monti’s party and coalition (respectively, 8.3% and 
10.6% of votes for the Chamber) and his low media appealing. Therefore, we could argue that 
among the various factors responsible for the decline of the turnout in Italy in 2013, campaign 
mobilization cannot be neglected.  
Figure 2.3: Trends of propensity to turn out (N=8,455) and interest in the electoral outcome 
(N=8,497) during 2013 Italian electoral campaign. Daily means and LOWESS interpolation 
(bandwidth=0.5).  
 
65 
 
Figure 2.4: Lowess interpolation (bandwidth 0.5) of the daily proportion of interviewees 
contacted by parties through different modes during 2013 Austrian electoral campaign 
(N=4,011). 
 
Figure 2.5: Trends of proportions of interviewees contacted by parties through on-line forms 
during 2013 Italian electoral campaign. Daily proportions and lowess interpolation (bandwidth 
0.5). N=8,722 
 
The analysis of its dynamics of party contacting gives further elements to understand 
the amount of direct mobilization during the campaign. Figure 2.4 shows that during the 
Austrian 2013 campaign the percentage of respondents who were somehow contacted by a 
political party increased with the approaching of the elections. This demonstrates that parties 
made their highest efforts during the last part of the campaign. In particular, in the last days of 
the campaign the percentage of people who declared to have received letters or e-mails during 
the campaign was almost four times higher than that at the beginning of the campaign. The 
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most personal forms of contacting, namely talking to a party member and being visited by a 
politician show to be among the least spread, together with receiving a call or a text message. 
Nonetheless, among people who answered the survey during the last days of the campaign, 
almost one out of five declared to have talked to a party member. The most spread form of 
contact is instead represented by the exposure to TV advertisements, and although they cannot 
be broadcast in the public TV channels, they were able to reach an overall of 69% of 
respondents (60% saw TV advertisements for more than one party, see Table A2.1 in 
Appendix A2). Looking at the Italian context, the dynamics of party contacting via web 
shows an increasing trend as well (Figure 2.5). However, the percentage increase of 
respondents contacted via web proves to be lower (from 24% of respondents to 30%) when 
compared to Austria, where at the end of the campaign some forms of contacting had reached 
over twice the number of respondents they had reached at the beginning. 
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Table 2.1: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) with 
self-reported  turnout as dependent variable and the six forms of party contacting (1=contacted 
after the pre-electoral survey; 0=otherwise), as main independent variables. 
  DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: DV: 
Variables Categories Call Letter Tvads Infogift Talk Visit 
        
Gender (Male) Female -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.15 -0.18 
  (0.19) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) 
Age  -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age_squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.39** 0.47** 0.41 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.31) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) (0.29) 
 Secondary 0.28 0.16 -0.11 0.25 0.31 0.03 
  (0.33) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.32) 
 Tertiary -0.06 0.44** -0.68*** -0.43** -0.38 -0.42 
  (0.38) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) (0.37) 
Religiosity  A little -0.53** 0.15 0.12 -0.44*** -0.38** -0.17 
(Not at all)  (0.26) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.26) 
 Somewhat -0.95*** -0.17 -0.36*** -0.72*** -0.55*** -0.16 
  (0.24) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) 
 Very -0.15 -0.26 -0.37* -0.02 0.42* -0.62 
  (0.33) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.41) 
Party closeness Yes 0.15 0.27*** -0.01 0.18* 0.31*** 0.03 
  (0.19) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 0.14 -0.08 0.09 0.48*** 0.14* 0.44*** 
Politicians  (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 0.08 0.05 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.16*** -0.07 
  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.00 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.06 0.04 0.14 
  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Campaign  0-3 0.41*** 0.23*** 0.09 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.44*** 
Attentiveness  (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.88*** 0.38*** 0.25*** -0.32*** 0.47*** 0.67*** 
  (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) 
 Constant -6.02*** -2.41*** -0.42 -1.56*** -4.45*** -6.76*** 
  (0.96) (0.42) (0.45) (0.48) (0.59) (0.94) 
        
 Pseudo R-squared 0,09 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 
 Observations 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Previous findings report an increasing trend in party contacting during the Austrian 
campaign, nonetheless existent research has shown that contacts with parties are not randomly 
distributed (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2008; Karp, 2012). However, those studies do not 
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distinguish among the several forms of contacting. In Table 2.1, we analyse the determinants 
of every mode of contacting. Among socio-demographics, gender and age prove not to be 
related to any contact. Education and religiosity are associated to some forms of mobilization, 
but a definite pattern does not emerge; net of political variables, tertiary educated are more 
likely to be contacted through letters or emails than lower secondary/primary educated, but 
they are less likely to watch TV advertisements or receive gifts and informational material. 
When looking at political variables, favourable attitudes toward politics encourage personal 
contacting and watching TV advertisements, while party closeness is positively related only 
to receiving letters or e-mails and talking to a politician. Instead, campaign attentiveness and 
the perceived amount of turnout in the network are positively associated with every mode of 
contact (the only exception is the negative relationship between perceived amount of turnout 
in the network and receiving informational material or gifts).
40
 Finally, concerning media 
exposure, apart from calls and visits all the other forms are positively related to at least one 
between newspapers and TV consumption. Overall, multivariate analysis shows that party 
contacting seems not to be socially patterned, but it is connected to various political attitudes 
and predispositions, as well as to media exposure. Notwithstanding, factors affecting party 
contacting prove to be strictly dependent on the mode of contact employed. 
 
After having detected factors influencing form of contacting, we can address the main 
aim of the chapter, namely to test whether turnout is driven by party contacting. Figure 2.6 
shows that only being visited by a politician or talking to a party member (marginal effect 
significant at 90%) led to a noteworthy increase in the turnout. Looking at the size of the 
effects, the visit of a politician resulted in an increase of 4.9 percentage points on the 
likelihood to turn out, while having talked to a party member allowed for an increase of 3.5 
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 Both campaign attentiveness and perceived turnout among family members could be seen as endogenous to 
party contacting, however the analysis shown in Table 2.1 is just meant to describe the characteristics of voters 
contacted by parties, without any causal claims. 
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percentage points. Among the mediated forms, the most effective ones were proved to be the 
call/text message, producing an increase of 2.4 percentage points on the likelihood to turn out, 
though not significant because of the low number of voters contacted. No mediated forms of 
party contacting, as well as receiving information material or gifts, had a significant effect on 
the turnout. Therefore, the findings give some empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1, as the two 
more personal and intrusive forms of contact (i.e. visit and talk) prove to be the most 
effective.  
Similar results come from the model including simultaneously the six forms of 
contacting as independent variables (Table A2.2 in the Appendix A2, last column), aimed at 
detecting the effect of every contacting mode on turnout when accounting for all the others. It 
shows that talking to a party member and being visited by a politician make increase turnout 
of respectively 3.7 and 4.0 (although the effect is not statistically significant) percentage 
points, while calls/text messages, letters/emails, and TV advertisements have no substantial 
effects. Moreover, receiving information materials or gifts even hinders participation 
(negative effect of 3 percentage points). The robustness check analysis reported in the 
Appendix A2 (Table A2.3), where party contacting is referred to as any form of contact 
happened in the period between the pre-electoral survey and the election, gives further 
support to Hypothesis 1. Even in those models, having talked to a party member only or 
having been visited by a politician positively affected the likelihood to turn out.
41
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 For an additional robustness check data were pre-processed through Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), a non-
parametric matching technique aimed at reducing the imbalance in covariates between treatment and control 
group (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). Since we have shown that being contacted by a party depends on several 
factors, in our framework the CEM technique allows minimizing the effects of selection bias when analyzing the 
relationship between the various forms of party contacting and turnout. Here, every treatment variable is 
represented by any forms of party contacting. As overall socio-demographic factors prove not to substantively 
affect party contacting, and media exposure influences only some forms of contact, coarsened variables were 
party closeness (2 categories: no; yes), attitudes toward politics (2 categories: <2; 2-4), campaign attentiveness 
(2 categories: 0-1; 2-3), perceived amount of turnout in personal networks (2 categories: 0-1; 2-3), and also 
propensity to turn out (3 categories: 0-5; 6-8; 9-10). In other not to lose relevant information, covariates can 
indeed be categorized into substantively meaningful groups (King, Iacus, and Porro, 2012, p. 9). In Appendix 
Table A2.4 reports six logistic regression models with CEM weights, analogous to models shown in Table A2.2. 
Since we matched data by every treatment variable, sample sizes are allowed to among the models. Findings 
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Figure 2.6: Predicted probabilities of turnout by modes of party contacting in Austrian 2013 
Elections. Estimates from the six different logistic regression models presented in Table A2.2. 
95% confidence intervals (N=2,333) . 
 
The full logistic regression models are reported in Table A2.2. The table shows that, 
even when the propensity to turn out before the elections is included among the control 
variables, both campaign attentiveness, which could be referred to as an indicator of latent 
participation, and expected turnout among network members, which is a measure 
interpersonal influence, significantly enhance the likelihood to turn out. Furthermore, tertiary 
educated people are more likely to turn out than the primary and lower secondary educated.
42
 
Net of the broad set of controls, both newspapers and TV exposures do not significantly affect 
the turnout. 
Since it was argued that being exposed to multiple conflicting messages could reduce 
the effect of mobilization (Zaller, 1996), we also ran analyses where every from of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
provide further evidence to Hypothesis 1 since only talking to a party member and being visited by a politician 
significantly (at the 90% level) enhance the likelihood of turning out. 
42
 Surprisingly, somewhat religious people are significantly more likely to turn out than non-religious ones, but it 
is not the same for very religious compared to non-religious. 
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mobilization is differentiated between contacts with a single party and contacts with two or 
more parties (see Table A2.5 in Appendix). Concerning personal contacts, talking to party 
members indeed produces a higher effect on turnout when coming from a single party (4.7 
percentage points, 1.4 when coming from two or more parties), while being visited by both 
one or multiple parties has similar positive effects on turnout (respectively, 4.4 and 5.8 
percentage points). Looking at the impersonal forms of contacting, watching TV 
advertisements of only one party proves to be positively related to turnout, as well as 
receiving call/text message by a single party, although barely significant at the 90% level. 
Moreover, receiving information material and gifts by multiple parties seems to discourage 
participation.  
Finally, Figure 2.7
43
 gives enough empirical evidence to support Hypothesis 2, which 
claims that in high-salience election campaigns, mobilization increases the turnout mainly 
among low-propensity voters, in accordance with Arceneaux and Nickerson’s (2009) theory 
of contingent mobilization. Looking at respondents with a low propensity to vote before the 
elections (from 0 to 5 on a 0-10 scale), the likelihood to turn out is significantly higher among 
those who talked to a party member (32 percentage points difference), while the effect of the 
talk is almost null for medium-propensity voters and rather small for the high-propensity ones 
(1.3 percentage points). Similarly, the positive effect on turnout of a politician’s visit at the 
workplace or at home is definitely stronger for low-propensity voters (36 percentage points) 
than for the medium-propensity (5 percentage points) and high-propensity ones (1.4 
percentage points). When we analyse the effect on turnout of party contacting among 
medium-propensity and especially among high-propensity voters, who register very high rates 
of self-reported turnout, ceiling effects need to be taken into account. However, the large 
                                                          
43
 In Figure 2.7, Hypothesis 2 is tested only for the two forms of party contact that proved to be significant at 
90% level in the previous analyses, namely talking to a party member and being visited by a politician. Average 
marginal interaction effects between propensity to turn out and the other four types of party contacting are 
reported in Appendix A2 (figure A2.1).  
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difference in size of the effect between the low-propensity voters and all others gives 
empirical leverage to the corroboration of Hypothesis 2.  
Figure 2.7: Average marginal effect
44
 of talking to a party member or being visited by a 
politician on self-reported turnout by propensity to turn out before the elections in Austrian 
2013 elections. Estimates from logistic regression models. 95% confidence intervals (N=2,333). 
 
Furthermore, in order to overcome the issue of ceiling effects, the same interaction 
models were estimated by substituting the propensity to turn out with the attentiveness to the 
electoral campaign. As Figure A2.2 in Appendix A2 shows, talking to a party member and 
being visited by a politician significantly enhance turnout only among citizens who are not at 
all or not very attentive to the campaign, thus giving further evidence to Hypothesis 2.  
2.7 Discussion and conclusions  
The increasing digitalization of electoral campaigns and the transition from a low to a 
high choice of media involved have raised scholars’ attention towards the role of campaigns 
in boosting electoral participation. This chapter has contributed to shed some light on the 
                                                          
44
 Interaction effects in logistic regression models cannot be interpreted simply by looking at the regression 
coefficient of the interaction term, but they can be better assessed by reporting the average marginal effects (Ai 
and Norton, 2003). Regression models are reported in Appendix A2 (Table A2.6). 
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impact of campaign mobilization on participation in two European countries, namely Austria 
and Italy, where few empirical studies have been previously undertaken. 
Methodologically, the chapter adopted an original bottleneck approach, aimed at 
integrating an overview of the dynamics of latent participation during the timespan of the 
campaign with the assessment of some specific mechanisms of campaign mobilization, 
namely the effects on turnout of various forms of party contacting. The approach seems well 
suited to investigate campaign effects on turnout from a broader perspective, starting from a 
descriptive and dynamic point of view with a rolling-cross-section design and then examining 
the causal effects with the pre-post panel survey. Moreover, it aims at exploiting the full 
potentiality of the rolling-cross-section panel design, which is becoming a standard of quality 
in the National Election Studies.  
Nonetheless, although the chapter employs a comparative perspective, the comparison 
between Austria and Italy was carried out only for the campaign development, as the Italian 
post-electoral data do not include measures of party contacting. This represents a limit of the 
chapter, since a full comparison between the two countries cannot be satisfied. However, if 
we consider the analyses that are comparable, Austria and Italy show different trends in latent 
participation during the 2013 electoral campaigns. Rather surprisingly, the last month of the 
Italian campaign did not produce a clear mobilization effect; this means that the parties’ 
attempts have been ineffective in enhancing the turnout, despite the large availability of 
techniques devolved to convince voters to go to the polls. Despite some relevant concurring 
events that took place during the Italian 2013 campaign, above all the resignation of Pope 
Benedict, the very weak mobilization effect represents an alarm signal for political parties and 
an element that should be taken into account by all scholars who analyse the decline of the 
turnout in Italy. In Austria, on the contrary, the campaign has been successful in increasing 
both the attention towards the campaign itself and the propensity to turn out. Indeed, 
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campaign mobilization does not seem to be among the most relevant predictors of the decline 
of turnout in the Austrian context. 
Focusing on party contacting in Austria, in the chapter the assessment of the effect of 
every form of contact on turnout is rather robust for three main reasons. First, by controlling 
for the propensity to vote before the elections, and moreover through the use of coarsened 
exact matching as a robustness check, most of the issues on endogeneity regarding the 
relation between party contacting and turnout are overcome (Schmitt-Beck, 2016). Second, 
since in Austria voter turnout is very high and self-reported turnout is around 90%, the 
analyses on the impact of contacts on turnout could be affected by ceiling effects (Enos, 
Fowler, and Vavreck, 2014). When significant effects of a predictor are detected, it thus 
means that they are pretty robust. Third, robustness checks on the regression analyses, where 
party contacting was considered only if occurred in the period between the pre-electoral 
survey and the elections, were carried out and have provided findings consistent with the 
other analyses. 
Looking at the findings, in Austria the most mobilizing forms are represented by 
personal contacts. As several Get Out The Vote studies found, voters are more likely to be 
pushed to the polls when they experience a face-to-face contact with electoral campaigners or 
party members. This finding goes in an opposite direction to Schmitt-Beck’s (2016) study on 
the German context in the 2013 federal elections, where impersonal contacts proved to be 
more effective than the personal ones. However, as previously argued, that paper does not 
disentangle the effect of every single form of contact, since it employs as independent 
variables two count index of personal and impersonal party contacting. Further analyses of the 
GLES 2013 RCS data in which every form of party contact is treated separately could clarify 
whether in Germany personal contacts boost or not the turnout. 
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In Austria, having personal contact with a party member is not so rare, since almost one 
out of five voters declared to have talked to a party member during the 2013 campaign. 
However, it represents a form of contact that can reach a restricted portion of voters for 
practical reasons, mainly due to the limited number of party members and volunteers. 
Furthermore, low-propensity voters could be less likely to be personally contacted since they 
are more likely to be socially marginal and, consequently, it is more complex to get in touch 
with them. By means of a meta-analysis of several GOTV studies employing face-to-face 
contact as treatment in experimental settings, Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck (2014) also argued 
that personal contacts increase social inequalities in electoral participation. They found that 
high-propensity voters were more likely to be pushed to the polls after personal contacts than 
low-propensity ones, regardless the presence of ceiling effects. On the contrary, this work 
shows that in Austrian high salience elections, personal contacts are more effective among 
low-propensity voters, in line with Arceneaux and Nickerson’s (2009) theory of contingent 
mobilization. Ceiling effects could soften the resulting effects on medium and high-propensity 
voters, nonetheless the effects of talk and visit among low-propensity voters are very strong, 
and further analyses employing campaign attentiveness as moderating variable provide 
similar results. These findings directly speak to electoral campaigners, who can concentrate 
their efforts in personally reaching a larger number of low-propensity voters. Concerning 
mediated contacts, only letters or e-mails produce a higher effect on turnout among low-
propensity voters, while the other forms of contact produce irrelevant effects for all the 
categories of voters. 
Despite the increasing use of new technologies in electoral campaigns, the traditional 
forms of contact still represent the most employed by political parties, at least in the Austrian 
context. The potentiality of digital techniques in electoral participation needs further research, 
however some previous works detected very weak mobilizing effects of e-campaigning 
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(Green, Aronow, and McGrath, 2013; Aldrich et al., 2016), though proved to be more 
successful in enhancing campaign participation (Aldrich et al., 2016) and political 
engagement (Vaccari, 2017). Unfortunately, data employed in this chapter do not allow 
disentangling the effects of on-line forms of contacting, since no specific measures are 
included in the Austrian data. In order to overcome this issue, the presence of some specific 
measures of digital contacting would be very welcome in future rolling cross-section panel 
studies. Furthermore, it would be advisable for future Itanes rolling cross-section panel 
studies to address the questions of party contacting in both pre and post survey, in order to 
analyse their causal effects on turnout. 
The use of panel survey data is an opportunity to provide external validity to the 
findings, thanks to the sample representativeness of the national population and the possibility 
to analyse causal relations within the context of the general elections. Nevertheless, the higher 
level of internal validity enables the experimental design to be the best way to address the 
causal effects. Both self-reported measures of party contacting and turnout can be affected by 
non-random measurement errors, as politically engaged people could be more likely to over-
report both the number of contacts and the likelihood to turn out. Furthermore, some forms of 
party contacting, such as talking to a party member, allow the voters to play an active role, 
whereas, within campaign mobilization, parties and candidates are the exclusive actors. 
Experimental methods, as the Get Out The Vote experiment in the context of Italian 
university elections described in Chapter 3, enable to treat with campaign contact only a 
random subsample of voters and to measure unbiased individual turnout.  
Future research programs are also welcomed to adopt more accurate comparative 
designs through the employment of new data sources, such as the fourth wave (2011-2016) of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Although the cross-sectional nature of those 
data is a limitation for assessing causality, they provide information for many countries on 
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several forms of contacting, including two specific items on online mobilization. Comparative 
data allow testing hypothesis on the moderating role of institutional factors, such as party 
system and voting system, in the relationship between party contacting and turnout. Also, 
comparative research should aim at investigating the impact of countries’ level of internet 
penetration on online mobilization, and moreover on the effect of online mobilization on 
electoral participation. Furthermore, comparative studies are needed to analyse the impact of 
the countries’ level of party membership on the volume of mobilization. Since party members 
“can help candidates and parties accomplish the labor-intensive side of local organizing and 
electoral campaigns" (Scarrow, 2014, p. 103), volunteering is indeed acknowledged as one of 
the leading contributions they offer to parties. However, research made little efforts to 
disentangle the effects of country-level party membership on mobilization and turnout so far, 
thus comparative data analysis can offer new empirical evidence.  
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Appendix A2 
 
Table A2.1: Distribution of the forms of party contacting (overall and by two or more parties). 
  
PARTY CONTACTING % % (by two or more party) 
Seen TV ads 69 60 
Received a letter/e-mail (a) 46 33 
Received info materials/gifts (b) 24 12 
Talked to a party member (b) 17 5 
Visited by a politician  (c) 6 2 
Received a call/text message (a) 6 1 
(a) from any party or candidate during the electoral campaign 
 (b) from any party or candidate at a campaign stand or at a campaign event 
(c) at home or at workplace 
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Table A2.2: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) 
with self-reported  turnout as dependent variable and the six forms of party contacting, 
measured in the post-electoral survey, as main independent variables. 
Variables Categories Main IV: 
Call 
Main IV: 
Letter  
Main IV: 
TV ads  
Main IV: 
Info-gift 
Main IV: 
Talk  
Main IV: 
Visit 
6 main 
IVs 
Gender (Male) Female 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.17 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age_squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.13 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
 Secondary 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
 Tertiary 0.73* 0.74* 0.79** 0.74* 0.76* 0.76* 0.78* 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Religiosity  A little 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.08 
(Not at all)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Somewhat 0.47** 0.47** 0.48** 0.44* 0.48** 0.46* 0.45* 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
 Very 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.26 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) 
Party closeness Yes 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.22 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 
Politicians  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Campaign attentiveness 0-3 0.20* 0.20* 0.22** 0.22* 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.29** 0.29** 0.30** 0.29** 0.28** 0.29** 0.21* 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Propensity to turn out 0-10 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Contact Call 0.47      0.15 
  (0.52)      (0.55) 
 Letter  0.20     0.03 
   (0.18)     (0.19) 
 TV ads   0.25    0.17 
    (0.19)    (0.20) 
 Info-gift    -0.16   -0.51** 
     (0.20)   (0.24) 
 Talk     0.69**  0.81** 
      (0.31)  (0.36) 
 Visit      1.12** 0.78 
       (0.56) (0.59) 
 Constant -2.71*** -2.71*** -2.76*** -2.67*** -2.69*** -2.70*** -2.72*** 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) 
         
 Pseudo 
 R-squared 
0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0,32 
 Observations 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.3: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) 
with self-reported  turnout as dependent variable and the six forms of party contacting 
(1=contacted after the pre-electoral survey; 0=otherwise), as main independent variables. 
 
  DV: Individual turnout  
Variables  Categories 
Main IV: 
Call 
Main IV: 
Letter 
Main IV: 
TV ads 
Main IV: 
Info-gift 
Main IV: 
Talk 
Main IV: 
Visit 
6 main 
IVs 
Gender (Male) Female 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age_squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.15 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
 Secondary 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
 Tertiary 0.75* 0.75* 0.75* 0.75* 0.77* 0.76* 0.78* 
  (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Religiosity  A little 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 
(Not at all)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Somewhat 0.45* 0.46** 0.44* 0.46* 0.48** 0.45* 0.46* 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
 Very 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.32 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
Party closeness Yes 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 
Politicians  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Campaign attentiveness 0-3 0.21* 0.22* 0.20* 0.21* 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Propensity to turn out 0-10 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Contact Call -0.14      -0.38 
  (0.52)      (0.53) 
 Letter  0.12     0.06 
   (0.23)     (0.24) 
 TV ads   -0.18    -0.22 
    (0.20)    (0.21) 
 Info-gift    0.01   -0.21 
     (0.25)   (0.28) 
 Talk     1.10**  1.09* 
      (0.51)  (0.55) 
 Visit      1.50* 1.24 
       (0.79) (0.82) 
 Constant -2.71*** -2.71*** -2.76*** -2.67*** -2.69*** -2.70*** -2.72*** 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) 
         
 
Pseudo 
R-squared 
0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0,32 
 Observations 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.4: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) 
with self-reported  turnout as dependent variable and the six forms of party contacting, 
measured in the post-electoral survey, as main independent variables. Data pre-processed 
through coarsened exact matching. 
Variables Categories Main IV: 
Call 
Main IV: 
Letter  
Main IV: 
TV ads  
Main IV: 
Info-gift 
Main IV: 
Talk  
Main IV: 
Visit 
Gender (Male) Female -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.16 
  (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.22) 
Age  0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.07* 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Age_squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational -0.20 -0.03 0.15 0.54** 0.05 0.20 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.34) (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.33) (0.31) 
 Secondary -0.15 -0.01 0.20 1.07*** 0.16 0.41 
  (0.37) (0.32) (0.30) (0.27) (0.37) (0.33) 
 Tertiary 0.73 0.56 0.83* 1.09*** 0.34 0.57 
  (0.55) (0.45) (0.42) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44) 
Religiosity  A little 0.31 0.15 0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.04 
(Not at all)  (0.29) (0.26) (0.24) (0.22) (0.30) (0.29) 
 Somewhat 0.78*** 0.60** 0.53** 0.39* 0.72** 0.37 
  (0.30) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) 
 Very 0.59 0.23 0.28 -0.25 -0.19 0.48 
  (0.47) (0.41) (0.40) (0.36) (0.43) (0.47) 
Party closeness Yes 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.07 0.38 0.24 
  (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 0.12 0.05 -0.00 -0.29*** 0.20 0.05 
Politicians  (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 -0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.19** 0.02 0.17* 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20** -0.08 -0.20** 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) 
Campaign attentiveness 0-3 0.24* 0.17 0.20* 0.05 0.12 0.51*** 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.34** 0.26** 0.28** 0.47*** 0.15 0.24* 
  (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14) 
Propensity to turn out 0-10 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.36*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) 
Contact Call 0.36      
  (0.51)      
 Letter  0.12     
   (0.20)     
 TV ads   0.16    
    (0.20)    
 Info-gift    -0.20   
     (0.19)   
 Talk     0.56*  
      (0.32)  
 Visit      1.08* 
       (0.57) 
 Constant -3.04*** -2.56*** -2.83*** -2.18*** -4.22*** -3.83*** 
  (0.94) (0.80) (0.76) (0.71) (0.87) (0.84) 
        
 Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.40 0.24 0.25 
 Observations 2,123 2,328 2,327 2,324 2,217 2,147 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A2.5: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) 
with self-reported  turnout as dependent variable and the six forms of party contacting, 
measured in the post-electoral survey and differentiated between contact with one party and 
contact with two or more parties, as main independent variables.  
Variables Categories Main IV: 
Call 
Main IV: 
Letter  
Main IV: 
TV ads  
Main IV: 
Info-gift 
Main IV: 
Talk  
Main IV: 
Visit 
Gender (Male) Female 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.14 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age_squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.14 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
 Secondary 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.24 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
 Tertiary 0.71* 0.72* 0.81** 0.71* 0.75* 0.76* 
  (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) 
Religiosity  A little 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.11 
(Not at all)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Somewhat 0.48** 0.47** 0.50** 0.38 0.48** 0.45* 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Very 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.17 0.29 0.34 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) 
Party closeness Yes 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.20 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 
Politicians  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Campaign attentiveness 0-3 0.19* 0.20* 0.22* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.28** 0.28** 0.30*** 0.24** 0.28** 0.29** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Propensity to turn out 0-10 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Contact: Call One party 1.75*      
  (1.05)      
 Two or more parties 0.58      
  (1.14)      
Contact Letter One party  0.20     
   (0.25)     
 Two or more parties  0.32     
   (0.22)     
Contact: TV ads One party   0.86**    
    (0.41)    
 Two or more parties   0.28    
    (0.19)    
Contact: Info-gift One party    0.47   
     (0.35)   
 Two or more parties    -0.49**   
     (0.23)   
Contact: Talk One party     1.00**  
      (0.43)  
 Two or more parties     0.26  
      (0.44)  
Contact: Visit One party      0.97 
       (0.66) 
 Two or more parties      1.43 
       (1.05) 
 Constant -2.73*** -2.72*** -2.79*** -2.62*** -2.70*** -2.68*** 
  (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) 
        
 Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
 Observations 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.6: Logistic regression models (beta coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) 
with self-reported turnout as dependent variable and the interaction between forms of party 
contacting and propensity to turn out as main independent variables. 
  DV: Individual turnout 
Variables Categories Main IV: 
Call 
Main IV: 
Letter  
Main IV: 
TV ads  
Main IV: 
Info-gift 
Main IV: 
Talk 
Main IV:  
Visit  
Gender (Male) Female 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.21 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age_squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Vocational 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.16 
(Primary-lower sec.)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
 Secondary 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
 Tertiary 0.73* 0.71* 0.77** 0.73* 0.75* 0.74* 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
Religiosity  A little 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 
(Not at all)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Somewhat 0.47** 0.50** 0.48** 0.45* 0.49** 0.45* 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Very 0.31 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.35 0.37 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) 
Party closeness Yes 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Attitudes toward 0-4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.00 
Politicians  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Newspapers exposure 0-4 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
TV exposure 0-4 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Campaign attentiveness 0-3 0.21* 0.21* 0.22** 0.22** 0.23** 0.22** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Network turnout 0-3 0.28** 0.27** 0.28** 0.28** 0.27** 0.28** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Propensity to turn out Medium 1.78*** 2.09*** 1.58*** 1.77*** 1.91*** 1.83*** 
(Low: 0-5) (6-8) (0.24) (0.30) (0.38) (0.31) (0.25) (0.24) 
 High 3.02*** 3.11*** 2.90*** 3.01*** 3.10*** 3.10*** 
 (9-10) (0.24) (0.30) (0.35) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) 
Call   -0.14      
  (0.52)      
Call*Propensity  Call*Medium 0.05      
to turn out  (1.48)      
 Call*High 0.65      
  (1.21)      
Letter   0.50*     
   (0.29)     
Letter*Propensity Letter*Medium  -0.86*     
to turn out   (0.47)     
 Letter*High  -0.29     
   (0.40)     
TV ads    0.13    
    (0.28)    
TV ads*Propensity TV ads*Medium   0.26    
to turn out    (0.48)    
 TV ads*High   0.18    
    (0.41)    
Info-gift     -0.13   
     (0.32)   
Info-gift*Propensity Info-gift*Medium    0.03   
to turn out     (0.47)   
 Info-gift*High    0.10   
     (0.46)   
Talk      1.92***  
      (0.67)  
Talk*Propensity Talk*Medium     -1.90**  
to turn out      (0.88)  
 Talk*High     -1.44*  
      (0.79)  
Visit       2.48** 
       (1.08) 
Visit*Propensity Visit*Medium      -1.81 
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to turn out       (1.51) 
 Visit*High      -1.94 
       (1.31) 
Constant  -1.79** -2.00*** -1.85** -1.79** -1.88** -1.85** 
  (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75) (0.76) (0.75) 
        
Pseudo R-squared  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Observations  2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 2,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A2.1: Average marginal effect on self-reported turnout in Austrian 2013 Elections of 
having received a call/text message, a letter/email, seen a TV advertisement and received 
information materials or gifts by propensity to turn out before the election. Estimates from 
logistic regression models. 95% confidence intervals (N=2,333). 
 
Figure A2.2: Average marginal effect of talking to a party member or being visited by a 
politician on self-reported turnout by campaign attentiveness in Austrian 2013 elections. 
Estimates from logistic regression models. 95% confidence intervals (N=2,333). 
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Chapter 3. Are email messages mobilizing tools? Evidence from a Get Out 
The Vote experiment in an Italian university election   
3.1 Introduction 
Mobilization deals with several forms, most of which have been introduced in the 
previous chapters and analysed in relation to turnout in the context of 2013 Austrian National 
Election in Chapter 2. Among these forms, the effect of online contacting on turnout could 
not be estimated, because of the lack of specific items measuring it in the surveys employed. 
Nonetheless, with the diffusion of the internet, political organizations have started to take 
advantage of the potential of the web in to contact individuals, mainly through emails and 
social networks. When campaign messages are sent online, scholars refer to that as online 
mobilization or internet mobilization (Krueger, 2006).  
Coming back to Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) conceptualization of mobilization, it 
has been argued that online mobilization can be expressed both in terms of direct and indirect 
mobilization (Aldrich et al., 2016; Vaccari, 2017). When online messages are directly sent to 
individuals by political parties and candidates we refer to that as direct mobilization, and 
when those messages reach individuals through other individuals (who send or share the 
messages by just reproducing or personalizing them) we refer to that as indirect mobilization. 
Although this distinction needs to be taken into consideration when dealing with online 
mobilization, this chapter focuses on direct online mobilization and its effect on turnout,
45
 
aiming at integrating the findings of the previous chapter concerning direct mobilization 
effects on turnout. Previous empirical studies provided mixed findings on the relation 
between online mobilization and turnout (Nickerson, 2007a; Malhotra, Michelson, and 
Valenzuela, 2012; Aldrich et al., 2016), therefore further empirical evidence is needed to shed 
more light on the relationship. 
                                                          
45
 From this point on, in this chapter I will simply refer to as online mobilization when dealing with direct online 
mobilization. 
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To address that issue, a field experiment has been conducted in the context of the 2014 
election for the students’ representatives of a Northern Italian university (the University of 
Trento). In the assessment of mobilization effects on turnout, Get Out The Vote (GOTV) field 
experiments (Gerber and Green, 2008) represent one of the most effective and rigorous tools 
to test causal mechanisms of mobilization.  
A relevant issue regarding GOTV studies is represented by the difficulty in accessing 
individual voting records in several countries. This issue has been overcome in this chapter 
thanks to the collaboration of the administrative offices of the University of Trento, which 
allowed recording the actual individual turnout in addition to sending an email message that 
invited several randomized groups of students to participate in elections. 
In the experimental design, 16,255 students have been randomly split into four groups, 
among which three of them received a non-partisan email (treatment groups), while the 
remaining one did not get any message (control group). Moreover, since each treated group 
received a message with different content and timing of delivery, we will further test the 
impact of different contents and timings of delivery on electoral participation.  
Although the experiment was carried out in the context of a low-salience election, we 
might argue that the participation in university elections could be intended as an indicator of 
political participation and civic engagement of young citizens, which has received large 
attention among scholars Therefore, in addition to analysing the effects of the GOTV 
campaign, the chapter aims at investigating the individual-level determinants of participation 
in university elections, which were little investigated before. By employing a unique 
administrative dataset provided by the University of Trento, the more relevant factors in 
predicting this form of participation will be examined, mainly socio-demographic and 
academic career-related characteristics. Since students are enrolled in several degree 
programs, belonging in turn to different departments, data analysis on the determinants of 
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turnout in university elections needs to take into account that hierarchical structure. This issue 
will be addressed through the employment of multilevel logistic regression models, with the 
individual turnout as the independent variable. 
The present chapter is thus split into two sections: the former focuses on the relation 
between online mobilization on participation in university elections, the latter deals with the 
determinants of participation in those elections. 
3.2 Online mobilization and turnout  
Two main advantages, strictly connected each other, are acknowledged to be associated 
with online mobilization: the low costs and the potential to reach a vast audience (Krueger, 
2006). Online techniques are characterized by massive economies of scale and low transaction 
costs (Nickerson, 2007a). The cost of sending one email message is indeed almost the same to 
the cost of thousands of email messages. Furthermore, by employing online mobilization, 
political organizations do not have to target their efforts only on a small portion of voters 
(Krueger, 2006), as in the case of offline mobilization where campaigners have to maximize 
their limited resources. Therefore, online mobilization is well suited to carry out large-scale 
campaigns.  
Nonetheless, online mobilization does not come without shortcomings. Although from 
an ideal point of view it could largely decrease inequalities in party contacting compared to 
offline mobilization, which tends to target politically active and high socio-economic status 
citizens, the empirical evidence tends to confirm only partially this expectation. By analysing 
the determinants of online and offline mobilization, Krueger (2006) found that both internet 
skills and political interest are associated with a higher likelihood of being contacted online, 
while civic skills and socio-economic status, which proved to be positively related to offline 
contacting, are not. A further issue raised by Krueger (2006) deals with the higher level of 
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annoyance of receiving an unsolicited email from political organizations, compared to other 
forms of unsolicited political contacts. However, this issue seems far less relevant in the 
European context than in the US, where it was argued that other unsolicited mediated 
contacts, such as phone calls, have been regularly employed during electoral campaigns for 
decades,
46
 and have been perceived as more accepted by voters accordingly (Krueger, 2006).  
Overall, the main shortcomings of online mobilization do not seem peculiar to that 
specific form of mobilization. Furthermore, from the perspective of political campaigners, the 
advantages of online mobilization seem to outweigh the disadvantages. Nonetheless, the use 
of online contacting is still rather limited compared to the offline one, in particular in the 
European context, characterized by a lower level of campaign professionalization than in the 
US. By comparing online and offline contacting in UK 2010 and US 2012 elections, Aldrich 
et al. (2016) indeed found that while in the US 17,1%
47
 of survey respondents reported to 
have been contacted online, according to two different data sources in the UK the percentage 
was equal to 1,6% and 2,6%
48
 (concerning offline contacting, the quota of respondents 
contacted was equal to 36,2% in the US, respectively to 46,7% and 50,6% in the UK). 
The main concern deals however with the efficacy of online mobilization in increasing 
political participation. For professional campaigners, it is crucial to know whether online 
mobilization is successful in increasing participation or whether it has no effect, thus 
representing a waste of time, as Nickerson (2007a) pointed out. Little empirical research has 
been carried out so far; however, findings do not converge into a unique direction. 
By employing cross-sectional survey data, Aldrich et al. (2016) found that online 
contacting is associated with a higher participation in campaign activities both in the UK and 
                                                          
46
 This seems to be different in the European context, as argued in the previous chapter in relation to the Austrian 
case, where only 6% of the respondents to the Autnes post-electoral survey 2013 declared to have been contacted 
through phone calls or text messages. 
47
 American National Election Study (ANES) 2012 post-electoral survey data. 
48
 Respectively BMRB 2010 post-electoral survey and British Election Study (BES) 2010 post-electoral survey 
data. 
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in the US. Analogously, by employing a comparative cross-sectional study on Germany, Italy, 
and UK in the period of 2014 European elections, Vaccari (2017) showed that people who are 
contacted through online forms are more likely to be politically engaged than the others. A 
laboratory experimental study in the Netherlands found instead that online mobilization only 
boosts online participation, while it does not increase offline participation (Vissers et al., 
2012). Although further research is needed to investigate the relation between online 
mobilization and political engagement with the employment of more sophisticated research 
designs, the few existing studies give some empirical evidence toward the presence of a 
positive relation between online mobilization and political engagement.  
When looking at online mobilization effects on turnout, in the abovementioned study 
Aldrich et al. (2016) showed that online contacting does not make increase turnout both in the 
UK and in the US. Nevertheless, the measurement of online mobilization reported in surveys 
could be affected by higher biases than the measurement of offline mobilization. Since the 
stimuli conveyed through online mobilization are in general low-intense, respondents could 
be more likely to misreport online contacts because they do not remember to have been 
contacted or they do not open or read the online messages sent by political organizations. 
Furthermore, as argued in previous chapters, when the dependent variable is represented by 
the individual turnout, another bias is represented by the overestimation of turnout in the 
surveys. Those issues are addressed by the employment of the GOTV field experimental 
technique. The following subsection will present an overview of the GOTV research, before 
focusing on GOTV studies on the relation between online mobilization, mainly regarding 
email messages, and turnout. 
3.2.1 GOTV email messages and turnout 
The experimental method guarantees a higher internal validity to the findings. GOTV 
studies have indeed the great advantage of measuring unbiasedly both the campaign contact, 
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since mobilizing messages are sent to randomized groups of individuals, and turnout, thanks 
to the access to individual voting records. Field experiments are usually carried out in small 
areas, providing a lower level of generalization than survey methods carried out in country 
areas. Nevertheless, thanks to their real-world setting field-experimental techniques provide a 
higher external validity with respect to lab-experimental techniques (de Rooji, Green and 
Gerber, 2009).  
Field experimental GOTV research has been mainly spread in the US, even though it 
has been recently growing in the European context (Bhatti et al., 2016). As Green, Aronow, 
and McGrath (2013) have suggested, more GOTV campaigns in each country are needed in 
order to compare the impact of different campaign strategies among contexts with various 
political cultures, media systems and electoral systems. GOTV is indeed still underdeveloped 
in a large number of countries. Anyhow, this cannot be entirely attributed to a low-advanced 
state of the mobilization research; also legal impediments that do not allow to carry out a 
proper GOTV campaign might have caused this differentiated development. Indeed, one of 
the main features of GOTV experiments consists in the measurement of the individual 
electoral participation, which represents the dependent variable in those studies, through 
individual official voting records. In some countries, an obstacle to the diffusion of GOTV 
techniques is represented by the difficulty in accessing the individual official voting records, 
due to privacy protection. In Italy, access to this information is allowed only with the 
authorization of the president of the provincial court in charge of the voting records – a rather 
hard procedure to obtain permission. So far, only one door-to-door canvassing GOTV study 
has been carried out in Italy employing the official voting records, in the context of the 2014 
mayoral election in a single municipality of the Northern Italy (Cantoni and Pons, 2017).
49
  
                                                          
49
 Other GOTV studies have been conducted in Italy, nonetheless but they do not employ individual official 
voting records for the measurement of turnout (Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi, 2015; Galasso and Nannicini, 
2016). 
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When dealing with online mobilization, previous GOTV research has tested the effect 
of email messages on voter turnout. Those studies, all carried out in the US context, led to 
inconsistent findings. On one side, 13 GOTV email campaigns organized by fictional and 
unofficial groups (e.g. Vote For Students) for various electoral events did not have positive 
effects on turnout, though they produced an overall weak negative effect, although not 
significant (Nickerson, 2007a). Similarly, email messages encouraging university students to 
online register to an election proved to cause a decrease in the registration rate of 0.3 
percentage points (Bennion and Nickerson, 2011) or to be ineffective (Bennion and 
Nickerson, 2012). On the other side, Malhotra, Michelson, and Valenzuela (2012) found a 
significant positive effect, although small, of the email messages on turnout when delivered 
by an official source,
50
 which was represented by the nonpartisan official responsible for 
administering the elections. Furthermore, in an experiment aimed at testing the impact of 
emails informing about a new convenient voting method, Hanmer, Herrnson, and Smith 
(2015) found that the experimental group which received an email with an appealing subject 
line (the only one focused exclusively on the new voting method) made register a higher 
usage of the new voting system and a higher “open rate” (the share of those who actually 
opened the email) than the other groups. However, no effect on voter turnout was found.         
GOTV email campaigns are “essentially costless” (Bennion and Nickerson, 2011, p. 
860). For professional campaigners, it could be crucial to know whether emails are successful 
in mobilizing some citizens or whether they have no impact on citizens’ participation. Even 
the presence of little mobilization effects could move political parties in conducting e-mail 
campaigns, thanks to their economic and logistic convenience. In light of these 
considerations, the present study deals with the impact of a low-cost GOTV email campaign 
                                                          
50
  Similarly to other studies, they also found that e-mail messages sent by fictional and unofficial groups are 
ineffective. 
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in the context of university elections, where it has been possible to measure the actual turnout 
from the official voting records.  
3.3 Participation in university elections  
In the European context the number of elections is far lower than in the US, where 
people are asked to express their vote for choosing a larger number of representatives (such as 
leaders at work or at church, see Lewis and Rice, 2005) However, in addition to classic first- 
and second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), individuals have further occasions to 
cast a ballot. An example is represented by university elections, in which university students 
are asked to choose their representatives for several university councils. Those elections are 
characterized by a low level of politicization, an insignificant media coverage, and low stakes. 
Because of those reasons, scholars devoted very little attention to the study of participation in 
university elections, although voting in those elections represents an indicator of political 
engagement (Astin et al., 1997; Astin, 1998). More specifically, it deals with youth political 
participation, since university students are mostly young (in 2014, 91% of the students of the 
University of Trento were under 30) and highly educated (at least with an upper secondary-
school diploma). 
The issue of youth political participation has been addressed since seminal studies on 
participation (Milbrath, 1965; in Italy Martinotti, 1966b). Coming to the recent times, younger 
generations are generally considered distant from politics, in so far that various scholars 
defined them as ‘apathetic’ (Norris, 2003), ‘disengaged’ (Delli Carpini, 2000)  or ‘invisible’ 
(Diamanti, 1999). From a different perspective, they were referred to as generations “apart” 
(Henn, Weinstein, and Wring, 2002). According to this view, they are not considered so 
uninterested in politics and apathetic, although they are supposed to have a different 
conception of political participation with respect to their parents, leading them to different 
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ways of participating. In the Italian context, this argument was empirically tested in a recent 
study by Quaranta (2016), who found that while younger cohorts tend to disregard 
conventional participation (namely, attending political parties meetings and donating money 
to political parties), they are more likely to engage in unconventional participation (namely, 
attending environmental, civil rights and peace meetings and demonstrations). This different 
way of participating in politics can be attributed to two different processes, labeled in 
Quaranta (2016) as the ‘generational hypothesis’ and the ‘modernization hypothesis’. The 
former explains this pattern of youth participation with the period of political socialization of 
the younger cohorts, characterized by the decline of mass parties and the detachment between 
civil society and parties. The latter refers to the values shift experienced in Western societies 
from the late 70s, with the rise of new issues (i.e., civil rights, environmental issues), which 
reflected in a new way of participating in politics (the so-called New Politics, Poguntke, 
1987). Nevertheless, although unconventional forms of participation are becoming more and 
more popular, they involve only a small minority of citizens unlike the primary form of 
conventional participation, that is voting. Furthermore, the lower participation of the younger 
cohorts leads to a decline in the overall turnout. In the Italian context, one of the most 
comprehensive recent contributions on turnout did not show a substantial decline in electoral 
participation among the younger cohorts (Tuorto, 2006), but further research is needed to 
assess that relation.  
The issue of youth political participation has been further addressed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), which built up a guide including a large number of 
interventions undertaken in different countries for enhancing youth participation.
51
 The issue 
was even addressed in Denmark by two GOTV studies, which have tested the impact of 
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 The first lines of the guide efficiently sum up the issue of youth participation: “young people […] are often 
involved in informal, politically relevant processes, such as activism or civic engagement, they are not formally 
represented in national political institutions such as parliaments and many of them do not participate in elections. 
This can impact on the quality of democratic governance.” (UNDP, 2012, p.3). 
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mobilizing tools on first-time voters, to increase turnout and to reduce inequalities among 
low-propensity and high-propensity voters (Bhatti et al., 2015, 2017). Although the effects 
were rather small, both the studies found that those operations boost turnout among first-time 
voters and are more likely to mobilize voters with a lower initial propensity to turn out. Our 
GOTV campaign was thought as an intervention within this framework, following the UNDP 
good practices and encouraging actions aimed at fostering youth political participation also 
during the electoral period.  
Furthermore, several studies have found that voting is habit-forming (Green and Shacar, 
2000; Plutzer, 2002; Gerber, Green, and Shacar, 2003), namely voting in an election makes 
more likely to vote in other elections. Therefore, even though this chapter will not give 
empirical evidence on the habit formation of participating in university elections, previous 
research suggests that it could predict participation in following more salient elections. 
Because of the young age of the voters, university elections could be one of the first electoral 
events for most of the students, thus it can really help them in reducing the “inertia” to 
participate (Plutzer, 2002) 
Determinants of participation in university election were never investigated, with the 
exception of a single study in the US analysing through aggregate level data various 
predictors of turnout (Lewis and Rice, 2005). Among student demographic factors, it was 
found that only the percentage of full-time students was associated to a higher turnout, while 
the percentage of women and minorities, as well as the percentage of students being from 
another state were not significantly related. Since previous research has never tested whether 
individual-level factors which are generally related to turnout in political elections are even 
associated to turnout in university elections, the present chapter aims at facing that issue, by 
focusing on the role played by social centrality and socio-demographic characteristics  
(Milbrath, 1965; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
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3.4 Research questions  
Moving from the theoretical background illustrated here and in Chapter 1, this chapter 
aims at answering to different research questions on turnout in university election, concerning 
both the role of online mobilization and social centrality. Within the framework of the thesis, 
the main research question is the following: 
RQ1: Do email messages increase turnout (in an Italian low-salience election)? 
Since previous research has provided mixed findings, no specific hypothesis regarding 
this first research question is given, although following the previous literature it is expected 
that the relation, if present, will be weak. Anyhow, in our GOTV experiment email messages 
were sent by an official source, following Malhotra, Michelson, and Valenzuela (2012), who 
found a weak positive effect on turnout. 
Moreover, the GOTV experiment manipulates both the content of the message (‘civic 
duty’, ‘political efficacy’, ‘being decisive’ – see Section 3.5 for more information) and the 
timing of delivery (either one or five days before the election). Previous research found that 
content is more relevant when messages include elements of social pressure, while other types 
of appeals seem not to produce differentiated effects on turnout (see Chapter 1, subsection 
1.3.2). Nonetheless, the experimental design was planned to include different messages in 
order to test whether some specific appeals are more likely to mobilize young voters.
52
 
Looking at the timing of the message, some previous GOTV experiments found a recency 
effect (see Chapter 1, subsection 1.3.2), namely that the message is more effective in 
increasing turnout when nearer in time to the election day. Moving from the previous 
literature, two more specific research questions are thus addressed, dealing respectively with 
the content and the timing of delivery of email messages, as follows: 
RQ2a: Do email messages with different contents have differentiated effects on turnout? 
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 Because of ethical issues, the messages employed in this experiment do not, however, include elements of 
social pressure. 
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RQ2b: Does the timing of the email message affect turnout? 
Both the effects of the content and the timing of the message should be conditional on 
the general effect of email messages of turnout since negative effects of specific contents or 
timings of delivery are not theoretically expected. 
The last research question does not deal with the GOTV campaign, but more broadly on 
the determinants of turnout in university elections. In the context of university elections, 
social centrality is perceived as centrality in university life, both referring to socio-
demographic and academic career factors. The research question can be expressed as follows: 
RQ3: Do socio-demographic background and academic career-related factors predict 
turnout in university elections? 
Measures employed for answering this question are presented in Section 3.6. 
3.5 The context and the experimental design 
The case study deals with the election of student representatives of the University of 
Trento, which took place on November 18-19, 2014. Students having the right to vote were 
16,399, belonging to 13 different departments. As previously stated, university elections are 
low-salient; thus turnout is rather modest. In 2014 elections, although only 21,1% of the 
students turned out, the result was far higher than in previous student elections in the 
University of Trento (14,5% in 2010 and to 17,3% in 2012) and similar elections in other 
Italian universities.
53
 Students were called upon to elect their representatives in the academic 
senate, in their own department council and in other thematic commissions
54
. Overall, 93 
elected offices had to be chosen. However, the number of representatives elected in every 
department council strictly depends on voter turnout, since fewer representatives (than the 
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 For instance, at the University of Milan turnout in 2014 student election was equal to 12,0%, at the University 
of Turin it was equal to 7,7% in 2015 election. 
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 Concerning sport, right to education and Opera Universitaria. 
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number expected) are elected in a department council when a quorum of 15% is not reached 
in the department.  
The access to the official voting records was possible thanks to the collaboration with 
the Chancellorship and other university offices, and turnout data collection was performed by 
the electoral office. Data were transmitted to the university research office, which produced a 
dataset including the records of all the students with the right to vote, in an anonymous form.  
The experiment consists of delivering email messages encouraging to vote to 
randomized groups of students. The whole delivering procedure was realized by the 
communication and events division of the University of Trento. Emails were delivered to the 
personal addresses provided by the students for receiving communications. For this reason, it 
is supposed that these email addresses were usually checked by the students, or at least that 
they were the most employed ones. Since 144 students did not provide an email address (or 
did not have an active email address), they were excluded from the study. Therefore, the 
sample involved in the randomization procedure was made of 16,255 students. 
Through a simple randomization, carried out by the research office of the university, 
students were firstly allocated to four different experimental groups. One group (control 
group: N=4,068) did not receive any email, while the other three groups (treatment groups) 
received an email with different content for each group, appealing respectively to civic duty 
(N=4,063), political efficacy (N=4,069) and to cast a decisive vote (N=4,055). All the three 
messages were expected to encourage electoral participation since they deal with arguments 
concerning factors that are acknowledged predictors of voter turnout. Civic duty is a key 
concept in Riker and Ordershook’s (1968) revised version of the rational choice theory of 
voter turnout (the so-called D term): citizens with a higher level of civic duty have a higher 
propensity to vote. Furthermore, various GOTV experiments, in primis Gerber and Green’s 
first experiment (2000), employ civic duty messages aimed at increasing turnout. The 
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message on political efficacy aims at involving students in university decisions. Previous 
literature found that the higher is the political efficacy, the higher is the likelihood to vote 
(Pattie and Johnstone, 1998). The ‘being decisive’ message rely on the possibility to not reach 
the quorum allowing to elect all the representatives available. The content of the appeal is 
strictly linked to the probability of casting the decisive vote, which plays a crucial role in the 
original Downsian theory of voter turnout (1957): the higher is the probability of casting a 
decisive ballot, the higher is the likelihood to turn out. In other words, the message deals with 
the closeness of the election, however not regarding the importance of casting a ballot that 
could be decisive in determining the success of a candidate, but in meeting a crucial threshold 
in turnout. 
An example of email messages (the ‘being decisive’ one) is reported in Figure 3.1 (the 
other messages are reported in Figures A3.1 and A3.2 in Appendix). The three emails only 
differ in the body of the message (grey-highlighted in Figure 3.1). Emails were sent by a no-
reply address of the University of Trento, which was used in order to disincentivize answers. 
If on one-side a no-reply address can discourage to open the email, on the other side the 
reference to the University of Trento (@unitn.it) and the direct subject line (“Elezioni 
universitarie: PARTECIPA”) could have made students aware of the truthfulness of the 
message. The keywords of the message were written in capital letters, in order to be more 
impressed. They mainly deal with a voting alert and a strong invitation to participate. 
Furthermore, the email message provided information on when and where to vote and how to 
find information on the candidates. The email was signed by the administrative in charge of 
the GOTV campaign
55
, belonging to the communication and events division of the university. 
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 Asterisks cover her name for privacy reasons. 
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Figure 3.1: Example of email message (Being decisive message)
56
.   
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 15:43:07 +0100 
From: noreply@unitn.it 
Subject: University elections: PARTICIPATE! 
To:  
  
Next Tuesday and Wednesday the STUDENT ELECTIONS for the appointment of student representatives will 
take place. 
  
YOU ALSO ARE CALLED TO EXPRESS YOUR PREFERENCE. 
DON’T FORGET TO VOTE! 
  
Voting in university elections is important. 
The number of representatives in every department is directly proportional to the number of voting students in 
the department itself. If a minimum threshold of votes is not reached, the number of representatives in your 
department will be lower than the available positions and the student representation will be weaker. 
Your voting participation can make the students’ voice louder. 
MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD, PARTICIPATE! GO TO THE POLLS!  
 
You could vote on the following dates: 
Tuesday 18 November, from 9.00 to 17.00  
Wednesday 19 November from 9.00 to 16.00  
  
FURTHER INFORMATION: 
Information on the CANDIDATES is available on the webpage http://www.unitn.it/ateneo/181/elezioni  
Indications on the POLLING STATIONS will be available in every department during the election days.  
  
 ---- 
Best regards, 
for the Internal Communication of the University 
********* ******  
Communication and Events Division 
General Direction 
University of  Trento 
 
In addition, every treatment group was randomly split into two sub-groups, which 
differed from the timing of the email. A half of every group received the email 5 days before 
the election (13 November 2014, at about 4 pm), while the other half received it the day 
before the election (17 November 2014, at about 10 am).
57
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 Author’s translation. Original messages were written in Italian. Text highlighted in grey was not highlighted in 
the original e-mail messages. 
57
 Civic duty group - Five days before: N=2,036; One day before: N=2,027. 
Political efficacy group - Five days before: N=2,031; One day before: N=2,038. 
Being decisive group - Five days before: N=2,025; One day before: N=2,030. 
Randomization checks show that the distributions of experimental groups do not significantly differ in terms of 
socio-demographic and career-related variables (p-value > 0.05 in every chi-square test. See Table A3.2 in 
Appendix A3) 
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3.6 Data, measures and methods 
Besides experimental data, namely the actual turnout and the experimental conditions, 
the analyses employ a unique administrative dataset coming from the communication and 
events division of the University of Trento. For every individual, information on experimental 
conditions and turnout is matched with socio-demographic characteristics and academic 
career-related variables. Among individual-level factors, two sets of variables are employed 
as measures of social centrality, both referring to socio-demographics and academic career. 
As socio-demographic variables, we include gender, the area of residence and type of upper-
secondary school qualifications. 
Although historically gender had represented a predictor of turnout, that is, men were 
more likely to participate in elections than women, recent studies have confirmed the 
disappearance of the gender gap (Smets and Van Ham, 2013). Furthermore, among Italian 
adolescents the intention to turn out proved not to significantly vary by gender (Cicognani et 
al., 2012) Nonetheless, we will take into account of gender in the analysis of the determinants 
of turnout in university elections, at least as a control variable. 
Area of residence is measured in 5 categories: Trento, Province of Trento, Province of 
Bolzano, other Italian regions and foreign countries. This variable could be interpreted as one 
of the measures of centrality in university life. Indeed, the large majority of the students 
coming from outside Trentino-Alto-Adige is supposed to be domiciled in Trento, while the 
ones coming from the provinces of Trento and Bolzano are supposed to be mainly commuter 
students. Previous research found that commuter students are less prone to participate in 
university events and interact with peers (Jacoby, 2000; Newbold, Mehta, and Forbus, 2011), 
in other words, that they are more marginal in university context than the others. Nonetheless, 
no specific information on the place of domicile of the students is available. 
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Since the Italian educational system allows various tracks in upper secondary education, 
reflecting in a hierarchy of the level of prestige and quality of teaching (Gasperoni, 1996), the 
type of upper secondary-school qualification is meant as a measure of horizontal inequality, 
that can further reproduce the socio-economic background of the students (Triventi, 2014). 
Cicognani et al. (2012) also found that students from lyceum are more likely to be politically 
engaged, and in particular to turn out in subsequent elections than students from vocational 
schools. Type of secondary school qualification is here categorized in lyceum, technical or 
teaching training school, vocational school and a residual category including other Italian 
qualifications, abroad qualifications and not specified titles. 
For what concerns academic career-related variables, we consider the number of ECTS 
credits obtained in the last academic year, the age of enrollment and the stage of career.  
The first variable measures the number of credits obtained during the last academic 
year, 2013/2014, and the current academic year till November 16, 2014 (two days before the 
elections), later categorized into four quartiles. This is assumed to be another measure of 
centrality in university life, since it is supposed that more successful students in terms of 
credits obtained should be more integrated into the university context than the less successful 
ones. Since the credits mainly refer to the academic year 2012/2013, in the dataset most of the 
first year students have zero credits. 
The stage of career could be associated to the electoral stakes perceived by students. 
Stakes are supposed to be higher for students at the beginning of their career, since they 
should spend a longer period of time in the university context. Therefore, these students are 
supposed to have more opportunities to be informed of the electoral event, and accordingly, a 
higher likelihood to participate. The stage of career is measured in three categories (first 
years, last years, and supplementary years), by considering also the type of degree of the 
program attended. ‘First year(s)’ category includes all the students enrolled in the first or in 
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the second year of the bachelor or unique cycle master degree, or in the first year of the 
master degree. ‘Last year(s)’ deals with students enrolled in the third year of the bachelor 
degree, or in the second year of the master degree, or in the third, fourth or fifth year of 
unique cycle master degree. Students enrolled in the university who are delaying with 
graduation are included in ‘delay’ category.  
Age of enrollment is coded in two categories, lower than 25 and equal or higher than 
25. Similarly to other measures employed, it is meant as a measure of centrality in university 
life, since students enrolled at the university at an older age are largely more likely to be 
workers and then to be less integrated into the university context. Therefore, students enrolled 
at a younger age are expected to make register a higher participation in the university 
elections. Moreover, no information on the occupational status is available. 
An additional measure dealing with the type of degree (bachelor, master, and unique 
cycle
58
) will be employed in the analysis as a control variable. Differently from the other 
variables, it is not measured at the individual-level, but rather at the degree program level.  
 
Research questions will be tested using different methods. RQ1 and RQ2A-B will be 
simply answered by comparing turnout between every treatment group and the control group 
by means of two-tailed proportions test. Analyses of experimental data are carried out on 
16,255 students, the ones who were included in the experimental design. Since randomization 
was realized at the individual-level, the assessment of the effects of experimental condition on 
turnout does not require the employment of hierarchical models. Further analyses explore 
whether the effects of email messages on voter turnout vary according to the socio-
demographic and academic career factors described above. This will be done through six 
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 Two unique cycle degree programs are provided by the University of Trento: the degree program in Law 
within the Department of Law and of the degree program in Architecture and Building Engineering within the 
Department of Civil, Environmental and Mechanical Engineering. 
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separate logistic regression models with interaction terms between the experimental condition 
(control vs treatment) and the student level variables. 
For answering the third research question (RQ3), dealing with the determinants of 
participation in university elections, analyses need to take into account the hierarchical 
structure of the data. Students are indeed nested in degree programs, which are in turn nested 
in departments. The composition of degree programs and departments in terms of socio-
demographic and career-related characteristics of the students could indeed largely vary. As 
well, a large difference is registered in the distribution of the outcome, that is individual 
turnout, among degree programs and departments (see Table A3.1 in Appendix A3 for the 
percentage of voters in every department). Considering the low salience of the election, the 
Centre for Biology Integration and the Department of Physics made register very high levels 
of participation, near to 50%.
59
 On the other side, two departments (Psychology and Cognitive 
Science, Letters and Philosophy) did not achieve the quorum of 15%, thus they were not able 
to elect the expected number of representatives. Among the departments with a high number 
of students, a rather high participation was registered in the Department of Law (27%), while 
in the Department of Sociology and Social Research the 15% threshold was barely overcome. 
Because of the hierarchical structure of the data, the analysis is carried out by means of 
a three-level multilevel model, where degree programs deal with the level-2 units, while 
departments with the level-3 ones. The dependent variable of the analysis is the actual 
turnout, while the independent variables are represented by the six abovementioned 
individual-level variables (gender, area of residence, type of secondary school, stage of 
career, number of credits obtained in last academic year) and one degree program level 
variable, that is, the type of degree. The total number of students involved in this analysis is 
equal to 15,775, since students who were enrolled in degree programs with less than 10 
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 Even in previous elections, these departments are characterized by a high turnout. It is hard to identify a 
common pattern in the performance of the two departments, since they are located in two different localities next 
to Trento. Further investigations are needed to better understand these results. 
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students or with null turnout are excluded.
60
 Degree programs considered are thus 48,
61
 with a 
number of students (level-1 unit) ranging from 42 to 2,568, while departments are 13, with a 
number of degree programs ranging from 1 to 11.  
Two main advantages are associated with the use of multilevel models in this situation, 
other than properly taking into account the hierarchical structure of our data. First, they allow 
an assessment of the variance partitioning, namely the quota of residual variance ascribable to 
every level, which cannot be evaluated in single-level models. Second, multilevel models 
allow the introduction of independent variables referring to properties of the higher level of 
analysis and properly assess their effect on the dependent variable measured on level-1 units. 
Nevertheless, the employment of multilevel models does not come without 
shortcomings. Scholars indeed largely debated about the estimation of multilevel models 
when the number of higher-level units is small. The number of three-level units employed in 
this chapter, equal to 13, is indeed slightly higher than the minimum number of clusters 
suggested by Snijders and Bosker (1999), that is, 10. By making use of simulations on survey 
data, Bryan and Jenkins (2016) show the issues of employing small numbers of higher-level 
units in multilevel models with random effects and both individual- and group-level fixed 
effects. In the assessment of variance partitioning coefficients, we thus need to be cautious in 
the interpretation of the results, however, whether level-2 and level-3 variances will prove to 
be significantly higher than zero we have robust evidence of the presence of variability at the 
group-levels.  
Multilevel linear probability models are thus employed. They indeed allow directly 
estimating level-1 variance, which has to be taken as fixed when using multilevel logistic 
models (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Moreover, they facilitate interpretation and comparison 
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 The degree programs with less than 10 students are supposed to not be active when the university election took 
place, while the total absence of students not voting enrolled to a precise degree program does not allow 
variability in the outcome within those level-2 units  
61
 In the complete dataset, students are enrolled in 65 unique degree programs.
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among models, and to reduce the issues of omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity 
(Mood, 2010). Nonetheless, exploratory analyses employing multilevel logistic regression 
provide substantially analogous results.  
The presentation of the models follows a step-wise procedure: Model 0 represents the 
null model, Model 1 includes socio-demographic variables, then academic career-related 
variables are added in Model 2, and finally, the type of degree enters in Model 3. 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 GOTV campaign 
Table 3.1 allows answering the main research question (RQ1) and the two more specific 
ones (RQ2a and RQ2b). The “treatment” group refers to all the students that received an email 
message, without taking into account the content and the timing of delivery. RQ1 is answered 
through the comparison between the “treatment” group and the “control” group. Voter turnout 
is little higher in the “treatment” group (21,3% vs 21,1% in the “control” group), but the 
difference is largely not significant. Email messages were only able to mobilize about 2 
students out of 1000, that is a largely insignificant result. Although the messages were sent by 
the organization in charge of the election, namely the University of Trento, as in Malhotra, 
Michelson, and Valenzuela (2012), emails seem not to boost electoral participation. 
Nonetheless, we have to point out that while in Malhotra, Michelson, and Valenzuela (2012) 
emails were sent directly by the address of the person in charge of the election, in our 
experiment emails were sent by an impersonal institutional address. 
Although GOTV campaign seems to be ineffective, differences between types of 
treatment could be detected. In order to test RQ2a, the effect of the different contents is tested 
comparing every treatment group (in terms of different content of the message) with the 
control group, without considering the timing of delivery of the message. The message 
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focused on the possibility to determine the electoral outcome (“being decisive”) proves to be 
the most effective (21,9%), although not significantly. On the other hand, citizens belonging 
to the civic duty group show a lower level of participation (20,5%) than the control, but not 
significant even in this case. We have further tested the difference of voter turnout in every 
two couple of treatment groups, but no significant differences are found. As in Gerber and 
Green’s (2000) experiment, different contents of the message do not produce differentiated 
effects on voter turnout. As previously underlined, the messages employed did not vary in 
terms of social pressure, which proved to significantly affect turnout in several GOTV 
studies. 
Table 3.1: Turnout (%) by experimental group (N=16,255).  
Group N % Turnout 
P-value (two-tailed) on 
difference with the control 
Control  4,068 21.1 Na 
Treatment  12,187 21.3 0.77 
    
Treatment – Content    
Treatment - Civic duty 4,063 20.5 0.54 
Treatment - Political efficacy 4,069 21.5 0.68 
Treatment - Being decisive 4,055 21.9 0.35 
    
Treatment - Timing     
Treatment - 5 days before 6,092 21.5 0.61 
Treatment - 1 day before 6,095 21.1 0.99 
    
Treatment – Content*Timing    
Treatment - Civic duty*5 days before 2,036 21.8 0.60 
Treatment - Civic duty*1 day before 2,027 19.2 0.09 
Treatment – Political efficacy*5 days before 2,031 21.7 0.61 
Treatment - Political efficacy *1 day before 2,038 21.2 0.89 
Treatment - Being decisive *5 days before 2,025 21.1 1.00 
Treatment - Being decisive *1 day before 2,030 22.8 0.12 
 
Notes: Proportion tests have been run for every couple of experimental groups, by content and timing. All the differences are 
not statistically significant. 
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The same applies for the timing of the message (RQ2b). The difference in turnout 
between students who received the email 5 days before the election and the other students 
(both students who did not receive the email and students who received the email, totally 
ineffective, the day before the election), apart from the content, is equal to 0.4 percentage 
points, however not significantly different from zero. Therefore, no empirical evidence on the 
recency effect has been found.
62
 
Moreover, there are no combinations of content and timing of the message producing a 
significant increase in turnout; even, there is weak evidence on the adverse effect of civic duty 
messages sent the day before the election (- 1.9 percentage points, significant at 90% level). 
Figure 3.2: Average marginal effect on turnout of having received the GOTV email by gender, 
area of residence, type of secondary school, stage of career, number of credits obtained in last 
year and age of enrollment. Estimates from logistic regression models. 95% confidence intervals 
(N=16,255). 
  
According to the theory of contingent mobilization (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009), 
in a low-salience election high-propensity voters are more likely to be mobilized, thus we 
should expect that the students more involved in the university life are more mobilized. 
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 The interaction between content and timing of delivery has been further analysed and it has proved to be 
largely not significant. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the average marginal effects of the interaction between the experimental 
condition and socio-demographics and academic-related factors estimated by means of six 
separated logistic regression models. The effects of email messages and turnout are not 
significantly different from zero for all the categories of the independent variables. Thus, no 
differentiated effects of the online mobilization among student characteristics are detected. 
3.7.2 Determinants of participation in university elections 
Although online mobilization proved not to increase participation in university election, 
further analyses aimed at detecting who vote in that kind of election and thus at answering 
RQ3 are presented in this paragraph. Table 3.2 shows the output of the stepwise three-level 
linear probability models with turnout in university election as the dependent variable. 
Looking at the variance components, the almost totality of the variance is explained at the 
individual level (91.8% in null model). Level-1 variance lowers from 0.161 to 0.158 after 
adding socio-demographics, and it makes register the highest reduction when including 
career-related factors, moving to 0.152. However, in every model variance at the degree-
program level (level-2) is significantly higher than zero. After adding socio-demographics, 
the variance partitioning coefficient for level-2 moves from 4.7% (Model 0) to 4.2% (Model 
1). Then, in Model 2 including career-related factors the coefficient is equal to 4.1%, and it 
still lowers to 3.6% in Model 3, which also accounted for the type of degree. Therefore, the 
more substantial drops in variance partitioning coefficient for level-2 are mainly due to the 
different composition of the degree programs in terms of socio-demographics and to the 
explicative power of the type of degree. Anyhow, the employment of multilevel models 
confirms to be well suited to analyse those data, since a significant quota of variance comes 
from group levels. Variance at the department level (level-3) is instead not significantly 
different from zero in all the four models. We should, however, take into account that 
variance at higher levels with a limited number of groups is systematically underestimated, as 
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illustrated in the previous section, and that most of the group-level variance is explained at the 
level-2. 
Table 3.2: Multilevel linear probability models (beta coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses) with turnout in 2014 university election in Trento as dependent variable (95% 
confidence intervals). 
VARIABLES  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOCIO-DEMO      
Gender (Male) Female  0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Area of residence Province of Trento  0.01 0.00 0.00 
(Trento) (Trento excluded)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Province of Bolzano  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Other Italian region  0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Foreign countries  -0.04 -0.06** -0.06** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Secondary school (Vocational) Technical/Teacher  0.02 0.01 0.01 
 Training  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Lyceum  0.07*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Other/Abroad  -0.00 0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
UNIVERSITY RELATED      
Stage of career Last year(s)   -0.07*** -0.07*** 
(First year(s))    (0.01) (0.01) 
 Delay   -0.19*** -0.19*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Credits obtained 2nd Quartile   0.02* 0.02* 
(1st quartile)    (0.01) (0.01) 
 3th Quartile   0.02** 0.02** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
 4th Quartile   0.07*** 0.06*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of enrollment >=25   -0.10*** -0.09*** 
(<25)    (0.01) (0.01) 
Type of degree Unique cycle    -0.09 
     (0.07) 
 Master    -0.03 
     (0.03) 
Constant  0.23*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Variance Level 1  0.161*** 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
(Individual)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Variance Level 2  0.008*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
(Degree program)  (0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance Level 3  0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 
(Department)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations  15,775 15,775 15,775 15,775 
Degree programs  48 48 48 48 
Departments  13 13 13 13 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Model 1 shows that female students are two percentage points less likely to vote than 
male ones. Furthermore, students coming from Italian regions outside Trentino-Alto Adige 
are more likely to vote than all the other students. Since most of them are supposed to move 
from their places of residence to Trento for the university studies, they could be more 
motivated to be integrated into the university life, even when compared to the students living 
in Trento (their probability to turn out is nine percentage points higher than students resident 
in Trento). On the contrary, students coming from abroad make register the lowest level of 
participation, although the difference with the ones resident in Trento is not statistically 
significant. As expected, university students with a lyceum qualification are more likely to 
vote than the ones with a technical/teacher training (5 percentage points difference) or a 
vocational qualification (7 percentage points difference). This last finding confirms that 
horizontal inequalities are also reflected in electoral participation, consistently with previous 
research (Cicognani et al., 2012).  
In Model 2, which accounts for academic career-related factors, the effect of gender 
even increases (- 3 percentage points in turnout for female). Students coming from Italian 
regions outside Trentino-Alto-Adige and with a lyceum qualification are still significantly 
more likely to turn out, although the effects partially weaken. Moreover, the negative effect of 
coming from foreign countries increases and becomes statistically significant. Looking at the 
career-related factors, stage of career proves to be strongly associated to turnout: students 
enrolled in the first years of their degree program have higher stakes to participate, thus they 
are 7 percentage points more likely to vote than students in last years of their program, and 19 
percentage points more likely than ‘delay students’. Findings also show an overall positive 
association between the number of credits obtained and turnout. In particular, a high 
difference is observed between students in the fourth quartile, who are thought to be the most 
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integrated into the university life, and the others. Moreover, students enrolled in university at 
25 years old or later are far less likely (- 10 percentage points) to turn out than the others.  
After adding the variable on the type of degree in Model 3, coefficients for socio-
demographics and career-related variables do not substantially vary from Model 4. Finally, no 
significant differences in turnout are registered among different types of degree. 
3.8 Discussion and conclusions 
The relevance of GOTV studies is strictly connected to their impact in real-world 
campaigns. GOTV research has largely contributed to the innovation of the electoral 
campaigns, which have been becoming more and more professional, by taking into account 
the findings of the academic research. The best example is represented by Obama’s campaign 
for 2008 Presidential Election, in which a large number of volunteers were involved in 
mobilizing American citizens through door-to-door canvassing, coordinated by a professional 
campaign staff. Nowadays, in the US context an increasing number of professional 
companies
63
 offer their expertise in order to carry out GOTV studies that support every 
political candidate or party that make request (and obviously pay) for it.
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Nonetheless, our GOTV campaign has proved to be ineffective: non-partisan 
impersonal messages encouraging people to vote have not boost participation university 
students. The delivery of GOTV email messages has proved to be a waste of time, as 
Nickerson (2007a) had pointed out. The content of the messages and the timing of delivery 
did not have any impact. However, because of ethical issues the messages employed did not 
contain a strong component of social pressure, which was proved to be successful in 
increasing the likelihood to vote. Furthermore, the collaboration with the university did not 
allow to employ other forms of contacting, such as text-messages, which proved to be more 
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 As, for example, New Organizing Institute (http://neworganizing.com/content/page/gotv) and Advocacy Data 
(http://www.advocacydata.com/work/gotv/) 
64
 GOTV strategy has even inspired the electoral campaign for an Italian municipal election (Cepernich, 2015). 
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effective in other contexts. Anyhow, conducting a field experiment is often challenging. As 
stressed by Gerber and Green (2012, p. 14), “field experiments are often the product of 
coordination between researchers and those who actually carry out the interventions or furnish 
data on subjects’ outcomes”, therefore “researchers cannot make unilateral decision about 
what treatments to deploy”. 
The present study presents some clear limitations, that need to be addressed.  
First, we do not know whether a person opened the email or not, therefore the 
mechanism of the no-effect is not wholly detected. Information available only allowed to test 
intent-to-treat effect, as it usually happens in GOTV direct mail campaigns. Indeed, we cannot 
conclude that email messages are not mobilizers because students did not read them or 
because the stimuli proved to be ineffective. Previous studies register an open rate of about 
20% (Nickerson, 2007a), thus we can expect that a consistent quota of students opened the 
emails.  
Second, the choice of university students as experimental subjects and of an election for 
students’ representatives as the object of the campaign can pose a threat to the external 
validity of the study. On one hand, students could be more exposed to digital electoral 
campaign, as a result of their widespread online presence. On the other hand, since the 
messages are sent by the university, which delivers a large number of email communications 
to students, it could be possible that students do not pay attention to these emails. 
Furthermore, university elections are low-ordered, with low stakes, thus our findings need to 
be confirmed within other frameworks, wherever it is possible.  
Third, the experiment cannot detect the spillover effects of the campaign (see 
Nickerson, 2008). In other words, we cannot know whether students who voted without 
having received the email were indirectly mobilized by students who received the email. 
However, low-salience elections are characterized by a low level of interpersonal 
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mobilization (Rolfe, 2012); therefore we should be able to detect the direct effect, whenever 
existent. 
Fourth, as in most of GOTV studies, mobilizing messages do not contain a partisan 
component which is usually included in real-world campaigns. 
Although the experiment suffers from the abovementioned shortcomings, it aims at 
giving an original contribution to the research on campaign mobilization. On our knowledge, 
it represents the first GOTV email experiment in Europe and it takes to the first empirical 
evidence of the inefficacy of an impersonal non-partisan email campaign within the Italian 
framework. The experiment was successfully carried out, since the emails were actually 
delivered to the randomized groups of students and the individual turnout was unbiasedly 
measured thanks to the access to the official voting records. Overall, our findings do not 
deviate from the previous U.S. empirical evidence, which found a little-to-no effect of the 
emails. Furthermore, the results can represent a precious source for professional campaigners, 
even though they make use of partisan messages. 
Since the study has demonstrated the feasibility to carry out a GOTV experiment even 
in Italy, although in low-ordered elections, we invite researchers to carry out other GOTV 
campaigns in order to test the impact of different campaign tactics in different contexts. Other 
university elections, on a larger scale or through the coordination of some universities, could 
represent the electoral events where carrying out these experiments. In addition, primary 
elections with a register of voters could be a precious source for this kind of experimentation. 
Through an agreement with the political party in charge of the primary election, it could be 
possible to carry out a GOTV campaign. Primary elections are even well-suited for a non-
candidate-oriented campaign, since their turnout usually represents the main proxy of a 
success, or of a failure, of those elections. Furthermore, other studies carried out in a first or 
second-order election are welcome, in order both to increase the external validity of our 
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findings and to test the effect of other campaign techniques on turnout in the Italian context. 
Cantoni and Pons (2017) have proved that there is a possibility to have access to the official 
voting records, nonetheless, it strictly depends on the final decision of the president of the 
provincial court. 
Following the UNDP practices, further interventions aiming at increasing political 
participation among young voters are welcome also in the Italian context. Although our 
GOTV campaign was not successful, other campaigns should be organized in order to 
sensitize young people to participate. A significant example comes from the Danish context, 
where the Parliament sends a copy of the Constitution to all first voters before the first local, 
national or European election to which they are eligible, together to a letter remembering 
them their eligibility to vote (Bhatti et al., 2015).  
In addition, the unique dataset of the university students which includes their individual 
electoral participation allows proving some indications on an unexplored form of political 
participation, that is the vote for university students’ representatives. The analyses show that 
social centrality factors prove to be salient also in the explanation of turnout in this kind of 
election. Studies on a larger scale, including data on various university elections, are welcome 
to give further evidence to our empirical findings. Furthermore, longitudinal studies are 
needed to test whether voting in university elections is really habit-forming. 
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Appendix A3 
 
Figure A3.1: Civic duty email message. 
Next Tuesday and Wednesday the STUDENT ELECTIONS for the appointment of student representatives will 
take place. 
  
YOU ALSO ARE CALLED TO EXPRESS YOUR PREFERENCE. 
DON’T FORGET TO VOTE! 
  
Voting in university elections is important. 
Voting is your right and also your duty. Your vote is needed to guarantee the democratic life of the University 
and the students’ control on the collegiate bodies, such the Academic Senate and the Council of your department.  
Your voting participation is necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of your university. 
MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD, PARTICIPATE! GO TO THE POLLS! 
 
You could vote on the following dates: 
Tuesday 18 November, from 9.00 to 17.00  
Wednesday 19 November from 9.00 to 16.00  
  
FURTHER INFORMATION: 
Information on the CANDIDATES is available on the webpage http://www.unitn.it/ateneo/181/elezioni  
Indications on the POLLING STATIONS will be available in every department during the election days.  
  
 ---- 
Best regards, 
for the Internal Communication of the University 
********* ******  
Communication and Events Division 
General Direction 
University of  Trento 
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Figure A3.2: Political efficacy email message. 
Next Tuesday and Wednesday the STUDENT ELECTIONS for the appointment of student representatives will 
take place. 
  
YOU ALSO ARE CALLED TO EXPRESS YOUR PREFERENCE. 
DON’T FORGET TO VOTE! 
  
Voting in university elections is important. 
With your vote, you could actively participate in decisions on your university life.  
You could have a say in matters regarding your studies and your student rights. You could elect colleagues of 
yours who will represent you in the council of the department and the academic senate.  
Your voting participation can  improve the functioning of your university. 
MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD, PARTICIPATE! GO TO THE POLLS! 
 
You could vote on the following dates: 
Tuesday 18 November, from 9.00 to 17.00  
Wednesday 19 November from 9.00 to 16.00  
  
FURTHER INFORMATION: 
Information on the CANDIDATES is available on the webpage http://www.unitn.it/ateneo/181/elezioni  
Indications on the POLLING STATIONS will be available in every department during the election days.  
  
 ---- 
Best regards, 
for the Internal Communication of the University 
********* ******  
Communication and Events Division 
General Direction 
University of  Trento 
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Table A3.1: Voter turnout (%) by department. 
Department Turnout (%) N 
Centre for biology integration 49.8 269 
Physics 46.0 413 
International Studies 33.7 95 
Centre for Mind/Brain Sciences 30.8 65 
Industrial Engineering 30.4 855 
Law 27.0 2,705 
Economics 22.2 2,491 
Mathematics 22.0 478 
Civil, Environmental and Mechanical Engineering 18.3 2,051 
Information Engineering and Computer Sciences 17.0 1,348 
Sociology and Social Research 15.3 1,777 
Psychology and Cognitive Sciences 14.9 1,212 
Letters and Philosophy 14.1 2,640 
Total 21.1 16,399 
Notes: in Italic turnout under the quorum of 15% 
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Table A3.2: Randomization checks: Percentage distribution of socio-demographics and 
academic career variables by experimental condition (N=16,255), and chi-square tests of 
independence. 
 
  Experimental condition 
 
  
Variables Civic duty Civic duty Pol.efficacy Pol.efficacy Be decisive Be decisive Control 
 
P-Value (Chi2)                    
  
5 days 
before 
1 day 
before 
5 days 
before 
1 day 
before 
5 days 
before 
1 day        
before   
  
          
Gender               
 
  
Male 49.3 47.8 49.3 47.9 50.5 50.7 49.8 
 
0.37 
Female 50.7 52.2 50.7 52.1 49.5 49.3 50.2 
 
          
Area of residence 
         
Trento 12.5 11.7 12.6 12.4 13.6 12.0 11.7 
 
0.87 
Prov. Tn 27.9 28.0 27.9 28.7 26.3 27.8 27.9 
 
Prov. Bz 7.5 7.0 7.3 6.4 6.6 7.2 7.1 
 
Other Italy 49.5 51.4 49.2 50.2 51.0 50.3 50.8 
 
Foreign 2.7 1.9 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.5 
 
          
Sec. School 
         
Professional 4.7 5.1 5.6 4.5 4.1 4.6 4.6 
 
0.67 
Tecnical 29.5 31.4 31.9 30.5 30.0 32.0 30.6 
 
Lyceum 59.9 58.6 57.1 59.7 60.1 57.9 59.4 
 
Other/Abroad 5.8 4.9 5.5 5.4 5.9 5.6 5.4 
 
          
Career stage 
         
First year(s) 48.4 46.6 48.0 47.7 47.9 48.9 46.4 
  
Last year(s) 33.3 33.6 31.6 31.7 31.3 31.6 34.1 
 
0.31 
Delay 18.4 19.8 20.4 20.2 20.9 19.5 19.5 
  
          
Credits 
         
1st quartile 27.6 28.8 30.3 28.8 29.2 28.7 28.9 
 
0.57 
2nd quartile 21.3 20.5 20.8 21.2 22.2 21.0 19.5 
 
3rd quartile 27.5 26.0 26.1 26.7 24.4 26.0 26.4 
 
4th quartile 23.7 24.8 22.9 23.3 24.1 24.4 25.1 
 
          
Enrollment age 
         
<25 89.8 90.3 89.3 90.5 89.3 90.4 90.3 
 
0.68 
>=25 10.2 9.7 10.7 9.5 10.7 9.6 9.7 
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Chapter 4. The relationship between disagreement in social networks and 
electoral participation: a matter of cohesiveness?                                                    
4.1 Introduction  
Since the seminal studies of Columbia scholars (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 
1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968), political behaviour has been seen as a social 
activity, largely affected by the environment in which citizens structure their preferences 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005). The network environment has been 
acknowledged to play a central role in determining political attitudes and behaviour, such as 
vote choice (Bello and Rolfe, 2014) and electoral participation (Mutz, 2002). According to 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, p. 23), “the explanation of participation, to make any sense, 
must move beyond the worlds of individuals to include family, friends, neighbors, and 
coworkers”. Among various characteristics of the networks as predictors of political 
participation, large amounts of attention have been devoted to their political composition. 
Citizens can indeed encounter disagreement in their networks, since some of their discussants 
will likely hold different political views. As exposure to political disagreement is not 
infrequent (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2002, 2004), previous research has tested 
whether this characteristic of the network may be reflected in political participation. 
Nonetheless, while a number of studies have shown that disagreement is negatively associated 
to electoral participation, other studies argue that exposure to some disagreement can lead to a 
higher likelihood to participate (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). 
This chapter argues that both of these hypotheses hold, yet depend on the level of 
cohesiveness of the social circles to which one is exposed (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). 
According to our argument, disagreement in more cohesive groups – such as the family – 
would be more difficult to bear. This would lead people to abstain as long as the level of 
disagreement in the group increases (Mutz, 2002). On the other side, in less cohesive groups – 
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such as those composed of friends – some disagreement can lead to higher likelihoods of 
turnout. This is because low levels of coercion (typical of the weak ties circles) can create a 
unique situation in which competition of opinions leads to the virtuous cycle of interest, 
commitment in political issues and participation (Nir, 2011; Bello, 2012). 
In order to test our expectations, Italian National Election Study (ITANES) data 
collected before the 2013 national elections will be used. By means of linear regression 
models, which employ as the main independent variable a continuous measure of political 
disagreement rarely used in the literature (Lee, Kwak, and Campbell, 2015; Guidetti, 
Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016), it is found, consistent with our hypotheses, that mixed political 
views among non-cohesive circles (namely, friends) are associated with a higher likelihood to 
turn out. The relation between family disagreement and likelihood to turn out, on the contrary, 
proves to be linear and negative. 
4.2 Theoretical Background 
4.2.1 Disagreement, diversity and electoral participation 
The relation between network and political participation has been investigated since 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s seminal work, The People’s choice (1968), in which the 
authors examined the effects of cross-pressures, defined as “the conflicts and inconsistencies 
among the factors which influence vote decision” (p. 53). Although their approach was 
mainly based on extra–political sources of conflict between social memberships (such as the 
most–known example of religious affiliation and socio–economic status) the authors also 
focused their attention on the cross-pressures between the voter and the prevalence of a 
political choice among family and associates.
65
 According to their framework, a citizen 
embedded in a network where at least some of the members politically disagree with her is 
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 This type of cross-pressures was later referred by Mutz (2002) as cross-cutting networks, in order to 
differentiate them from the other types of cross-pressures. 
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considered to be under cross–pressure, and, as a result, is more likely to delay her voting 
decision. Some decades later, a remarkable number of studies tested whether somewhat 
opposing ideas in one’s social network dampen turnout. General consensus concerning the 
nature of the relationship, however, has not yet been reached. 
A number of contributions found a negative relation between disagreement and turnout, 
reinforcing Lazarsfeld and colleagues’ (1968) results. Among these studies, the main 
contributions came from Mutz (2002, 2006), who provided a more systematic framework 
explaining the deterrent effect of disagreement both on political participation and turnout. 
Similar results were found in other studies, both in the US (McClurg, 2006; Belanger and 
Eagles, 2007; Eveland, Song and Beck, 2015) and in other contexts, such as Great Britain 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2009), and Italy (Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016). 
Conversely, other studies did not find a relation between disagreement and turnout 
(Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004; Huckfeldt, Mendez, 
and Osborn, 2004; Nir, 2005), or indicated only an indirect relation through the time of voting 
decision (Hopmann, 2012). 
Several recent contributions (Eveland and Hively 2009; Nir 2011; Bello, 2012; 
Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg, 2013; Lupton and Thornton, 2017) suggest rethinking the 
way of assessing the relationship between disagreement and turnout, arguing that the sole 
concept of disagreement is not enough. By identifying two crucial, qualitatively different 
states of disagreement (Nir, 2011, p. 676), they highlighted that opinion diversity, per se, does 
not necessarily depress participation. These studies found that there is a substantial difference 
between being exposed to a network composed of people who totally disagree with ego and 
experiencing some disagreement, namely, being exposed to both agreeable and disagreeable 
discussants (Bello, 2012). According to this framework, citizens experiencing disagreement 
could be included either in an opposition or in a competition network. If universal opposition 
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depresses turnout (consistently with previous studies) then competition can stimulate, and 
thus mobilize, voters (Bello, 2012; Eveland and Hively, 2009; Lupton and Thornton, 2017; 
Nir, 2011). In addition, experiencing complete agreement may signal to ego that the marginal 
utility of her choice would make an insignificant difference to the outcome, and thus 
discourage turnout. 
Mixed findings emerge from studies that investigate the mobilizing nature of 
competitive networks. By analysing turnout in two different US elections, it was found that 
citizens experiencing competition are more likely to vote for the House of Representatives 
than citizens experiencing total agreement, while no difference is registered in the turnout for 
Presidential elections (Nir, 2011). Moreover, by studying both the direct effect of 
disagreement on turnout and the indirect effect through the time of voting decision and 
political discussion, Bello (2012) showed some empirical evidence concerning the mobilizing 
nature of the competitive networks.  
It seems that the relation between disagreement and turnout could be visualized as a sort 
of inverted U, where turnout is lowest in a total opposition network, highest in a competitive 
network and decreases again as people are exposed to complete agreement. 
Furthermore, some scholars suggest distinguishing between the concept of disagreement 
and the concept of diversity (Eveland and Hively, 2009; Lupton and Thornton, 2017). While 
disagreement is defined as “the extent to which one is exposed to individuals with whom one 
disagrees”, diversity represents “the extent to which multiple viewpoints are expressed in the 
individual’s discussion network” (Lupton and Thornton, 2017: p. 4). By testing the effects of 
separated measures of the two concepts, it was found that while disagreement discourages 
electoral participation, diversity boosts it, although not significantly (Lupton and Thornton, 
2017). Nonetheless, even though the concepts can diverge, it is possible to find a 
correspondence between disagreement and diversity. Indeed, we can think that ego 
124 
 
experiences the highest level of diversity when half of the network discussants hold different 
political views from (disagree with) her. Similarly, when ego is exposed to total agreement or 
total disagreement (complete opposition), she experiences no diversity.
66
 In other words, we 
can refer to diversity as a situation where an individual is exposed both to agreement and 
disagreement. Coming back to the qualitatively different states of disagreement, an individual 
is embedded in a competitive network only when she is exposed to some diversity of opinions 
in her network. Since the two concepts prove to be interrelated, we will not test their 
separated effects on turnout, however we will integrated the notion of diversity within the 
framework of disagreement. 
4.2.2 Mechanisms of participation 
The literature proposing a relationship between participation and disagreement provides 
at least three mechanisms to explain this empirical result. 
The first is rooted in the social norms that regulate political discussion among citizens 
and stresses the constraining nature of the general climate of that network (Ulbig and Funk, 
1999; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2016). This social accountability explanation (Mutz, 2002) 
focuses on the system of social rewards and punishments that regulates political discussions: 
in the case of disagreement in a certain social network, ego tends to feel more uncomfortable 
with taking a political side that would unavoidably displease a part of her discussants (Mutz, 
2002). As a result, ego could be more prone to abstaining in order to preserve the social 
harmony of her discussion network. 
The second theoretical mechanism is the so-called ambivalence (Mutz, 2002; Bello, 
2012). According to this explanation, people who are more exposed to disagreement have a 
higher propensity to remain uncertain until the final days before the election because of cross-
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 These considerations apply under the assumption of the existence of only two classes of political views. It 
means that when an individual is embedded in a network of complete opposition, all of her discussants hold 
similar political views. If they hold different political views, the diversity will be no more null. Following 
previous literature, both the theoretical and the empirical section of the chapter will ground on this assumption.   
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pressures produced by their environment. Thus, it is expected that part of these undecided 
people will withdraw from the possibility of expressing a vote choice when the election day 
comes because of their indecision (which, in turn, increases the likelihood of abstaining). 
While the first two mechanisms suggest that the level of disagreement should be 
negatively associated with turnout, the third one, that assigns a crucial role to the concept of 
diversity, argues that different states of disagreement produce complex effects on turnout. 
According to this mechanism, being exposed to diverse opinions leads individuals to benefit 
from their exposure to the different sides of the political debate, making them more 
knowledgeable about politics with respect to those who hear from only one side. Knowledge 
and interest, in particular, represent two of the strongest predictors of political participation 
and turnout (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). In other words, as Nir (2011, p. 676; see also 
Scheufele et al. 2004, 2006) points out, “[i]ndividuals’ networks characterized by their 
diversity of opinion [...] increase factual knowledge and interest, and motivate further 
exposure to mass-mediated hard news and reflection on its content”. As a result, citizens 
embedded in diverse/competitive networks are activated by their environment.
67
 According to 
this framework, then, exposure to different levels of disagreement has a two–sided effect on 
people’s behavior: from one side, total opposition, that implies no diversity, leads to 
uncomfortable situations, in which people perceive themselves as being attacked because of 
their opinion (with the result of a likely depression in turnout). From the other, some 
disagreement leads to a more intense exchange of ideas, which can, in turn, enhance 
knowledge/interest and propensity to go to the polls.
68
 Following this line of research, we can 
thus expect that mechanisms of activation will be dominant in determining the turnout of 
people experiencing different levels of network disagreement (Hp1). 
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 From here on, we will refer to this mechanism as activation. 
68
 This second side of the effect could not be applied for people experiencing universal opposition, who are 
affected only by the negative side of exposure to disagreement (Verba, Brady, and Scholzman, 1995). 
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The original contribution of the chapter, however, is to argue that these two orders of 
theoretical mechanisms (social accountability/ambivalence and activation) hold, according to 
the nature of the discussants with whom ego interacts and, in particular, the intimacy that they 
share. 
4.2.3 Mechanisms of participation in cohesive and non-cohesive social groups 
As stressed in Chapter 1, when analysing the relationship between the various network’s 
characteristics and political behaviour we should always take into account the level of 
network’s intimacy (see Section 1.4). In this respect, the literature differentiates between 
cohesive and non-cohesive social groups. Generally speaking, cohesive social groups 
represent groups where the ties that connect people are more intimate; as Huckfeldt and 
colleagues (1995) notice, the most ubiquitous example of a cohesive social group is the 
familiar one. On the other hand, non-cohesive groups can be exemplified as those lying just 
beyond the boundaries of a cohesive one (for instance, groups of friends or co-workers). 
It is known that people mainly exposed to cohesive social groups tend to be subjected to 
stronger coercive power compared to people who are exposed to non-cohesive groups (Mutz 
and Mondak, 2006; Faas and Schmitt–Beck, 2010; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2016). From the 
other side, less cohesive circles, because of their structure, are expected to present a lower 
level of coercion (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995) and an increased level of permeability to new 
and unorthodox ideas (Granovetter, 1973; Vezzoni and Mancosu, 2016). In other words, since 
the level of intimacy experienced in non-cohesive social groups is lower with respect to more 
cohesive circles, we can expect that a more lenient system of social rewards and punishments 
that is usually present in the former could encourage a more productive debate. 
If it is true that cohesive networks lead to higher levels of coercion, mechanisms in 
which the normative system of social rewards and punishments are crucial (namely, social 
accountability and ambivalence) are expected to have a major role in shaping individual 
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likelihood to abstain. Exposure to coercive social relations, indeed, should lead individuals to 
perceive possible situations of disagreement as socially harmful. In turn, this could lead to 
them delaying their turnout decision or finding it difficult to take a clear political position and, 
therefore, to a higher likelihood to abstain. The corresponding hypothesis reads as follows: 
when cohesive social groups are considered, mechanisms of social 
accountability/ambivalence are dominant in determining turnout (Hp2). 
On the other hand, the relation expected by Nir (2011) and Bello (2012) would be clear 
if condensed in networks in which individuals do not expect a social sanction in case of 
disagreement. With the debate being freer and discussants less coercive, non-cohesive social 
groups are expected to be those in which some disagreement leads to a more thoughtful 
debate, that eventually enhances knowledge, interest in political topics and, in turn, the 
likelihood of going to the polls.
69
 For this reason, we expect that, when non-cohesive social 
groups are considered, mechanisms of activation are dominant in determining turnout (Hp3). 
The three hypotheses lead to a further remark on the nature of the relationship between 
network disagreement and turnout. If outcomes result in being consistent with those presented 
in the hypotheses, it means that both the social accountability/ambivalence and activation 
mechanisms hold. More specifically, they hold simultaneously in different parts of one ego–
network (the former among the more cohesive circles, the latter among the less cohesive). 
This outcome would mean that previous empirical evidence, found on the global ego-network, 
is the result of the differentiated effects of two different “social worlds” which individuals are 
exposed to in their everyday lives. 
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 According to another stream of research (Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens, 2012; Bello and Rolfe, 2014), the 
expectation could be also reversed. These studies state that in general people tend to avoid discussing dangerous 
topics (such as politics, religion, values etc.) with people who do not know well (such as, for instance, weak 
ties). On the contrary, they tend to argue about these issues with closer people and could also be more prone to 
share disagreement over time. As a result, having intimate disagreeable discussants could increase the likelihood 
of turnout, instead of depressing it. Nonetheless, by comparing the individual level of conflict avoidance in 
different types of social circles, Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens (2012) found that the lowest level of conflict 
avoidance is experienced when discussing with friends. 
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4.3 Data, measures and methods  
4.3.1 Data 
As in Chapter 2, data come from the ITANES 2013 Rolling Cross–Section (RCS) pre–
electoral survey. The whole sample is thus made of 8,722 individuals interviewed through the 
CAWI mode from January 5 to February 23 (for further information see subsection 2.5.1)  
4.3.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable employed in the analyses is the propensity to turn out in the 
2013 Italian National election, measured on a 0 (not likely at all to turn out) – 10 (very likely 
to turn out) scale. Since the survey was administered before the election, this variable (valid 
cases=8,455, mean=8.3, s.d.=2.8) is considered the most suitable to measure the intention to 
participate in elections (Bolstein, 1991). Indeed, as Wagner, Johann and Kritzinger (2012, p. 
375) pointed out, “[r]espondents might be more honest regarding their actual intention to turn 
out when presented with a scale in which people can indicate uncertainty and reluctance 
without declaring directly that they might abstain”. Although it would have been possible to 
take into account the reported turnout among respondents included in the panel module 
(namely, in wave-2), we decided not to consider it since this measure is affected by a 
remarkable over–reporting bias, a very common issue in the measurement of turnout in survey 
research. This is particularly relevant in contexts in which turnout is high (Karp and 
Brockington, 2005), as in the Italian case, where in 2013 it was about 75%. Self–reported 
turnout obtained through ITANES CAWI post-electoral survey (administered on respondents 
of the panel module) is equal to 87.6% when considering the whole sample, and 91.4% when 
considering only respondents reporting a non–missing answer category to the question on 
electoral participation. As a result, the scarce variance of the measure does not allow a proper 
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test of our hypotheses.
70
 Furthermore, since the panel module involves a minor part of the 
RCS respondents (about 3,000), we preferred to give higher leverage to the empirical findings 
by considering the largest number of respondents in the analyses. 
4.3.3 Main independent variables 
The main independent variables deal with the level of disagreement that an individual 
perceives in her networks. Since the concept is rather complex to operationalize, the 
measurement of disagreement represents a non-trivial issue. Previous research has mainly 
addressed the measurement of disagreement by employing the so-called ‘name generator’ 
technique, by which the respondent is asked to name her main political discussants (usually 
up to five, see Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe, 2009; Sokhey and Djupe, 2014). Respondent is 
thus asked to provide information on every discussant’s political attitudes (including the 
perceived vote choice). By means of these questions, it is possible to measure the level of 
political disagreement that every individual experiences, by combining respondent’s political 
views with her discussants’ (Mutz 2002; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004; Nir, 2011; 
Bello, 2012). Therefore, an individual who holds political views that are different from those 
of  all of her discussants is exposed to the maximum level of disagreement. By means of name 
generator procedures, in addition, it is possible to estimate how much one is exposed to 
diversity of opinions, namely, the variety of different political opinions in one’s network 
(Lupton and Thornton, 2017). 
The name generator approach suffers from various shortcomings. The first is the fact 
that information is ego-reported, meaning that the researcher does not know the actual 
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 The six regression models have been also estimated, only for the respondents of the panel module, by 
employing the self-reported turnout in the post-electoral survey as dependent variable, instead of the propensity 
to turn out. Even if these analyses are plagued by the abovementioned issues with the self-reported measures of 
turnout – mainly in terms of overestimation that leads to a lack of variance in contexts of high turnout – we 
observed that the patterns of the analysis exploiting the longitudinal design (although less consistent in terms of 
statistical significance) are substantially congruent to the ones employing the cross-sectional data. Models and 
predicted probabilities of self-reported turn out by networks’ disagreement are reported in Table A4.1 and 
Figures A4.2 and A4.3 in Appendix A4. 
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opinions of discussants. Research suggests that the level of people’s accuracy in guessing 
their alters’ political orientations is not particularly high (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995, p. 
131) and that there is a tendency to project one’s own attitudes onto the alters (Eveland, Song, 
and Beck, 2015). In addition, the name generation technique only allows us to obtain 
information from a limited part of the network, since individuals are usually asked to report 
information on no more than three/five people. In this way, name generator procedures tend to 
underreport information on non-cohesive groups, since members of these circles are 
considered, by definition, individually less important compared to cohesive groups members 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). Aiming to overcome these issues, the chapter employs 
original measures of network political composition, introduced for the first time by 
Baldassarri (2009) in 2006 ITANES surveys, and employed in other works (e.g. Guidetti, 
Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016). In particular, the two questions (one for family, one for 
friends), asked in the 2013 RCS survey, differ slightly from those proposed by Baldassarri 
(2009)
71
 and read as follows:  
Think of the members of your family [your friends]. How many of them do you think have 
your same political opinions? 
a. None of them (0%) 
b. A few of them (around 10%) 
c. Some of them (around 25%) 
d. About half of them (around 50%) 
                                                          
71
 The questions asked in 2006 ITANES post-electoral surveys deal with the percentage of members of the 
individual’s social circles who voted for the center-right coalition (the House of Freedom) and the center-left one 
(the Union), thus the level of political disagreement could be obtained by comparing those measures to the 
coalition voted by the respondent. Instead, in 2013 RCS survey, the questions refer to the political viewpoints of 
the social circles. Two main advantages could be underlined. First, by means of these variations, it is possible to 
measure the level of the disagreement that an individual perceives with a single question for each of the social 
circles examined. Second, since individuals could be mainly affected by the political opinions of their 
discussants, rather than by their voting intentions, which could be uncertain until the day of the election, it seems 
more proper measuring disagreement in terms of political opinions. 
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e. Many of them (around 75%) 
f. Most of them (around 90%) 
g. All of them (100%) 
These measures
72
 have the main advantage of referring to the whole network, providing 
information on more than the core group of discussants. The respondent is asked to evaluate 
her level of agreement with two social circles, where family network is meant to be more 
cohesive than friends’ one.73Another advantage is represented by the possibility to treat them 
as continuous variables, by rescaling them in a 0 (total disagreement/complete opposition) – 1 
(total agreement) scale, in which the value 0.1 is associated to the category ‘few of them 
(around 10%)’, the value 0.25 to the category ‘some of them (around 25%)’, and so forth. We 
can also expect that the highest level of competition is experienced at the 50% level - a 
situation in which ego agrees and disagrees with (more or less) an equal proportion of 
network discussants. 
At least three technical issues, related to information availability in the 2013 RCS 
survey, must be highlighted. The first is that the agreement measure does not give us any 
information about the size of the network. In other words, given our data, it is impossible to 
detect whether the respondent calculates the percentage of people in agreement with her by 
considering 5, 10 or 20 people. The second issue is connected to the first hypothesis, that 
considers the relation between the whole network and turnout. In this case, in absence of a 
variable explicitly asking it, we decided to measure the level of disagreement in the whole 
network by calculating the mean of the two measures of agreement within family and friends’ 
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 Following Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg’s (2013) distinction between general and partisan disagreement, we 
can underline that our measures tap the concept of general disagreement. 
73
 It must be stressed that when we deal with these social groups (the family and the friends), we do not have any 
empirical instrument to assess whether the family is actually more cohesive than friends’ group. We are thus 
making an assumption based on previous research (Huckfeldt et al., 1995; Klofstad et al., 2009;). The limits that 
this assumption leads to, as well as possible workarounds, will be addressed in the concluding section of this 
chapter. 
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network. This is consistent with Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani (2016), who employed the 
same data to test the linear relation between disagreement in the whole network and turnout. 
Of course, this is a crude simplification of the actual complexity of the whole network 
composition, especially because it assumes that each social circle is given equal weights in 
the variable. We will deepen this latter issue in the Section 4.5. The third drawback, which is 
shared with name generator procedures is the ego-reported nature of the variables they lead to. 
As previously observed by Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani (2016), the questions do not 
exactly measure the true disagreement, but rather the level of disagreement that individuals 
perceive in their network, which is nonetheless the one effectively experienced.  
Figure 4.1: Level of political agreement (%) in family and friends networks (n=8,107). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the level of agreement in family and friends 
networks. As found by previous research (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004), 
disagreement seems to be persistent in both the discussion networks.
74
 Only 11% of the 
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 The correlation between the two measures is .56. 
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respondents experience total agreement within their family (rising to 32% when we include 
those who encounter agreement among ‘most’ of their relatives). In friend networks, this 
figure stands at 5% (and 19% when we include those who encounter agreement among ‘most’ 
friends). Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, disagreement is more present among 
friends, where the median and the modal level of network agreement is equal to 50%. In the 
family, the median and the modal level of network agreement is 75%. This is consistent with 
several studies (e.g. Huckfeldt et al., 1995; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzegerald, 2007), in 
which the family circle is put forward as the social place in which political agreement is 
stronger. 
4.3.4 Control variables 
In order to study the genuine relation between disagreement and turnout, the models 
control for interest in politics, measured on a 4–point scale (0: no interest; 3: high interest), 
and frequency of political discussion, referred to the week before the interview, measured on 
a 6–point scale (0: never; 5: every day). Among the political controls, a measure of general 
dissatisfaction with parties has also been inserted, by means of a 11–point scale, obtained 
from a question that asked the respondent, according to her view, to which extent the whole 
party system was responsible for the Italian economic crisis (0: not at all; 10: totally 
responsible). Since the 2013 Italian electoral context was characterized by strong anti-political 
claims and a general dissatisfaction toward the established parties (Vezzoni, 2014), we argued 
that this variable can represent a good predictor of abstention. 
Following previous literature, as socio-demographic controls we insert gender, 
education (coded in three answer categories: primary, secondary and tertiary), age and age-
squared (Smets and Van Ham, 2013), and geopolitical area (coded in four categories: North–
West, North–East, Red Area, Center–South). 
Finally, in order to take into account the mobilizing effect of the electoral campaigns, a 
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continuous variable that measures the day of campaign in which respondent have been 
interviewed, on a 1 (first day of interviews) – 43 (last day of interviews) scale, has been 
added.   
4.3.5 Data analysis 
In order to test the three hypotheses, step-wise regression models with the propensity to 
turn out as dependent variable are estimated. Model 1 includes only socio-demographic 
controls, in Model 2 political variables are added, while in Models 3-6 we introduce network 
variables. In detail, Model 3 investigates the linear relation between disagreement and 
turnout, employing the individual-level of network political agreement, operationalized as the 
mean of family and friends’ network agreement. This is the strategy employed, on the same 
RCS ITANES data, by Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani (2016). Model 4 takes into account 
the non–linear relation between disagreement and turnout, by adding a quadratic term for the 
whole network political agreement. Model 4, thus, tests the relevance of the activation 
mechanism when considering the whole discussion network (Hp1). 
Then, in Model 5 and 6, we differentiate between family network and friend network 
political agreement. In order to clarify the interpretation of the results, we need to specify that 
these two models aim to study the effect of agreement in the family (friend) network on the 
propensity to turn out, net of the effects of agreement in the friend (family) network. In 
particular, Model 5 assesses the relation in a linear way, by estimating political agreement in 
those networks separately. Model 6 assesses the non-linear relation among cohesive and non-
cohesive social groups, by introducing both the linear and the quadratic term for the two 
independent variables. Those models allow us to test the relevance of both social 
accountability/ambivalence and activation mechanisms (Hp2 and Hp3). 
135 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 shows the six regression models employed to test the hypotheses. Looking at 
socio-demographics, Model 1 shows that gender, education, and geopolitical area are 
significantly associated with the propensity to turn out: men, higher educated, and individuals 
coming from the Red Area are more inclined to participate, while residing in Southern Italy 
depresses the propensity to turn out. After the introduction of political (Model 2) and network 
variables (Model 3-6), the relation between gender and propensity to turn out is reversed; net 
of political and network variables, women prove to have a higher propensity to turn out. This 
association is somewhat puzzling since gender no longer represents a standard predictor of 
turnout (Smets and Van Ham, 2013
75
). Moreover, the positive effect of the educational level 
persists, although weaker, while concerning geopolitical areas only coming from Southern 
Italy remains negatively associated with a propensity to turn out. Those findings are 
consistent with the literature on turnout in Italy (Mannheimer and Sani, 2001; Tuorto, 2006. 
Finally, the coefficients for age and age squared are not significant when including political 
and network variables.  
Consistent with numerous previous studies (e.g., Eveland and Hively, 2009; Smets and 
Van Ham, 2013), Model 2 shows that political discussion enhances the average propensity to 
vote, as does interest in politics, while a higher dissatisfaction with parties is associated with a 
lower likelihood to participate. Even after the inclusion of network variables in Models 3-6, 
the effects of political variables remain pretty stable. 
Since we deal with an RCS survey, it is no surprise that the date of interview coefficient 
is positive and significant, given that, ceteris paribus, the approach of election day leads to a 
higher propensity to turn out (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). 
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 However, the same authors show that in the few cases in which gender is found as significant in predicting 
turnout, women are more likely to vote than men, like in our analyses. 
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Table 4.1: OLS regression models with propensity to turn out as dependent variable. Estimates 
of coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). 
  Propensity to turn out 
Indep. Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
Network         
        
Network Agreement    0.52*** 4.16***   
    (0.13) (0.58)   
Network Agreement squared     -3.17***   
     (0.49)   
Family Agreement      0.69*** 0.69 
      (0.13) (0.55) 
Friends Agreement       -0.21 2.64*** 
      (0.14) (0.57) 
Family Agreement squared       -0.02 
       (0.47) 
Friends Agreement squared       -2.56*** 
       (0.50) 
Politics        
        
Political discussion   0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Interest in politics   0.73*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
All parties responsible for the crisis   -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Socio-demographics        
        
Gender (Male) Female -0.13** 0.10* 0.10* 0.12** 0.10* 0.13** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education (Primary) Secondary 0.57*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 Tertiary 1.05*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 
Geopolitical Area  North-East -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
(North-West)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
 Red Area 0.16* 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 Centre-South -0.17** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age  0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Day of Interview  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Constant  6.21*** 5.52*** 4.57*** 3.71*** 4.53*** 3.97*** 
  (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36) 
        
N  7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 
R-squared  0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As stressed in the previous section, Model 3 and 4 aim to study the relation between 
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disagreement in the whole network and propensity to turn out. Model 3 shows that an increase 
in global network agreement is associated with a higher individual propensity to turn out. This 
seems to add further empirical evidence to the strand of literature that argues a negative 
relation between disagreement and turnout. In particular, the result is consistent with previous 
analyses on the same data (Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016), which nonetheless employ 
as dependent variable the propensity to abstain in the future, finding a positive relation 
between that measure and disagreement. Model 4 tests whether the activation mechanism is 
sustained by empirical evidence (Hp1). The negative and significant squared agreement 
coefficient, together with the positive and significant main effect, lead us to posit, similar to  
Nir (2011), an inverted U relation between agreement and turnout. Figure 4.2 shows the 
predicted scores of the likelihood to turn out by (whole) network agreement estimated by 
means of Model 4 coefficients. As it is possible to see, the predicted turnout probability is at 
its peak when the level of agreement is equal to 66% – a situation of competitive/diverse 
network, where citizens encounter more agreement than disagreement. In addition, propensity 
to turn out is higher when citizens are exposed to competition rather than when they 
encounter a totally agreeable network, consistently with what is argued in Hp1.  
The other two models in Table 4.1 (Models 5 and 6) account for the same network, but 
are subdivided between cohesive and non-cohesive circles (operationalized here as family and 
friends). 
In Model 5, the family agreement coefficient is positive and significant. The friend 
network agreement, however, proves to be non–significant. Thus, the analysis seems to prove 
the existence of a linear relation between the agreement in a cohesive social group and 
turnout, while no linear relation between agreement in a non-cohesive social group and 
turnout is registered. However, Model 6, which takes into account a potential non–linear 
relation for both the networks, shows quite a different situation. Since the interpretation of the 
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coefficients and variable trends is not straightforward, linear predictions for the two 
independent variables are shown in Figure 4.3.  
Figure 4.2: Predicted means of propensity to turn out by whole network political agreement, 
estimated by Model 4 (95% confidence intervals). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Predicted means of propensity to turn out by family (left panel) and friends network 
(right panel) political agreement, estimated by Model 6 (95% confidence intervals). 
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The prediction for the family network agreement (left panel) shows a linear trend. In 
other words, the more the respondent experiences disagreement, the less she is likely to vote. 
Thus, competitive cohesive networks seem not to mobilize their members. As expected, this 
outcome seems to be more consistent with social accountability/ambivalence mechanisms 
compared to activation, corroborating Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of the family agreement 
terms estimated in Model 6 and the prediction shown in Figure 4.3 (left panel) present an 
apparent inconsistency.  
The trend is radically different for what concerns the friend network agreement. Figure 
4.3 (right panel) shows the predicted propensity to turn out at different levels of friend 
network agreement. The lowest predicted values, as in the family network case, concern 
universal opposition networks, but the peak of the distribution is around 50% (52%) in a 
situation that can be exemplified as a competitive network (consistently with the activation 
mechanism). At the same time, respondents experiencing moderate disagreement seem to 
hold a similar propensity to turn out with respect to those experiencing moderate agreement. 
In this case, the shape of the relation between disagreement and turnout looks like an inverted 
U. Thus, as expected, some disagreement in the friend network largely (and significantly) 
enhances participation, consistent with Hypothesis 3.
76
 
Previous studies have also tested whether the relation between disagreement and turnout 
is mediated by variables such as interest in politics, frequency of political discussion or 
exposure to political information (Bello, 2012). Since in this chapter we focus on the non–
linearity of the relation between disagreement and propensity to turn out, empirically tested 
through the quadratic term of our measures of disagreement, techniques aimed at detecting 
indirect effects, such as path analysis or structural equation models, could be arduous to 
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  In the chapter, it is assumed that the optimal functional form is the quadratic one, without considering other 
options. In Appendix A4 the simple bivariate relationship between agreement and turnout intention is plotted 
(Figure A4.1). As it is possible to see, the functional forms are pretty similar to models’ predictions. 
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interpret and estimate. Therefore, although linear regression models control for such 
variables, indirect effects are not assessed.  
Moreover, interest in politics and frequency of political discussion could even moderate 
the relationships between disagreement and propensity to turn out in family and friends’ 
networks. Previous findings have shown that two different mechanisms can explain the 
effects of disagreement within social circles on turnout (social accountability/ambivalence 
among relatives, activation among friends), but those mechanisms could be more prevalent 
among individuals characterized by certain political predispositions. By adding interactions 
between the quadratic terms of family and friends disagreement and interest in politics (see 
Model 6A in Table A4.2 in Appendix A4), we thus provide an answer to the last research 
question: Does interest in politics moderate the relationship between disagreement in family 
(friends) networks and propensity to turn out?  
Figure 4.4 shows that interest in politics moderates the relationship between friends’ 
agreement (right panel) and propensity to turnout while the same does not apply when 
considering the family network (left panel). In friends' circles, mechanisms of activation seem 
to play a crucial role among less interested individuals (with not at all and little interest in 
politics), since their experience of some disagreement leads to a significantly higher 
propensity to turn out (see the inverted U-shape form of the relation). This result suggests that 
among little-interested individuals the exposure to some disagreement leads to a more vivid 
debate, which then reflects in an increased propensity to vote. The same consideration cannot 
be extended to highly interested individuals, whose propensity to turn out proves not to 
depend on the amount of disagreement experienced in friends’ network. When an individual 
is very interested in politics, any experience of disagreement within friends does not have an 
impact on her likelihood to participate.  
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On the contrary, interest in politics does not moderate the relationship between 
disagreement in the family network and propensity to turn out (see Figure 4.4 – left panel: 
lines are parallel). Independently from the interest in politics, the higher is the disagreement, 
the lower is the propensity to turn out. Mechanisms of social accountability/ambivalence thus 
seem to explain the relationship between disagreement and propensity to turn out for all the 
individuals, independently from their political interest. This result gives further empirical 
leverage to the prevalence of such mechanisms when considering familiar networks: 
experiencing disagreement in familiar networks is more difficult to bear, and it leads to a 
lower propensity to turn out, even among those who are very interested in politics.  
Both for family and friends’ network, similar conclusions come out when employing the 
frequency of political discussion as moderating variable (see Figure A4.4 in Appendix A4, 
full regression model reported in Table A4.2-Model 6B in Appendix A4). 
Figure 4.4: Predicted means of propensity to turn out by family (left panel) and friends network 
(right panel) political agreement, and interest in politics (95% confidence intervals), estimated 
by Model 6A (see Table A4.2 in Appendix A4) 
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4.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The relation between participation in elections and political disagreement has been 
widely studied in electoral research (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968; Mutz, 2002; 
Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004; Nir, 2011; Rolfe, 2012). In this chapter, two orders of 
competing mechanisms in the explanation of this relation have been analysed. From one side, 
classical electoral behavior studies stressed that disagreement is an uncomfortable situation 
that drives citizens to abstain, arguing social accountability/ambivalence mechanisms 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968; Mutz, 2002). From the other side, more recent 
contributions have shown that some disagreement can lead to an activation of interest, more 
thoughtful deliberation and higher levels of turnout (Nir, 2011; Bello, 2012). In the literature, 
these two types of explanation have been presented as competing, but, in this chapter, it has 
been argued that they can both hold according to the cohesiveness of the network in which the 
individual is embedded. Since individuals are exposed, at the same time, to different social 
spaces, with different degrees of coercive power and cohesiveness, it has been argued that, in 
social circles characterized by higher coercive power and cohesiveness, social 
accountability/ambivalence could be the dominant mechanism that drives the propensity to 
turn out. On the other side, when considering circles characterized by weak ties, the relation 
between disagreement and turnout could be explained by the activation mechanism.  
By employing ITANES 2013 data – and a continuous variable that explicitly measures 
individuals’ perceived agreement in different circles – we have found that the evidence 
presented is consistent with our expectations. In other words, it seems that the relationship 
between disagreement and turnout is the result of two different effects: people are pulled, in 
their decision to turn out, by both ambivalence/social accountability and activation 
mechanisms, depending on the social circle we consider. Among discussants about whom ego 
cares more, the former mechanism will be dominant – an uncomfortable situation of 
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disagreement is even more uncomfortable when a person who is more intimate with ego is in 
disagreement with her (Erisen and Erisen, 2012; Huckfeldt et al., 1995). On the other side, 
confronting the disagreeable opinions of friends (who are assumed to share, on average, 
weaker ties with ego) can ignite mechanisms in which political deliberation becomes more 
thoughtful and enriching for discussants, and can lead, eventually, to a higher level of turnout, 
as expected by more recent contributions (Bello, 2012; Nir, 2011). 
Moreover, this chapter suggests a different perspective in the analysis of the relationship 
between disagreement and turnout. Previous research that employs the same data as our 
analysis (Guidetti, Cavazza, and Graziani, 2016) does, in fact, lead to different results. It does 
not take into account either the non–linearity of the relationship, or the cohesiveness of social 
groups in which individuals are embedded. By means of more detailed analyses, we are able 
to shed light on the potential mechanisms underlying the relationship between disagreement 
and turnout.  
Overall, findings of this dissertation lead to two main implications. First, being exposed 
to unanimous disagreement is substantially different from being exposed to not unanimous 
disagreement. In the bivariate relationships between the level of agreement in family and 
friends’ networks and the propensity to turn out (see also Figure A1 in the Appendix), we 
indeed observe the highest increase in the mean propensity to turn out when moving from 
complete disagreement to almost total disagreement. Holding isolated positions within a 
social network is dramatically detrimental to the individual political predispositions; however, 
the presence of even minimum political support is highly beneficial. This is consistent with 
the so-called Asch phenomenon (Asch 1951), according to which even a weak social 
reinforcement can produce remarkably different results in taking a position on a certain issue. 
This result suggests the need for further investigations on the qualitative and quantitative 
extent of political disagreement and its consequences on political behaviour. 
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Second, this work speaks to the long-standing dilemma between participation and 
deliberation, by offering a new perspective. Being exposed to some dissonant views is crucial 
for the existence of deliberative democracy, since it leads to higher political tolerance and 
open-mindedness, however it is generally meant to be detrimental for participatory democracy 
(Mutz, 2006). Empirical findings have shown that the experience of disagreement is 
substantially different in family and friends’ networks. When considering family, exposure to 
disagreement is harmful for participation; therefore participation and deliberation are 
associated in a sort of trade-off. When considering friends’ networks, deliberation and 
participation are no more seen as competing, since the experience of some disagreement leads 
to a higher propensity to turn out. Accordingly, we provide partial empirical evidence toward 
the existence of an ideal democratic citizen, who is supposed “to be enthusiastically 
politically active […], yet not to be surrounded by like-minded others” (Mutz, 2006, p. 125), 
however only when those discussants are friends. 
This work, however, presents a number of shortcomings. The first is the cross–sectional 
nature of the data presented. Arguing that people can be pushed to vote (or not) by the relative 
prevalence of discussants in their network means assuming some form of influence process. 
However, cross–sectional data are poorly suited to identifying a causal mechanism. In an 
ideal setting, and according to the most recent research (Klofstad, 2007; Fowler et al., 2011; 
Bello and Rolfe, 2014), the only way in which we can identify influence is by observing the 
effect of the change over time of network disagreement on the over-time ego’s propensity to 
turn out. Unfortunately, panel data allowing the detection of such an effect are rarely 
available.
77
 Further studies, and more refined data would be able to tell us more about the 
causal aspects of the argument. 
The second shortcoming is related to the nature of our main independent variable, 
                                                          
77
 Although, as previously argued, the data employed represent the first wave of a six-wave panel, questions on 
disagreement and propensity to turn out are asked only in the first wave, that is, the RCS survey.  
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especially for what concerns Models 3 and 4. As stressed in the Methods section, the measure 
of whole network agreement is calculated by averaging the friends and family network 
agreement variables, following a strategy already employed on the same data by Guidetti, 
Cavazza, and Graziani (2016). This makes our measure a (probably biased) simplification of 
the ‘true’ perceived level of agreement in the whole network since we are not able to take into 
account the varying importance that individuals could attribute to family and friends. While 
acknowledging the issues related to the measure, we decided to keep Models 3 and 4, because 
they provide a suggestive and useful picture of what happens when the whole network is 
considered. In addition, the results of the first two models are pretty consistent with previous 
literature (which could be considered as a sort of external validity check). Another issue 
related to our independent variable concerns the definition of cohesive and non-cohesive 
circles. As stressed above, we made the assumption based on previous literature that familial 
circles are more cohesive than friends’ one, since data here employed cannot extract this piece 
of information. Future data collection strategies will need a more thorough account of the 
strength of the relationships between the respondents and their discussants (for instance, by 
measuring directly levels of emotional intimacy, time spent together, and reciprocity of 
services, see Granovetter, 1973). 
Finally, as highlighted in the previous chapters, the measurement of individual turnout 
in survey research is affected by a number of issues. Since self-reported turnout is highly 
overestimated and available only for a portion of the sample, this chapter employs as 
dependent variable a continuous measure of the propensity to turn out. This reveals one’s 
intention to go to the polls before the election, but not the actual participation. Further 
research in contexts where validated data on individual turnout are available is needed to 
corroborate the empirical findings of the present work. 
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Appendix A4 
 
Table A4.1: Logistic regression models with self-reported turnout as dependent variable. 
Estimates of coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
  Turnout 
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
Network        
        
Network Agreement    0.35 2.26**   
    (0.28) (1.13)   
Network Agreement squared     -1.74*   
     (1.00)   
Family Agreement      0.39 0.44 
      (0.30) (1.17) 
Friends Agreement        1.04 
       (1.19) 
Family Agreement squared      -0.05 -0.06 
      (0.31) (1.03) 
Friends Agreement squared       -1.02 
       (1.09) 
Politics        
        
Political discussion   0.14*** 0.13** 0.12** 0.13** 0.12** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Interest in politics   0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
   (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
All the parties responsible for the crisis   -0.04* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Socio-demographics        
        
Gender (Male) Female -0.15 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Education (Primary) Secondary 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
 Tertiary 1.04*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Geo-political area (North-West) North-East -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
 Red Area 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
 Centre-South -0.26 -0.28* -0.28* -0.27 -0.28* -0.27* 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age  0.07*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age squared   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Day of Interview  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Constant  -0.45 -1.21* -1.38** -1.81** -1.41** -1.61** 
  (0.63) (0.68) (0.69) (0.73) (0.69) (0.73) 
        
N  2,589 2,589 2,589 2,589 2,589 2,589 
Pseudo R-squared  0,04 0,07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4.2: OLS regression models with propensity to turn out as dependent variable 
Interactions between quadratic terms of family (and friends) agreement and interest in politics 
(Model 6A) and frequency of political discussion (Model 6B). Estimates of coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses). 
  Propensity to turn out 
Indep. Variables  Model 6A Model 6B 
Family Agreement  -0.44 0.06 
  (1.54) (1.33) 
Friends Agreement   6.74*** 5.01*** 
  (1.55) (1.32) 
Family Agreement squared  1.17 0.94 
  (1.35) (1.18) 
Friends Agreement squared  -6.65*** -4.62*** 
  (1.40) (1.22) 
Political discussion  0.16*** 0.38*** 
  (0.02) (0.08) 
Interest in politics  1.04*** 0.73*** 
  (0.18) (0.05) 
Family Agreement* Interest in politics  0.48  
  (0.71)  
Family Agreement squared* Interest in politics  -0.52  
  (0.62)  
Friends Agreement* Interest in politics  -2.06***  
  (0.73)  
Friends Agreement squared* Interest in politics  2.03***  
  (0.65)  
Family Agreement* Political discussion   0.09 
   (0.35) 
Family Agreement squared* Political discussion   -0.20 
   (0.30) 
Friends Agreement* Political discussion   -0.78** 
   (0.36) 
Friends Agreement squared* Political discussion   0.66** 
   (0.32) 
All parties responsible for the crisis  -0.08*** -0.08*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender (Male) Female 1.04*** 0.73*** 
  (0.18) (0.05) 
Education (Primary) Secondary -0.08*** -0.08*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 Tertiary 0.12** 0.13** 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Geopolitical Area  North-East 0.30*** 0.31*** 
(North-West)  (0.09) (0.09) 
 Red Area 0.51*** 0.52*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
 Centre-South -0.04 -0.05 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
Age  0.07 0.07 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
Age squared   -0.21*** -0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Day of Interview  0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Constant  4.18*** 4.15*** 
  (0.46) (0.41) 
N  7,643 7,643 
R-squared  0.11 0.11 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A4.1: Conditional means for propensities to turn out, by family and friends 
agreement. 
 
 
Figure A4.2: Predicted probability to turn out by whole network political agreement, estimated 
by Model 4 in Table A4.1 (95% confidence intervals). 
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Figure A4.3: Predicted probabilities to turn out by family (left panel) and friends network (right 
panel) political agreement, estimated by Model 6 in Table A4.1 (95% confidence intervals). 
 
 
Figure A4.4: Predicted means of propensity to turn out by family (left panel) and friends 
network (right panel) political agreement, and frequency of political discussion (95% confidence 
intervals), estimated by Model 6A (see Table A4.2 in Appendix A4) 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has aimed at giving a contribution to the study of the relationship between 
the various forms of mobilization and interpersonal influence and electoral participation, 
with a focus on the Italian case, where little research on electoral participation has been 
recently conducted. The main findings of the thesis could speak both to the academic 
community and to the political campaigners. In particular, the second and the third chapter 
could give some suggestions to political candidates and parties when carrying out an electoral 
campaign. The first advice is that the personal contact with party members matters and it is 
still the most effective tool to convince citizens to participate in elections (see also Green and 
Gerber, 2008). The second advice is that impersonal contacts with parties do not seem 
effective in boosting turnout, both in traditional (e.g., leaflets, letters) and digital forms (email 
messages).  
This work has given further empirical evidence on the failure of email messaging as a 
form of online mobilization in increasing turnout. This needs to be particularly taken into 
account when carrying out electoral campaigns since although the employment of online tools 
has been becoming more and more employed their effects on turnout have proved to be rather 
weak. However, this work did not investigate the effectiveness of the most widespread form 
of online mobilization, namely mobilization via social media. Future research is needed to 
address this issue, and moreover to test whether digital appeals increases turnout under 
specific circumstances. 
Moreover, the thesis even proves that personal mobilization can reduce inequalities in 
participation in high salience elections. It indeed succeeded in persuading to vote more 
peripheral individuals, who have a low-propensity to turn out before the election. Therefore, 
personal contacting can give a beneficial contribution to the democratic health of a country, 
since political equality is considered as “the fundamental premise of a democracy” (Dahl, 
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2006, ix). This finding, which contrasts with evidence coming from the US (Enos, Fowler, 
and Vavreck, 2014), directly encourages both policy makers to involve marginal voters in the 
democratic process and political parties to get in contact with them.  
Nonetheless, the implications of these findings are not straightforward. The number of 
citizens who can be personally contacted is limited, as well as the financial budgets of the 
electoral campaigns. As Chapter 2 empirically shows, in high-salience elections party 
contacting is effective in increasing turnout especially among low-propensity voters, therefore 
in that type of elections parties need to target their efforts to reach these categories of citizens. 
Since low-propensity voters are harder to be contacted, especially in recent times 
characterized by political disaffection and distrust, political organizations need to find proper 
strategies to get in touch with them. Furthermore, they need to improve their mediated 
techniques of contact to be more effective in enhancing participation. 
Besides giving empirical evidence on some relevant research questions, the thesis has 
tried to provide both a theoretical and a methodological contribution. Although all the 
empirical chapters are inserted within the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 4 provides a new theoretical perspective, then corroborated by the empirical 
evidence, regarding the relationship between disagreement in social networks and turnout. 
Previous research has little studied that relationship by providing a differentiated theoretical 
explanation of the effect of disagreement when experienced in cohesive and in non-cohesive 
groups. In Chapter 4, we argue that while mechanisms of social accountability are more 
relevant in cohesive groups, in non-cohesive social groups the most relevant mechanism deals 
with the activation of interest. Therefore, in cohesive social groups, the higher is the level of 
disagreement experienced, the lower is the likelihood to participate, while in non-cohesive 
groups the highest likelihood to participate is associated with the situation in which 
individuals experience a mix of agreement and disagreement, namely diversity. The thesis 
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thus comes to a crucial conclusion: the experience of disagreement in friends’ network is 
substantially different than the experience of disagreement in the family. When intimacy with 
discussants is high, disagreement is more difficult to bear socially and accordingly does not 
promote a fertile exchange of ideas. On the contrary, in non-cohesive social groups the 
exposure to some disagreement is desirable, since it helps stimulating political discussions 
aimed at activating individual political predispositions. Although the findings refer to 
disagreement in family and friends' networks, their implication could move beyond those 
groups to understand the meaning of experiencing disagreement in further social networks 
and its consequences. In particular, as social media have become a crucial setting for political 
communication, we could offer insights about the consequences of disagreement in such 
venues. Previous research even found that individuals are more likely to be exposed to 
disagreement in social media than in face-to-face interactions (Barnidge, 2017). Therefore, 
since in social media relationships with discussants are usually supposed to be non-intimate, 
we could argue that being exposed to some disagreement in social networks has positive 
consequences. According to our theoretical framework, we could thus expect that in such 
non-cohesive groups the experience of some disagreement finally leads to higher political 
participation. However, online interactions could not activate individual predispositions as 
face to face ones. Future research strategies would be welcomed to test such expectations, and 
accordingly to add value to the contribution of this thesis. 
From the methodological point of view, the thesis employs different methods, data 
sources, and data analysis techniques to investigate the relationship between the various facets 
of mobilization and interpersonal influence and turnout. Both secondary survey data and 
experimental data have been used to study whether direct mobilization boosts turnout, and in 
particular to test which forms of campaign contacting are more successful. In Chapter 2 and 3, 
the employment of respectively panel data and experimental data allows overcoming the issue 
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of causality in the relation between party contacting and turnout. Furthermore, in the second 
chapter, the integration of an exploratory analysis of the dynamics of the campaign and a pre-
post analysis of the effect of the forms of party contacting has been helpful for a better 
understanding of campaign effects. As well, the employment of experimental data employed 
in Chapter 3 allows at answering specific research questions which could not be addressed 
with secondary survey data, and to analyse the effect of online mobilization which could not 
be tested by those secondary data. Moreover, the integration of national survey data and case-
study experimental data helps in providing a mix of external and internal validity to the 
findings. Further research is thus welcomed to adopt such a multifaceted approach, which 
could be useful for giving a more comprehensive knowledge of the relationships between 
sociological concepts. 
Notwithstanding, the thesis shows some limitations. 
First, although the focus of the thesis deals with the Italian case, the second chapter 
analyses the effect of party contacting on turnout on the Austrian data. This because no 
appropriate data are available in the Italian context. The choice of Austria deals with several 
analogies with the Italian case and the data availability, that can make the two countries 
comparable, as it has been argued in Chapter 2. Therefore, the overview of the campaign and 
interpersonal effects on electoral participation offered by the thesis is not exhaustive; thus 
future research and first of all more suitable data are needed to better assess those effects. 
Second, the thesis does not adopt a comparative approach, except for the second chapter 
where campaign dynamics effects on latent participation in Italy and Austria have been 
compared. The non-comparative nature of the thesis is explained by two main reasons. The 
primary aim of the thesis is to shed light on the effects of mobilization and interpersonal 
influence on electoral participation in Italy, which were very little investigated in previous 
research. Moreover, the research questions that have been addressed needed some specific 
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measures that are not available in comparative electoral surveys. In general, the thesis has 
preferred to properly empirically answer some specific research questions. The absence of 
comparative data needs, however, to take with caution the generalization of the findings of the 
thesis to other contexts.  
Third, direct mobilization and interpersonal mobilization have been presented as 
interrelated in the theoretical framework, but data available do not allow testing whether the 
latter is wholly derivative from the former, as argued in Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) 
theory. New evidence is needed to provide empirical leverage to this theoretical statement, 
which has been under-investigated in the literature. In addition, the effect of interpersonal 
mobilization was not tested in any empirical chapter of this thesis. Future research could 
overcome this issue, by following the approach adopted by a few experimental works 
(Nickerson 2008; Sinclair, McConnell, and Green, 2017), and moreover by analysing the 
interplay between direct mobilization, interpersonal mobilization, and disagreement in 
influencing turnout (Foos and de Rooij, 2017).     
The thesis, however, has provided empirical evidence on theoretically-driven research 
questions that are thought to be relevant in the real world. All the research questions deal with 
the role of extra-individual factors that can enhance (or discourage) electoral participation. 
More in general, the study of political behavior always needs to take into account of the role 
of the context and the social circles in which individuals are embedded. This work has shown 
that both electoral campaigns and interpersonal networks can be crucial in determining 
individual electoral participation, even in contexts that have been experiencing a decline in 
turnout. 
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